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Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical essays studying the capital market implications
of the accounting for R&D costs. The first empirical study (Chapter 2) re-visits the
debate over the positive R&D-returns relation. The second empirical study (Chap-
ter 3) examines the risk relevance of current R&D accounting. The third empirical
study (Chapter 4) explores the joint impact of R&D intensity and competition on the
relative relevance of the idiosyncratic part of earnings.
Prior research argues that the positive relation between current R&D activity and
future returns is evidence of mispricing, a compensation for risk inherent in R&D or
a transformation of the value/growth anomaly. The first empirical study contributes
to this debate by taking into account the link between R&D activity, equity duration
and systematic risk. This link motivates us to employ Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004a)’s intertemporal asset pricing model (ICAPM) which accommodates stochastic
discount rates and investors’ intertemporal preferences. The results support a risk
based explanation; R&D intensive firms are exposed to higher discount rate risk.
Hedge portfolio strategies show that the mispricing explanations is not economically
significant.
The second empirical study contributes to prior research on the value relevance of
financial reporting information on R&D, by proposing an alternative approach which
relies on a return variance decomposition model. We find that R&D intensity has a
significant influence on market participants’ revisions of expectations regarding future
discount rates (or, discount rate news) and future cash flows (or, cash flow news),
thereby driving returns variance. We extend this investigation to assess the risk rel-
evance of this information by means of its influence on the sensitivity of cash flow
and discount rate news to the market news. Our findings suggest R&D intensity is
associated with significant variation in the sensitivity of cash flow news to the mar-
ket news which implies that financial reporting information on R&D is risk relevant.
Interestingly, we do not establish a similar pattern with respect to the sensitivity of
discount news to the market news which may dismiss the impact of sentiment in stock
returns of R&D intensive firms.
The third empirical study examines the effect of financial reporting information on
R&D to the value relevance of common and idiosyncratic earnings. More specifically,
iii
we investigate the value relevance of common and idiosyncratic earnings through an
extension of the Vuolteenaho (2002)’s model which decomposes return variance into
its discount rate, idiosyncratic and common cash flow news. We demonstrate that the
relative importance of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news in explaining return
variance increases with firm-level R&D intensity. Extending this analysis, we find that
this relation varies with the level of R&D investment concentration in the industry.
Those results indicate that the market perceives that more pronounced R&D activity
leads to outcomes that enable the firm to differentiate itself from its rivals. However,
our results also suggest that the market perceives that this relation depends upon the
underlying economics of the industry where the firm operates.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Investment in research and development (R&D) is the primary measure of innovation
and technological change and, in turn, a key driver of long-term economic growth (e.g.,
Bushee 1998; Nakamura 2001; Lerner and Wulf 2007; Corrado et al. 2009). Battelle (2013)
estimates an impressive amount of $1.4 trillion is invested in R&D globally (2014 forecast).
The biggest contributor is the United States (US), which accounts for 31% of the global
R&D spending. Specifically, in the US, $465 billion are invested in R&D (source: Battelle
2013). Overall, the bulk of the US R&D spending stems from private-sector firms and
not from the federal government. In that respect, the US Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report (2014) suggests that, three quarters of the US R&D activity come from the
private sector. Part of these private sector firms finance their R&D spending through the
US capital market. Indeed, Cohen et al. (2013) argue that the US capital market has an
ever increasing role in allocating R&D investment. Chan et al. (2001), Li (2011) and Gu
(2016) acknowledge that most public equity firms are R&D active and their total market
capitalization constitutes a substantial amount of the US capital market.
The present thesis investigates the role of financial reporting information on R&D in
capital market participants’ assessments. The main concern is that R&D investment is
not recognised on the firm’s balance sheet and instead, it is expensed as incurred in the
income statement.1 Skinner (2008) points out to four R&D economic characteristics that
keep this investment “off the balance sheet”. First, the value of R&D is inseparable from
the value of other tangible assets, since the successful completion of R&D projects requires
the input of tangible assets into the process. Second, there are no secondary markets to
reliably estimate fair values for R&D outcomes. Third, there are control issues, since it
is often difficult to prevent rivals from the appropriation of the benefits arising from the
R&D investment. Fourth, due to the inseparability, the lack of reliable value estimates
as well as control issues, it is difficult to establish any contractual rights over the asset
1International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) requires the immediate expense of R&D, but it also
permits the capitalization of development costs, upon meeting strict technical feasibility and commercial
viability criteria [International Accounting Standards (IAS) No. 38 2004].
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associated with the R&D expenditure. The factors driving the decision to keep the R&D
asset “off the balance sheet” also point out to the uncertainty surrounding this asset’s
future benefits. The notion of uncertainty underpins the treatment of R&D costs in the
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) where the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 2 (1974) prescribes expensing and allows capitalisation
only in the case of software development costs (SFAS No. 86 1985).
The treatment of R&D capital in the US GAAP is a typical expression of uncon-
ditional conservatism in financial reporting. Unconditional conservatism prescribes a
predetermined understatement of the book value of net assets, while conditional con-
servatism involves the more timely recognition of bad news than good news in earnings
(Ryan 2006). In particular, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) note that unconditional conser-
vatism is an asymmetric response to uncertainty: from a range of possible values, select a
low value, not the expected value. Beaver and Ryan (2005) point out that unconditional
conservatism results to unrecorded goodwill and growth dependent biases in accounting
numbers. Those growth dependent biases are the tipping point for Penman and Zhang
(2002), who argue that the unrecorded goodwill, or assets, are “hidden” reserves that are
released into earnings when investment growth slows. Later on, Penman and Reggiani
(2013) give a different perspective on the earnings growth arising from the application
of unconditional conservatism. In particular, they recognize that conservative accounting
defers earnings recognition to the future under uncertainty, and it defers relatively more
earnings to the long-term future when outcomes are particularly risky.
Acknowledging that: (1) unconditional conservatism is a response to uncertainty (Ball
and Shivakumar 2005); and (2) the deferral of earnings to the future, required by uncondi-
tional conservatism, conveys that future earnings are at risk (Penman and Reggiani 2013);
may suggest that unconditional conservatism communicates information about risk. Pope
(2010) explicitly refers to the conservative accounting treatment of expensing R&D costs
as a crude form of risk adjustment being undertaken by accountants -they are reluctant
to recognize assets if the future cash flows resulting from an investment are sufficiently
improbable. To date, there is no much empirical support to the idea that the uncon-
ditional conservatism applied in the case of R&D investment conveys information about
risk. Instead, most of the research so far views this treatment as a source of mispricing
and value relevance deficiency.
The research presented by this thesis contributes to a long-standing stream of research
that investigates the capital market consequences of the recognition of the R&D investment
in the firm’s financial statements. The main debates in this stream of research evolve
around the mispricing and the value relevance deficiency attributed to the conservative
2
accounting treatment of R&D investment. The present thesis contributes to both debates.
Prior research establishes a positive association between R&D intensity and future
returns which is attributed to mispricing (Penman and Zhang 2002; Eberhart et al. 2004;
Lev et al. 2005; Ali et al. 2012), compensation for higher risk inherent in R&D (Chambers
et al. 2002; Li 2011) or a transformation of the value/growth anomaly (Donelson and
Resutek 2012). In particular, the mispricing explanation builds upon the idea that the
conservative treatment of R&D misleads investors to under-react to reported earnings
that are suppressed by expensing R&D costs. On the other hand, there is also research
which claims that the relation between R&D investment and future returns is driven by risk
(Chambers et al. 2002; Li 2011) or other asset pricing factors (Donelson and Resutek 2012)
implying no particular consequences of the conservative treatment of R&D. By contrast
to prior research, this thesis considers the conservative treatment of R&D as a source of
information about risk rather than a source of misleading information and mispricing.
According to Penman and Reggiani (2013), accounting conservatism deals with uncer-
tainty by deferring the recognition of earnings until uncertainty has been largely resolved.
Earnings deferral by expensing R&D expenditures reduces short-term earnings. It also
prompts an anticipation of earnings growth in the long-run when revenues arising from
the R&D project are earned and realized, or cost savings become effective. From this
perspective, the conservative treatment of R&D indicates that exposure to R&D activity
is associated with longer equity duration and higher systematic risk. Consistent with the
influence of equity duration, we hypothesise that the returns on firms exposed to R&D
are sensitive to changes in discount rates of the market portfolio. Chapter 2 tests this hy-
pothesis by employing Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a)’s Intertemporal Capital Asset
Pricing Model (ICAPM) which decomposes systematic risk into two parts: the cash flow
news beta and the discount rate news beta. The choice of the ICAPM is advantageous in
this setting, because it allows for stochastic expected returns and accommodates investors’
intertemporal preferences. Intertemporal preferences arise when investors with a long hori-
zon hedge against shocks to total wealth as well as unfavourable shifts in the investment
opportunity set (Merton 1973). Accommodating intertemporal preferences is important
to the context of this thesis, because the potential benefits from the R&D activity will
materialise over multiple periods in the future.
We document that discount rate betas are higher for R&D intensive firms than for firms
which do not invest on R&D. In addition, we do not find any relation between cash flow
news betas and R&D intensity. Taken together, those findings indicate that systematic
risk increases with R&D intensity. We explore the mispricing explanation of the R&D-
return relation using an ICAPM model as well as a set of mainstream benchmark models,
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namely the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the two-news factor model and the
three factor Fama and French (1993) model. The asset pricing metrics/tests yield mixed
results. Nevertheless, the mispricing explanation is not economically significant; based on
the ICAPM model, a hedging strategy that goes long on portfolios of R&D intensive firms
and short on portfolios of firms with no R&D costs yields insignificant abnormal returns.
Value relevance tests capture the extent to which accounting information is relevant
to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough to be reflected in share
prices (Barth et al. 2001). In empirical terms, value relevance is established by a significant
association between market prices or returns and the accounting variable of interest. Initial
evidence by Sougiannis (1994) suggests that a one-dollar increase in R&D expenditure
produces a five-dollar increase in market value, denoting that investors place a high value
on R&D investments. However, research conducted in firms in intangible intensive sectors
(e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Xu et al. 2007) reveals significant deficiencies in the value
relevance of accounting information, which investors address by reference to non-financial
information. Although Collins et al. (1997) and Francis and Schipper (1999) find that
R&D intensity is not associated with an overall decline in the value relevance of financial
statements, their results suggest that R&D intensity has adverse implications for the value
relevance of earnings. By contrast, Lev and Zarowin (1999) demonstrate deterioration in
the value relevance of accounting information, which they attribute to business changes
and mainly, changes in R&D investment. Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that, the extent
of the value relevance distortion attributed to the conservative R&D costs treatment is
severe, and they propose extended application of intangibles capitalisation in order to
address it. More recent research, which also employs value relevance tests (Ciftci et al.
2014), reaches to a similar conclusion.
When interpreting value relevance tests, it is important to consider that those are joint
tests of relevance and reliability (Barth et al. 2001). Therefore, it is difficult to determine
whether the deficiencies, identified in prior research, with respect to the value relevance
of financial reporting information on R&D can be attributed to issues in relevance or
reliability. Nevertheless, the nature of the benefits from the R&D activity suggests that
this is a reliability rather than a relevance issue. Wyatt (2008) notes that, although R&D
expenditures provide relevant information about value creation, R&D expenditures are not
a reliable indicator of future rents. Kothari et al. (2002) employ the variability of future
realised earnings to argue that R&D investments generate more uncertain future benefits
compared to capital expenditures (CAPEX). Those indications point to the possibility
that conventional value relevance tests, as join tests of relevance and reliability, may yield
inference that is biased by the uncertainty in benefits arising from R&D. A contribution
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of this thesis is to employ an alternative measure of value relevance which accommodates
information from the variability of earnings and returns.
The value relevance tests employed in the present thesis measure the extent to which
revisions of expectations about future earnings (cash flow news) and/or revisions of expec-
tations about future discount rates (discount rate news) affect the revisions of expectations
about future returns or, return news (Callen et al. 2006). To operationalise this alternative
concept of value relevance in Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis follows Callen and Segal (2004),
and subsequent research2, employing Vuolteenaho (2002)’s return variance decomposition
into cash flow and discount rate news variance. The main variable of interest is the cash
flow news variance which captures how unexpected returns variance reflects the variance in
revisions of expectations about future earnings. In the context of the thesis, this variable
also captures the uncertainty (i.e., variance) about the firm’s expected earnings. This fea-
ture is pertinent, as uncertainty of future benefits related to the R&D activity is the main
driver of its current accounting treatment. From this perspective, information on R&D is
relevant insofar it conveys to market participants the consequences of R&D activity for
future earnings uncertainty.
Chapter 3’s empirical analysis suggests that, R&D intensity has a significant influence
on cash flow and discount rate news variance, thereby driving unexpected returns news
variance. This finding provides empirical evidence to the argument in Kothari et al.
(2002) that, stock return variability reflects the market’s assessment of a firm’s cash flow
uncertainty. We extent this analysis by also showing that the association between R&D
intensity and cash flow news variance is driven by risk. In the spirit of Beaver et al.
(1970)’s “accounting betas”, we assess the sensitivity of cash flow news to the aggregate
market news using the Campbell et al. (2010) methodology. The findings reveal significant
associations between R&D intensity and the sensitivity of cash flow news to the market’s
cash flow and discount rate news. On the other hand, we do not establish a similar
relation with respect to discount rate news which, according to Campbell et al. (2010), is
an indication of the effect of sentiment in market participants’ assessments. Those results
provide empirical evidence as well as a more comprehensive explanation to the intuition in
Chambers et al. (2002)’s informing an association between R&D intensity and systematic
risk.
Chapter 4 examines the effect of R&D intensity on the importance of idiosyncratic
earnings relative to industry-common (henceforth, common) earnings in driving US stock
returns. Common earnings capture the idea that R&D-related innovation spillovers to
2Subsequent accounting studies, such as Callen et al. (2005, 2006), Clatworthy et al. (2012), Shan et al.
(2014) and Hou, Zhang and Zhuang (2015), also employ Vuolteenaho (2002)’s methodology.
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competitors (e.g., Arrow 1962; Mansfield 1985; Jaffe 1986; Mansfield 1986; Cohen and
Levinthal 1989). On the other hand, idiosyncratic components capture the idea that R&D
activity allows the company to differentiate itself from its rivals (e.g., Hall 1993b; Villalonga
2004; Brown and Kimbrough 2011). However, it has yet to become clear which influence
is prevalent in market participants’ assessment of firms that invest on R&D projects. The
present thesis investigates the value relevance of those two earnings components. To this
end, Chapter 4 decomposes Vuolteenaho (2002)’s cash flow news into a common and an
idiosyncratic cash flow news component. We find that both idiosyncratic and common
cash flow news variance increase as a function of R&D intensity. Additionally, we find
that R&D intensity accelerates the rate at which idiosyncratic cash flow news variance
prevails over the common cash flow news variance. Hence, the dominance of idiosyncratic
cash flow news, as the main return variance driver, increases with R&D intensity.
Given that the balance between common and idiosyncratic earnings depends on the
industry structure where the company operates, we further inform results by introducing
a variable which captures the R&D investment concentration in any given year and in-
dustry. We show that the association between R&D intensity and the relative importance
of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news depends upon our concentration measure.
More specifically, we find that an increase in concentration weakens the importance of
idiosyncratic cash flow news over common cash flow news variance contribution to return
variance. Conversely, this could be interpreted as the enhancement of the importance of
common cash flow news over idiosyncratic cash flow news variance as R&D investment
concentration increases. Overall, results in this study suggest that financial reporting
information on R&D allows not only an assessment of the source of uncertainty in fu-
ture benefits (relating to common and idiosyncratic earnings), but it also allows those
assessments to be informed by the economics of the industry where the firm operates.
This thesis focuses on the effect of financial reporting on R&D capital in investors’
expectations. However, there are other types of intangible capital: advertising, brands,
trademarks, customer loyalty, patents and human capital which, similarly to R&D, re-
main “off balance sheet” (see Lev 2001 for details). Such investments in intangibles are
typically aggregated with operating expenses in the Selling, General and Administrative
(SG&A) expenses (Lev and Radhakrishnan 2005). Recent research attempts to identify
intangible investment within SG&A (Enache and Srivastava 2016) but finds that their
proxy exhibits a weaker relation with future earnings and risk than R&D expenses. This
is not surprising given that previous research has already identified that other-than-R&D
expensed intangible assets are short-lived investments with small economic contributions.
For example, Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) and Hall (1993a) document that, the advertising
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effect on subsequent periods’ earnings is only one to two years. Furthermore, intangible
investment in organisational capital is elusive; it can be listed with employee mobility.
On the other hand, investment in R&D has a prominent role for firm prospects, risk and
valuation (Bushee 1998) as well as wider economic implications (Lerner and Wulf 2007).
The importance of R&D for the firm’s prospects has stirred a debate with respect to
its accounting treatment (e.g., Lev 2008; Skinner 2008). The results in the present thesis
aim to inform this debate and, specifically, the capital market effects of its conservative
treatment. The US GAAP presents an opportunity for studying this treatment, because
it provides the longest uninterrupted time-series of financial data on R&D costs. R&D is
reported under the same accounting standard since 1974, and such circumstances enable
the implementation of asset pricing tests demanding long time series. Note that this task
becomes challenging in another context, e.g., European countries where the capitalisation
of the development costs has been permitted before 2005 and imposed after the IFRS
adoption and, specifically, under IAS No. 38 (2004).3 Nevertheless, expensing basic
research costs is still a pervasive practice outside the US. The results of the present thesis
may apply to the part of R&D expenses that are still expensed, and it may indirectly
shed light on why the capitalisation of R&D costs is unlikely to result to more relevant
information (e.g., Shah et al. 2013).
The remainder of the thesis proceeds with the three empirical studies in Chapters 2, 3
and 4. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and discusses limitations.
3Overall, international evidence are inconclusive with respect to the usefulness of capitalising development
costs. Some researchers suggest that the compulsory capitalization of development costs provided relevant
information under the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) No. 13 (1989), when capital-
isation was optional (Oswald and Zarowin 2007); others argue that the option to capitalise encouraged
earnings management (Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean 2006; Cazavan-Jeny et al. 2011). Interestingly, the
market seems to be able to identify cases of earning management through development costs capitalization
(Dinh et al. 2015).
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Chapter 2
Are R&D Intensive Firms
Mispriced? Evidence from an
Intertemporal Capital Asset
Pricing Model
2.1 Introduction
Prior research attributes the positive association between current R&D activity and
future returns (R&D-returns relation) to mispricing (Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al.
2005; Ali et al. 2012), compensation for higher risk inherent in R&D (Chambers et al.
2002; Li 2011) or a transformation of the value/growth anomaly (Donelson and Resutek
2012). This chapter revisits this long-standing debate in the accounting literature.
Drawing upon Cornell (1999) and Dechow et al. (2004), we argue that the exposure
to R&D activity is associated with longer equity duration and higher systematic risk. In
particular, stock returns of firms active in R&D are more sensitive to changes in discount
rates of the market portfolio. We consider the relation between R&D activity and future
returns through Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a)’s intertemporal capital asset pricing
model (ICAPM) which decomposes systematic risk into two parts: the cash flow news
beta and the discount rate news beta. The choice of the ICAPM is also advantageous in
our setting, because it allows for stochastic expected returns and accommodates investors’
intertemporal preferences. Intertemporal preferences arise when investors with a long
horizon hedge against shocks to total wealth as well as unfavorable shifts in the investment
opportunity set (Merton 1973). Considering intertemporal preferences is important here,
because the potential benefits from the R&D activity will materialize in multiple periods
in the future.
Cornell (1999) argues that high technology firms exhibit long equity duration since
cash flows arising from high technology projects likely take a long time to realize. The
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long equity duration of R&D intensive firms is also implied in the conservative practice of
expensing R&D costs as they occur. Historical cost accounting deals with uncertainty by
deferring the recognition of earnings until uncertainty has largely been resolved (Penman
and Reggiani 2013). Earnings deferral by expensing R&D expenditures reduces short-term
earnings. It also prompts an anticipation of earnings growth in the long run when revenues
arising from the R&D project are earned and realized or cost savings become effective.
In this sense, the conservative treatment of expensing R&D costs reflects the long equity
duration for R&D intensive firms.
Drawing upon the relation between R&D activity and equity duration, we predict that
R&D intensive firms have higher discount rate betas than firms that do not engage in R&D.
In specific, as Cornell (1999), we believe that R&D intensive firms have a longer duration
of cash flows which leads to a higher sensitivity to discount rate news in the market
portfolio. Note that we do not have any ex-ante expectations regarding the association
between R&D intensity and cash flow betas. Therefore, we mainly attribute the relation
between R&D activity and future returns to a risk compensation that investors require
for their exposure to the market’s portfolio discount rate news.
We confirm that Dechow et al. (2004)’s measure for equity duration increases with
R&D intensity, mostly among small size stocks. Consistent with our predictions, we also
document that discount rate betas are higher for R&D intensive firms than for firms which
do not engage with R&D. We do not find any relation between cash flow news betas and
R&D intensity. Taken together, our findings suggest that systematic risk increases with
R&D intensity and are consistent with Cornell (1999) and Dechow et al. (2004). This is
in-line with a risk based explanation of the relation between current R&D activity and
future returns, and that this relation is not merely subsumed by the value/growth anomaly
(e.g., Donelson and Resutek 2012). In our support, discount rate betas increase along the
R&D intensity dimension after controlling for the book-to-market (BE/ME) effect.
We explore the mispricing explanation of the R&D-return relation using a battery of
asset pricing metrics and tests. We compare the results for our base ICAPM model to those
obtained for a set of popular benchmarks, namely the CAPM, the two-news factor model
and the three factor Fama and French (1993) model. Note that the two-news factor model
is a generalization of Campbell (1993)’s discrete time ICAPM which does not restrict the
price of risk of cash flow and discount rate shocks. The asset pricing metrics/tests yield
mixed results. Nevertheless, the mispricing explanation is economically insignificant in
the sense that a hedging strategy that goes long on portfolios of R&D intensive firms
and short on portfolios on firms with no exposure to R&D yields statistical insignificant
abnormal returns based on the ICAPM model.
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Our chapter contributes to a long-standing debate in the accounting literature which
examines whether the association between R&D activity and future returns is due to mis-
pricing, a compensation for risk inherent to R&D or a transformation of the value/growth
anomaly. The findings support a risk explanation as R&D intensity contributes to shifts
in systematic risk, in the form of increased sensitivity to stochastic discount rates in the
market portfolio. A risk explanation is already implied by the empirical work presented in
Chambers et al. (2002). However, our study takes the risk explanation further by providing
an economic explanation for the risk inherent in R&D and presenting the corresponding
evidence from asset pricing tests. In this respect, we complement the asset pricing results
in Lev and Sougiannis (1999) and Al-Horani et al. (2003) who argue that the relation be-
tween R&D activity and future returns is explained by a separate R&D related risk factor.
In this study, we consider that the risk inherent in R&D is not necessarily an extra factor
but instead, it is part of the systematic risk arising from exposure to stochastic discount
rates.
Our results also contribute to the nascent literature which seeks to use information
from financial statement numbers and the accounting principles on which they depend to
identify relevant dimensions of risk (Pope 2010). Along these lines, Penman and Reggiani
(2013) argue that the allocation of earnings that conservative accounting imposes is a
reflection of how accounting provides relevant information about risk. Our results directly
build on this line of research. In our context, the conservatism principle that underpins
the accounting treatment of R&D, reveals useful information about the equity duration
and the systematic risk of firms with R&D exposure. We acknowledge prior research’s
view that the conservative treatment of R&D costs misleads investors who “fixate” on
the lower profitability of R&D intensive firms (Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al. 2005;
Ali et al. 2012). However, given the results of our hedging strategy, we argue that the
fixation’s effect may not be as prevalent as previously thought.
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses related lit-
erature; Section 2.3 describes the data that we employ; Section 2.4 introduces the ICAPM,
the estimation of CF and DR betas, and the methodology of the asset pricing tests; Sec-
tion 2.5 discusses the results; Section 2.6 discusses our robustness checks and finally;
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Positive R&D-returns Relation: Prior Explanations
Extant accounting and finance research documents a positive relation between current
R&D expenditures and future returns (positive R&D-returns relation). This relation has
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been predominantly attributed to mispricing. However, there are also risk as well as
alternative explanations.
The mispricing explanation suggests that, the positive R&D-returns relation is evi-
dence of accounting information misleading investors and of the corresponding market
frictions. Specifically, investors are “fixated” with reported earnings that are biased down-
wards by the immediate expensing of R&D. They, thus, fail to appreciate the positive R&D
signal for the firm’s prospects, and they underestimate future R&D-related benefits. The
positive R&D-returns relation arises when investors revise expectations in subsequent pe-
riods and in light of the unanticipated R&D-related benefits (see Lev and Sougiannis 1996;
Chan et al. 2001; Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al. 2005; Ciftci et al. 2011).4 Building
on this process, current R&D accounting has been associated with frictions in the way
market allocates funds in R&D intensive firms. Empirical analyses suggest that mispric-
ing symptoms, such as profitable insider trading opportunities (Aboody and Lev 2000)
and adverse (low) market liquidity (Boone and Raman 2001), manifest themselves in the
positive R&D-returns relation, even after controlling for major risk factors.
The risk-based explanation argues the positive R&D-returns relation reflects the risk-
bearing characteristics of R&D activity. In particular, R&D intensive firms exhibit: (1)
higher long-term buy-and-hold returns; (2) higher year-to-year return variation; (3) larger
variation in analysts’ future earnings forecasts; and (4) larger variation in reported future
earnings than low R&D firms (Chambers et al. 2002). Relatedly, Kothari et al. (2002)
document that, R&D expenditures generate more variable future earnings than capital
expenditures (CAPEX).5 Li (2011) takes into account that financially constrained R&D
intensive firms are more likely to suspend or discontinue R&D projects. She attributes
the positive R&D-return relation to financial constraints.6 Consistent with the R&D risk
characteristics driving the BE/ME risk characteristics, Lev and Sougiannis (1999) doc-
ument that as risk from basic research to development stages is resolved, so does risk
from high BE/ME (low growth) to low BE/ME (high growth) stages. Finally, disentan-
gling the R&D–BE/ME interplay, Al-Horani et al. (2003) suggest that R&D is a separate
risk-factor, at least in the United Kingdom (UK).7
Drawing from Lev and Sougiannis (1999), a recent study proposes an alternative ex-
4In related context, Eberhart et al. (2004) and Ali et al. (2012) find that positive changes in R&D invest-
ment are also associated with higher future returns. They argue that investors underreact to the positive
news of R&D increases, and the correction in this underreaction takes long time.
5In a similar vein, Amir et al. (2007) find in industries with high R&D intensity to CAPEX ratio, R&D
contributes to the variance of subsequent earnings more than CAPEX.
6Although not directly comparable, Li (2011)’s results are is in stark difference with studies suggesting
R&D intensive firms are not distressed but, instead, misclassified by accounting-based distress measures
(see Darrough and Ye 2007; Franzen et al. 2007; Franzen and Radhakrishnan 2009; Beaver et al. 2012).
7Related work suggests R&D activity also increases bondholders’s risk, since it is associated with high
bond default probabilities and bond risk premia (Shi 2003).
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planation by attributing the positive R&D-returns relation neither to mispricing nor to
risk. Donelson and Resutek (2012) propose the unexpected earnings in R&D intensive
firms are unrelated to the R&D investment, and thus R&D intensity is inconsequential for
either mispricing or risk. Instead, Donelson and Resutek (2012)’s analysis suggests that
R&D intensive firms have characteristics that are more consistent with the BE/ME effect
on stock returns (or, the value/growth “anomaly”). They conclude that the R&D effect
is subsumed by the BE/ME effect.
Whilst the debate on the positive R&D-returns relation has been going on whether this
can be attributed to risk or not, we note the lack of proper asset pricing testing in most
of the studies cited above. As long as we wish to ascertain whether the relation under
investigation is due to risk or not, we need to develop tests with an appropriate model for
expected returns. The lack of a widely accepted “correct” asset pricing model complicates
this task. We draw upon Skinner (2008)’s concerns that the application of inappropriate
asset pricing models may lead the (potentially, erroneous) evidence of R&D mispricing;
whilst the market discounts those firms’ expected cash flows correctly, given that R&D
projects are inherently riskier.8 To address this concern, we focus on the economics of the
cash flows expected to arise from R&D projects to identify a suitable asset pricing model.
Work in the intersection of economics, finance and accounting suggests that R&D ac-
tivity is associated with long equity duration and risk, both conveyed by current R&D
accounting. Cornell (1999) argues that R&D investments have long equity duration, since
they generate future cash flows -if any- that take long time to materialize. True, it takes
time from basic research to a final distributable product, while there are always cases of
no market demand, or competitors launching related/copycat products quicker (Cornell
1999). Moreover, the future cash flows from R&D projects depend on many managerial
decisions up until the final distributable product (Berk et al. 2004). According to Berk
et al. (2004), the managerial decisions to proceed with further research or mothball an
R&D project are conditioned on macroeconomic conditions and systematic risk. Indeed,
long equity duration has direct systematic risk implications. The valuation of assets with
cash flows weighted more in the future, are sensitive to systematic changes in expected
returns–discount rates (Cornell 1999; Dechow et al. 2004). Furthermore, the discount
rates should be higher the longer the duration of the project. Importantly, current R&D
accounting communicates this interplay. Penman and Reggiani (2013) suggest that con-
servative R&D accounting defers the recognition of earnings into the future when a final
8Fama (1970) is the first to notice that, asset pricing tests are joint tests of market efficiency and of the
appropriateness of the selected model for expected returns. In related work, Richardson et al. (2010)
suggest many return “anomalies” involving accounting information are the artefacts of irrelevant and
weak models for expected returns and, in turn, inadequate risk controls.
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distributable product will be available, and risk about the time-consuming R&D outcome
will be resolved.
Taken together, the latter stream of research suggests accounting and finance studies
need to model the risk related to the equity duration characteristics of R&D activity
and the corresponding accounting principle of conservatism. In doing so, studies would
be able to determine wether accounting information communicates risks or, instead, is
misleading. We can make such an inference because our choice of model for expected
returns, namely the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a) ICAPM, directly controls for the
risk-duration link. Theoretically, the model’s discount rate betas are defined to reflect
the pricing and arbitrage of an asset’s growth options and equity duration characteristics
(Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004a). In support, Dechow et al. (2004) explicitly argue that
long equity duration probably coincides with higher Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a)
discount rate betas. We put this hypothesis into test. Ultimately, if the model cannot
explain the positive R&D-returns relation, then accounting information does not efficiently
communicate the long duration pertained to R&D activity.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Test Portfolios
We form the test portfolios by independently sorting on three variables: (a) size, (b)
book-to-market ratio (BE/ME) and (c) R&D intensity. We construct the R&D intensity
measure for firm i at time t as follows: R&D intensityi,t =
R&DCi,t
MEi,t
, where R&DCi,t
denotes R&D capital (i.e., the capitalized and amortized current and past R&D expen-
ditures) and MEi,t is the market value of equity of the firm i in December of calendar
year t − 1.9 Notice that R&DCi,t corresponds to the value that would have been on the
balance sheet in calendar year t, in the case where this accounting treatment had been
allowed. We follow Lev and Sougiannis (1996) to estimate R&DCi,t (see Appendix A).
We obtain accounting data from COMPUSTAT and stock market data from CRSP.
Our sample spans the period from January 1975 to December 2013. We define the starting
point of the sample based on the date that SFAS No. 2, the standard which prescribes
the expensing of R&D costs became effective (see SFAS No. 2 1974). Following existing
9Scaling R&D capital with market value of equity raises suspicions for a spurious relation in the association
of R&D activity with returns (e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002). We have two at least reasons
to advice against caution. The focus of our study is the intuition for the R&D-returns relation provided
by the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a) ICAPM. To this end, following Chan et al. (2001), we put
the pricing model of our preference into the most difficult test, namely, with an R&D intensity measure
that has been associated with the strongest traces of abnormal performance. Moreover, we avoid data-
snooping biases in the asset pricing tests, for the ICAPM risk factors are not derived from or in the same
fashion with the portfolios they explain (for an extended discussion of data-snooping biases see Lo and
MacKinlay 1990 and White 2000).
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studies, we apply several filters prior to constructing the test portfolios. First, we consider
stocks with positive and non-missing t − 1 sales and book value of equity figures. We
estimate book value of equity according to Daniel and Titman (2006) (see Appendix B).
Second, we consider stocks with non-negative R&D;10 we assign the value zero to R&D
expenses in the case of firms which do not report any such expenses. Third, we require
stocks to appear in COMPUSTAT records for at least two years. This mitigates the bias
in the way COMPUSTAT adds firms to its files (see Kothari et al. 1995). Finally, to filter
out data errors and potential mismatches, we disregard firms with December market value
of equity less than $10 million (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002). After applying the filters, we have
a sample that consists of 105,890 NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firm-year observations for
the period from 1975 to 2012.
We construct our test portfolios at the end of June of calendar year t using accounting
data that refer to the preceding fiscal year (i.e., t− 1); we use a (minimum) six-month lag
to ensure that accounting information is observable to all market participants (e.g., Fama
and French 1993).11 First, we sort the stocks on size. We use the median NYSE market
value of equity at the end of June at year t as the size breakpoint. This yields two size
portfolios, namely the Small and the Big size portfolios. Second, we sort the stocks on
BE/ME. The BE/ME at time t is the book value of equity for the last fiscal year end,
divided by the ME for December of t − 1 calendar year. We use 30th and 70th NYSE
percentiles as BE/ME cut-off points. This results in three BE/ME portfolios, i.e., the
growth (G), the medium (M) and the value (V) BE/ME portfolios. Finally, we sort the
stocks on R&D intensity. The first portfolio includes all firm-year observations with no
records on R&D expenses. Firms with R&D expenses are sorted in two portfolios using
the median NYSE R&D intensity as a cut-off point.12 This yields three R&D intensity
portfolios (i.e., No-R&D, Low-R&D and High-R&D) and the R&D intensive firms are
represented by the High-R&D portfolios. Henceforth, we use the terms “High-R&D” and
10As explained by COMPUSTAT, the cases of negative R&D expenditures are very rare. Indeed, in this
chapter’s sample there are only nine firm-years with negative R&D expenditures. However, these are
not data errors. According to COMPUSTAT’s internal investigation, the negative R&D expenses likely
reflect adjustments of funds allocated in previous fiscal years.
11Following Beaver et al. (2007), when both monthly and delisting returns are available the delisting return
is computed as DLRt,t+k = ((1 +Rt,t+j−1)(1 +DLRt,t+j))− 1. When delisting returns are missing we
follow the next procedure. If a firm was listed on NYSE or AMEX and has been dropped by the exchange
or the Security Exchange Commission (SEC, delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591, but not 501 and
502), we assume -30% delisting return (Shumway 1997). If a firm was listed on NASDAQ and has been
dropped by the exchange or the SEC (delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591, but not 501 and 502),
we assume -55% delisting return (Shumway and Warther 1999). If a firm was listed on any of the three
exchanges and has been or will be liquidated (delisting codes ranging from 400 to 490), we assume -100%
delisting return (Prakash and Sinha 2012).
12Our choice of R&D intensity breakpoint has no theoretical justification. However, we choose the median
NYSE percentile as R&D intensity cut-off point because this ensures that the test portfolios are reason-
able diversified, especially in the early years of our sample. In robustness checks we use alternative R&D
intensity breakpoints and portfolio definitions with qualitatively similar results (see Section 2.6.2).
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“R&D intensive” stocks interchangeably. After aggregation into the 18 portfolios each test
asset has 450 monthly value-weighted returns from July 1976 to December 2013.
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the annualized average excess returns for the 18 test
portfolios. To calculate the excess portfolio returns, we use the one-month Treasury bill
rate from CRSP. The results confirm the relation between R&D activity and future returns,
especially among small size stocks. In the case of the small stocks subset, we observe
increasing returns along the R&D intensity dimension within each BE/ME bucket. This
is a preliminary indication that the relation between R&D activity and future returns is
a distinct phenomenon from the value-growth anomaly.
Panel B of Table 2.1 displays the average number of firms in each portfolio. Diver-
sification is preserved since there are enough observations in each portfolio. Note that
observations in the big/value portfolios are considerable low. We advice against caution
since our partition approach ensures that at least 9 firms exist at each point in time for
each portfolio.
[Insert Table 2.1 here.]
2.3.2 Duration and R&D Intensity: A Preliminary Analysis
We examine the relation between equity duration and R&D intensity. Recall that the
further into the future cash flows are realized, the longer the equity duration. We follow
Dechow et al. (2004) to estimate the implied equity duration. We forecast cash flows over
a 10-year horizon using portfolio-level return on equity (ROE), returns, sales, growth in
sales, size and book value of equity. We revert the growth rate in sales to its cross-sectional
mean using the pooled autocorrelation coefficient for sales. Subsequently, we apply the
forecast growth rates in sales to the lagged book values of equity in order to forecast
book values of equity. We revert ROE to the cross-sectional mean return using the pooled
autocorrelation coefficient for ROE. We apply the forecast ROEs to lagged book value
of equity forecasts to generate earnings forecasts. Following Dechow et al. (2004), the
earnings forecasts and book values of equity forecasts are then used to extract cash flow
forecasts (i.e., CFt = Et− (BVt−BVt−1)). The implied cash flow forecasts are discounted
to present values. The discount rate is fixed across portfolios and through time to equal
the annualized cross-sectional mean return. Similar to Dechow et al. (2004), the terminal
period duration is the same for all portfolio-years (i.e., T+(1+r)/r≈10+1.15/0.15≈17.77).
Finally, for each portfolio-year, the implied equity duration is the weighted sum of the finite
and terminal periods durations. The weight for the finite period is the ratio of the present
value of the 10-year cash flow forecasts to the portfolio size.
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[Insert Table 2.2 here.]
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the average (median) implied equity duration for each
of the 18 test portfolios. We observe that for small firms and within any given BE/ME
partition, the average equity duration is longer as we move from the No-R&D to the
Hight-R&D stocks. This pattern is more pronounced if the focus shifts on median equity
duration figures. Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the results from a sensitivity analysis for the
impact of discount rates.13 We repeat the estimation of the equity duration characteristics
of the test portfolios for 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% discount rate figures. The results are
quantitatively similar; the R&D-duration link is not affected by the discount rate figure.
Specifically, for small firms, in any BE/ME subset, the average equity duration is longer
for Hight-R&D stocks than for No-R&D stocks. Differences are again larger for median
equity duration values. The choice of discount rate affects only the magnitude of implied
equity duration estimates in a uniform manner across portfolios. The lower the discount
rate, the longer the duration for all portfolios.
Collectively, evidence in this section is in-line with existing studies that relate R&D
projects to higher equity duration, on the premise that R&D benefits are realized further
ahead in the future (e.g., Cornell 1999). Given the figures in Table 2.2 we can in turn argue
that after controlling for the BE/ME effect, small R&D intensive stocks are more exposed
to discount rate risk. In what follows, we explore in depth this section’s preliminary
evidence on the positive relation between R&D and discount rate risk by using an ICAPM
framework that directly measures the part of the systematic risk attributed to discount
rate news.
2.3.3 Risk Factors
We consider the ICAPM, as well as a set of benchmark pricing models; we use the
CAPM, the two-news factor and FF three-factor model as benchmarks. To estimate these
models, we construct the following risk factors: cash flow news (NCF), discount rate news
(NDR), excess market return (reM,t), small minus big (SMB), and high minus low book-
to-market (HML). All the risk factors are measured on a monthly basis over the period
from July 1976 to December 2013 (450 observations).reM,t is the difference between the log
value-weighted return stock index and the log one-month Treasury bill rate (rf ), both of
which are obtained from CRSP. SMB is the return spread between the portfolios of small
and big firms. HML is the return spread between the portfolios of high book-to-market
13The choice of discount rate affects the estimation of the terminal period duration. It also affects the
estimation of the finite period duration, since it discounts the 10-year cash flow forecasts, and it is used
as the reverting target for ROE forecasts.
16
firms and low book-to-market firms. We obtain both SMB and HML from Professor
Kenneth R. French’s website.14
We also construct the NCF and NDR which are the risk factors in the case of the
ICAPM model. Following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a), we use the VAR method-
ology to extract the two market-wide news components from state variables that predict
the aggregate stock market (see Section 2.4.1). We consider the following state variables:
excess log market return (reM,t), smoothed price-to-earnings ratio (PE), term yield (TY),
small stocks value spread (VS) and default spread (DEF).
The state variables span the period from January 1929 to December 2013 and are
observed at a monthly frequency yielding 1020 time series observations. reM,t is defined
as above. PE is the ratio of the S&P 500 price over the 10-year moving average of the
S&P 500 earnings and is taken from Professor Robert J. Shiller webpage.15 TY is the
difference between the log-yields of ten-year Treasury bonds and three-month Treasury
bills. The former is obtained from Professor Robert J. Shiller’s webpage and the latter
from CRSP. V S is the difference between the log-BE/ME of the small value portfolio
and the log-BE/ME of the small growth portfolio at the end of June of any given year t.
Following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a), for the remaining months the V S spread
is constructed by adding the cumulative log returns of the small growth portfolio and
subtracting the cumulative log returns of the small value portfolio realized over the last
year. The data used to construct V S are obtained from Professor Kenneth R. French’s
webpage. Finally, DEF is constructed as the difference between the log-yields of Moody’s
BAA and AAA corporate bonds. The data on corporate bonds are obtained from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (FRED).
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 The ICAPM Model
According to Merton (1973)’s ICAPM, multi-period investors hedge against shocks
to total wealth (market) and to unfavorable shifts in the investment opportunity set.
Specifically, Merton (1973) supports that investors face two risks: (1) the covariation of
an asset with the return on the total wealth (same as in the CAPM) and (2) the covariation
of an asset with the state variables that describe the investment opportunity set and affect
current consumption. Interestingly, the ICAPM boils down to the CAPM (i.e., only shocks
14Data on the SMB and HML risk factors can be retrieved from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/
15PE as well as the ten-year Treasury bond rate can be retrieved from http://www.econ.yale.edu/
~shiller/data.htm.
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to total wealth are hedged) when the investment opportunity set is not stochastic.
Campbell (1993) derives a two-factor discrete-time version of Merton (1973)’s ICAPM.
This is based on Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) preferences, as well as on Campbell (1991)’s
return decomposition. Campbell (1991)’s return decomposition is given by the following
equation:
rt+1 − Etrt+1 = NCF t+1 −NDRt+1 (2.1)
where rt+1 − Etrt+1 is the unexpected market return, NCF t+1 = ∆Et+1
∑∞
j=0ρ
j∆dt+1+j
is the cash flow news and NDRt+1 = ∆Et+1
∑∞
j=1ρ
jrt+1+j is the discount rate news, and
ρ is the log-linearization discount factor. Note that a risk-averse investor should be more
concerned about NCF than NDR. This is because NDR has both a wealth effect and
an offsetting investment opportunities effect, while NCF has only a wealth effect. More
specifically, a negative (positive) NDR, decreases (increases) the value of wealth today.
However, a negative (positive) NDR also signals better (worse) investment opportunities
since less (more) need to be saved today to grow a dollar in the future. On the other hand,
a negative (positive) NCF , decreases (increases) the value of wealth permanently, since
there is no change in the investment opportunity set to offset the loss (gain).
Campbell (1993) expresses an asset’s expected return as a function of the NCF and
NDR:
Etri,t+1 − rf,t+1 + σ2i,t/2 = γcovt(ri,t+1, NCF t+1) + covt(ri,t+1,−NDRt+1) (2.2)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; σ2i,t is the return variance; and σ
2
i,t/2
adjusts for Jensen’s Inequality. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a) re-formulate the model
in equation (2.2) in a beta representation form:
Etri,t+1 − rf,t+1 + σ2i,t/2 = γσ2M,tβi,NCFM ,t + σ2M,tβi,NDRM ,t (2.3)
where βi,NCF,t ≡ Cov(ri,t,NCFt)V ar(reM,t−Et−1reM,t) is the CF beta and βi,NDR,t ≡
Cov(ri,t,−NDRt)
V ar(reM,t−Et−1reM,t) is
the DR beta, whereby βi,NCF,t and βi,NDR,t sum-up to the CAPM beta, approximately.
The two beta definitions ensure that the ICAPM is a natural extension of the CAPM (see
Merton 1973; Campbell 1993). Equation (2.3) states that the risk price of the CF beta is
γ times greater than the risk price of the DR beta. Moreover, the DR beta premium is
restricted to equal the variance of the market portfolio.
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2.4.2 Estimating the Cash Flow and the Discount Rate News
To estimate the NCF and NDR, we follow Campbell (1991) and assume that the data
generating process of the state variables is a first-order VAR:
zt+1 = c+ Γzt + ut+1 (2.4)
where zt is the (k× 1) vector of the k state variables with the excess market return as its
first element, c is the (k × 1) vector of intercepts, Γ is the (k×k) matrix of coefficients,
and ut+1 is the (k × 1) vector of the i.i.d. disturbance terms. Based on equation (2.4),
NCF and NDR can be expressed as a linear function of the disturbance terms:
NDRt+1 = e1
′λut+1 (2.5)
NCFt+1 = (e1
′ + e1′λ)ut+1 (2.6)
where e1 is a vector with first element one and the remaining elements zero, λ ≡ ρΓ(I −
ρΓ)−1 maps the state variables shocks into the two market-wide news components, and
ρ is the log-linearization discount factor [see also equation (2.1)]. As is standard, we set
ρ = 0.95 which implies a constant 5% annual average consumption-to-wealth ratio (see for
instance, Campbell 1993).
We estimate equation (2.4) by using the following state variables: excess log market
return (reM ), smoothed price-to-earnings ratio (PE), term yield (TY ), small stocks value
spread (V S) and default spread (DEF ). We choose these variables because prior stud-
ies suggest that they explain the time variation in market returns (e.g., Campbell and
Vuolteenaho 2004a; Campbell et al. 2013 and references therein). For the sake of brevity
the VAR(1) results are reported and discussed in Appendix C.
Using the residuals of the estimated VAR(1), we construct the NDR and NCF time
series [see equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively]. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of NCF
and NDR across time. The gray shaded area corresponds to the recessions as defined by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
[Insert Figure 2.1 here.]
We can see that the NDR series is more volatile than the NCF one. This suggests that
in the aggregate level NDR dominate the time variation of returns which is in-line with
the findings documented by Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a). We
can also see that the two news series do not move together and hence, capture separate
sources of risk (correlation = 0.006).
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2.4.3 Estimating the Pricing Models
Our base model is the unconditional version of discrete time ICAPM:
E[R−Rf ] = γσ2M,tβi,NCF + σ2M,tβi,NDR (2.7)
which restricts the NDR premium to equal the variance of the market portfolio [see
equation (2.3)]. As is standard in the asset pricing literature, R − Rf denotes simple
excess returns.
We evaluate the performance of our base model by testing it against three benchmarks.
The first benchmark is the CAPM:
E[R−Rf ] = λMβi,M = λM (βi,NCF + βi,NDR) (2.8)
where λM is the market price risk and βi,M is the CAPM beta.
The second benchmark is a generalization of Campbell (1993)’s discrete time ICAPM
which does not impose any restriction on the NCF and NDR risk prices. We refer to this
model as the news-factor model:
E[R−Rf ] = λNCFβi,NCF + λNDRβi,NDR (2.9)
The third benchmark is the three-factor Fama and French (1993) (FF) model:
E[R−Rf ] = λMβi,M + λSMBβi,SMB + λHMLβi,HML (2.10)
for consistency with prior research that seeks to explain the R&D-returns relation (e.g.,
Lev and Sougiannis 1996).
We estimate all pricing models [equations (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10)] in two steps
(Fama and MacBeth 1973). First, we estimate the betas by running a time-series regression
for any given test portfolio.16 Second, we estimate the risk prices by running a cross-
sectional regression at any given point in time with the betas obtained from the first step
serving as independent variables:
Ri,t −Rf,t = gi,t +
∑
j
λj,tβj + αi,t (2.11)
16In the case of (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) we follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a) and include one lag
of the respective market-wide news component in their denominator. Note that those estimates deviate
from the fitted values of the commonly used first-stage time-series estimation. We add the lags to decrease
biases in the betas estimation arising from the inclusion of stocks with stale prices in the portfolios where
low-frequency data are used (see for example, Dimson 1979; Fowler and Rorke 1983; Lo and MacKinlay
1990; Kothari et al. 1995).
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where gi,t is the constant, λj,t is the risk price of the j
th factor (j = 1, 2 for ICAPM,
CAPM and the two-news factor models, j = 1, 2, 3 for the FF model), βj is the beta of
the jth factor and αi,t is the error term which captures the pricing error (i = 1, 2, .., 18 for
each test portfolio).
We estimate the Fama-MacBeth (1973) risk premia (λj) and pricing errors (α) as the
time-series averages of the fitted and residuals values of the cross-sectional regression of
equation (2.11):
λˆj =
1
T
T∑
t=1
λ̂j,t (2.12)
αˆ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
α̂i,t (2.13)
To estimate all pricing models we could have also used alternative econometric ap-
proaches. We could have used a one-step time-series regression approach, or/and a one-
step generalized method of moments discount factor (GMM/DF) approach. The one-step
time-series regression approach is not applicable; the cash flow and discount rate news are
not tradeable portfolios. Hence, their prices of risk need not to be equal to the sample
means of cash flow and discount rate news, as theory requires (see Brennan et al. 2004,
for example). Building on that, the intercept from this regression cannot be used to assess
the ability of cash flow and discount rate news in capturing the expected returns of a test
portfolio.17
The one-step GMM/DF with an identity matrix as weighting matrix is similar to the
two-step Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. Notably, it is not subject to the bias on the
second-step Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression due to estimation errors on
the fist-step betas. However, to stabilize the GMM/DF estimates, we would probably
need to narrow down the number of test portfolios. The difference between the moment
restrictions and the time-series observations (450) would be too large with 18 test portfolios
(see Hamilton 1994; Greene 2003; Cochrane 2005). An alternative is to iterate the one-
step GMM/DF that uses Hansen (1982)’s optimal weighting matrix. This approach allows
asset pricing models to weight test portfolios according to the variance of their returns
(i.e., the higher the return variance, the lower the weight). However, in this chapter we
would like to examine whether the ICAPM and the benchmark models are able to explain
the returns of all test portfolios equally well, which such an approach suppresses. Asset
pricing models that have been used by prior research failed to explain the returns of small
17Thus, the GRS statistic of Gibbons et al. (1989) that uses time-series regression intercepts to test whether
an asset pricing model completely captures the expected returns of a combination of test portfolios, is
not applicable too.
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and R&D intensive portfolios (e.g., Chan et al. 2001).18 On top of that, the returns of
these portfolios also exhibit high variance. Therefore, the one-step GMM/DF that allows
asset pricing models to place low weights on the high return variance small and R&D
intensive portfolios would likely eliminate the R&D effect we are focusing on. Our aim
is to investigate the ICAPM’s ability to explain these specific 18 test portfolios. In that
respect, the two-step Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach is the most advantageous.
2.4.4 Evaluating the Pricing Models
We first test whether any given asset pricing model implies a reasonable risk free rate
(termed zero beta rate) and in turn fits the equity premium adequately. The zero beta
rate is defined as the return on a test portfolio with zero sensitivity to a pricing model’s
risk factors (Black 1972). In practice, we estimate each model in two alternative versions.
The first restricts the zero-beta rate to be equal to the risk-free rate observed in the
market. Intuitively, this restriction reflects that the investor allocates her wealth between
Treasuries and equities. In this case the constant gi,t in equation (2.11) is set to zero. The
second version considers an unrestricted zero-beta rate and that the investor can choose
only among equities (Black 1972). In this case, the excess return of the zero-beta portfolio
(i.e., gi,t) should not be significantly different from zero (e.g., Jagannathan and Wang
1996; Cochrane 2005), i.e., the corresponding asset pricing model is supported if the zero
beta rate is not significantly different that the prevailing risk free rate.
We also consider five alternative metrics to evaluate the asset pricing models under
consideration. The first metric is the R2 which is defined as follows:
R2 = 1− αˆ
′αˆ
[(R
e
i,t)−
∑
i (R
e
i,t)]
′[(Rei,t)−
∑
i (R
e
i,t)]
(2.14)
where αˆ is the vector of the pricing errors and R
e
i is the vector of average return over the
risk-free rate for portfolio i. Notice that R2 can take negative values for poorly performing
models under the restricted zero-beta rate versions.
The R2 metric weights all test portfolios equally, even though some are less volatile
than others (Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004a; Khan 2008). To address this concern we
consider two further metrics, both of which test the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors
(H0 : α = 0). Regarding the first metric, we estimate the covariance matrix of the sample
pricing errors:
cov(αˆ) =
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
(αˆi,t − αˆ)′(αˆi,t − αˆ) (2.15)
18This is, small and R&D intensive stocks have realized higher returns than predicted by a version of the
FF model.
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and compute the test statistic as follows:
alpha = αˆ′cov(αˆ)−1αˆ ∼ χ2n−j (2.16)
where n is the number of test portfolios and j is the number of factors for any given asset
pricing model.19 If alpha exceeds the χ2n−j 5% critical value we reject the null hypothesis
of zero pricing errors.
We also report the Composite Pricing Error (CPE) used in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004a):
CPE = αˆΩ−1αˆ ∼ χ2n−j (2.17)
where Ω is a diagonal matrix with the variances of the test portfolio returns. We do not
consider the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix to avoid the curse of
dimensionality (e.g., Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004a; Ledoit and Wolf 2004). If CPE
exceeds the 5% critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors. As
opposed to alpha, the critical value for each pricing model’s CPE is obtained from a
bootstrap distribution (see Appendix D).
We supplement the analysis by considering the magnitude of the pricing errors across
models (Hansen and Jagannathan 1997). To this end, we report two measures of pricing
errors magnitudes. The first is the square root of the CPE which is defined as follows:
PEM = [αˆΩ−1αˆ]1/2 (2.18)
The second statistic is the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance measure:
HJ = [αˆ′(Rei
′
R
e
i )
−1
αˆ]
1/2
(2.19)
This statistic can be interpreted as the maximum pricing error per unit of payoff norm
(Hansen and Jagannathan 1997).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Cash Flow and Discount Rate Betas
Table 2.3 reports the estimated betas for the 18 size, BE/ME and R&D intensity
portfolios, as well as the differences in betas between Value minus Growth partitions (V −
19The Shanken (1992) correction for the sampling error in the first-stage estimation of the loading factors
cannot be applied in the case of the ICAPM. This is because we do not obtain the corresponding betas
by means of a time series (i.e., first-stage) regression. For consistency, we do not estimate the Shanken
(1992) correction for the remaining models.
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G) and High-R&D minus No-R&D (H −N) partitions. Panels A and B show the results
for the CF and the DR betas, respectively. The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are
based on bootstrap standard errors. With the bootstrap simulation we take into account
the uncertainty both in the estimation of the news terms with the VAR methodology and
the uncertainty in the computation of the respective betas. The details of the bootstrap
simulation are available in Appendix D.
[Insert Table 2.3 here.]
We draw a number of observations from Table 2.3. First, the DR betas increase as
R&D intensity increases within any given size and BE/ME partition. Within each size and
BE/ME subset, the differences between the DR betas of High-R&D and No-R&D portfolios
is positive and statistically significant. In other words, figures in Table 2.3 support the
view that the R&D effect on systematic risk is distinct from and not subsumed by the
growth/value effect (see for instance, Donelson and Resutek 2012). The higher betas for
High-R&D firms suggest that these stocks are exposed to more systematic DR risk than
No-R&D stocks and hence, they are expected to earn higher returns.
Second, the magnitude of CF betas increases along the R&D intensity dimension within
any given size and BE/ME partition, albeit differences are insignificant. The lack of
significance comes as no surprise given that NCF are well diversified in the market level
(e.g., Hecht and Vuolteenaho 2006).
Third, both CF and DR betas decrease when the size increases for any given BE/ME
and R&D intensity bucket. Fourth, value stocks have higher CF betas and lower DR
betas than growth stocks. The last two findings are in-line with those of Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004a); Campbell et al. (2010) and of Campbell et al. (2013).
Overall, our findings extend the risk explanation of the relation between R&D activity
and future returns proposed in the literature (e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002;
Kothari et al. 2002). In particular, our results show that R&D intensive stocks are exposed
to higher DR risk than No-R&D firms. This finding confirm that the sensitivity to DR
risk is associated with long equity duration (e.g., Cornell 1999; Campbell and Vuolteenaho
2004a).
2.5.2 Cash Flow and Discount Rate Prices of Risk
Table 2.4 presents the results of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regres-
sions for the ICAPM and the three benchmark models. For any given asset pricing model,
the first (second) column reports results in the case where the zero-beta rate is (not) con-
strained to equal the risk-free rate. Panel A reports the estimated prices of risk, the Fama
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and MacBeth (1973) Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses and the annualized
risk premia in square brackets. Panel B reports the R2, alpha, CPE, PEM and HJ for
each model-version.
[Insert Table 2.4 here.]
Panel A reveals that the ICAPM handles the equity premium adequately, i.e., the
excess return on the zero-beta portfolio is insignificant. In addition, the price of risk for
NCF is higher (between 38% and 29%) than the NDR one (around 3%). The positive
and large difference in the two risk premia is also confirmed by the two-news factor model.
Panel B shows that the ICAPM performs relatively well even though the number of
free parameters is lower. In particular, the ICAPM explains a fair amount of the test
portfolios’ cross-sectional variation (around 27%). The PEM and HJ are analogous to
the corresponding figures for the best performing benchmarks, namely the FF model and
the two-factor model. Turning to the zero pricing t-statistics, the null hypothesis and
therefore the underlying model is rejected if alpha and CPE exceed the 5% critical values
obtained from the normal and a bootstrap distribution, respectively (reported below each
statistic). As is the case for all the benchmark models, we reject the null hypothesis of
zero pricing errors (H0 : α = 0) based on the alpha statistics. On the contrary, based on
the CPE statistics we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors (H0 : α = 0)
for the ICAPM with constrained zero-beta portfolio and both versions of the news-factor
model (generalized ICAPM). In sum, given the aforementioned mixed results, we cannot
dismiss a mispricing explanation of the R&D-returns relation.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot the expected versus the realized mean excess returns for the
constraint and unconstrained zero beta rate models, respectively. Panels (a), (b), (c)
and (d) correspond to the ICAPM, the CAPM, the two-new factor and the FF models,
respectively. The red asterisks correspond to the High-R&D test portfolios. The 45◦
straight line depicts where the test portfolios would lie in the case of a perfect fit model.
[Insert Figure 2.2 here.]
[Insert Figure 2.3 here.]
The figures provide graphical illustrations of the findings in Table 2.4. The CAPM
fits the data poorly. The performance of the ICAPM is comparable to those of the FF
model and the two-factor model. Notably, red stars, denoting High-R&D portfolios, are on
average closer to the 45◦ line under the ICAPM rather than the FF model. The extreme
outliers below the 45◦ line confirm prior literature and show that the small/growth stock
returns are difficult to predict. The extreme outliers above the 45◦ line show that the
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excess returns of some High-R&D stocks are understated by all pricing models considered
by this study. We further examine the magnitude of mispricing for High-R&D stocks in
the next section.
At this point a remark is at place. The FF model performs well in terms of R2.
However, this result should be viewed with caution for at least four reasons. First, the FF
model is an empirical model with no, unanimously agreed, theoretical motivation. Second,
the high explanatory power of the FF model may just reflects the additional degrees of
freedom; the FF model has three parameters that are freely estimated (Campbell and
Vuolteenaho 2004a). Third, the FF model handles the equity premium inadequately since
the excess return on the zero-beta portfolio (i.e., Rzb−Rrf ) is significant. Fourth, similarly
to the other models, the FF model yields significant pricing errors.
In sum, our findings are mixed and suggest that none of the employed asset pricing
models explains realized returns perfectly. The ICAPM combines adequate empirical
power with theoretical-economic soundness. In the following section, we examine further
the mispricing explanation of the relation between R&D activity and future returns by
means of a trading strategy.
2.5.3 Trading Strategy
The mispricing literature posits that investors underprice R&D intensive stocks. To
further examine this mispricing explanation of the R&D-returns relation, we form six
portfolios where we go long on High-R&D stocks and short on No-R&D stocks within
each size and BE/ME bucket. This zero investment trading strategy enables us to hedge
against the R&D intensity effect on returns that is not captured by our pricing models.
Intuitively, we examine the mispricing explanation of the R&D-returns relation from a
different angle, namely by considering pricing errors for individual test portfolios (and not
for the cross-sectional average as in Section 2.5.2). A pricing model is unable to explain
the R&D-returns relation, if the R&D-mispricing generated by this model is exploitable
by our trading strategy.
Table 2.5 shows the annualized abnormal returns and their Fama and MacBeth (1973)
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses of the hedge portfolios for any given model. For
each pricing model, the average abnormal return for each one of the six hedge portfolios is
the average abnormal return on the long portfolio minus the average abnormal return on
the short portfolio where the abnormal return is given by the estimated residuals of the
second-stage Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression.
[Insert Table 2.5 here.]
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Overall, the ICAPM is responsible for an R&D-mispricing that cannot be profitably
traded and exploited. Specifically, we observe that the ICAPM model yields insignificant
hedge abnormal returns and hence, explains the R&D-returns relation in all but one
cases. The only exception occurs for the large value stocks. Note that in this case the
hedge portfolio earns negative abnormal returns, which is inconsistent with the prevailing
story of investors underpricing High-R&D stocks. The hedge portfolio strategies show
that the CAPM generates effectively the same pricing errors for No-R&D and High-R&D
portfolios within each size and BE/ME bucket. The CAPM is therefore unable to capture
the R&D effect on returns. Interestingly, the FF model fails to explain the R&D-returns
relation, since hedge returns in the small subset of firms are statistical significant. The
hedge portfolio tests confirm that the most serious problem of the FF model is in small
stocks (see Fama and French 2015, and references therein). Our results suggest that a
dimension of this problem is related with R&D intensity.
It has to be noted that, like most asset pricing literature, our main and benchmark
models and the hedge trading strategy test ignore market frictions, such as transaction
costs. The hedge portfolio strategy test is designed to capture whether the R&D-mispricing
generated by any given model can be exploited. However, due to transaction costs the
portion of the abnormal R&D effect on returns is less likely to be large enough to at-
tract investors. Ignoring transaction costs bias the results of our trading strategy test
against, rather than in favour of, finding statistical insignificant abnormal hedge portfo-
lio returns under the ICAPM. The ICAPM already generates an R&D-mispricing that is
not exploitable in most cases. Taking into account transaction costs would result in an
ICAPM-generated R&D-mispricing that is even less likely to attract investors.20
2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Quarterly Observations
We assess the robustness of the results documented in the previous section by con-
sidering quarterly observations. As discussed in Section 2.4.2, in the case of monthly
observations, we estimate the CF and the DR betas by including an additional lag of their
market-wide news. This reduces the influence of stale prices in the computation of betas,
where high frequency observations are used. An alternative is to use lower frequency obser-
vations (Kothari et al. (1995), and references therein) where we do not include additional
20For example these costs can be estimated as a fixed amount of basis-points (bps) for each transaction
that takes place in the annual re-balancing of our test portfolios. This approach has been used in prior
literature, and the results usually draw attention. For example, Carhart (1997) suggests momentum is
not exploitable after fixed-bps transaction costs are accounted for.
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market-wide news lags to estimate the betas.
[Insert Table 2.6 here.]
[Insert Table 2.7 here.]
Table 2.6 shows the prices of risk and the evaluation metrics for any given model
when quarterly observations are used. Table 2.7 shows the corresponding hedge portfolio
annualized abnormal returns. All the results are analogous to those documented in the
case where monthly observations are used.
2.6.2 Alternative Breakpoints and Portfolio Definitions
We consider alternative R&D intensity breakpoints to form our test portfolios. Specif-
ically, we use the 30th and the 70th as well as the 40th and the 60th NYSE percentiles
as cut-off points. Below, we discuss results for the portfolio definition with the 30th–70th
R&D intensity cut-offs. Using instead the portfolio definition with the 40th–60th R&D
intensity cut-offs produces identical results.
We define 24 value-weighted test portfolios which are constructed as the intersection
of 2 size, 3 BE/ME and 4 R&D intensity portfolios. The size and BE/ME classifications
are those used in our main empirical analysis (see Subsection 2.3.1). We then assign firm-
years with missing R&D expenditures to the No-R&D portfolio. Firm-years with R&D
intensity below the 30th NYSE percentile are assigned to the Low-R&D portfolio; firm-
years with R&D intensity between the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles are assigned to
the Medium-R&D portfolio; and the remaining firm-years are assigned to the High-R&D
portfolio.
[Insert Table 2.8 here.]
Table 2.8 presents the annual excess returns on the 24 portfolios (Panel A); and the
differences in CF and DR betas between the High-R&D and the No-R&D portfolios (Panel
B) within each size and BE/ME subset. The findings are qualitatively similar to those
discussed in our main empirical analysis. Panel A confirms that there is a relation be-
tween R&D activity and future returns, especially among small size stocks. In the case
of the small stocks subset, we observe statistically significant increasing returns along the
R&D intensity dimension within each BE/ME bucket. Panel B re-affirms that there is
no particular R&D effect on CF sensitivity. More importantly, it also confirms that R&D
intensive stocks are exposed to higher DR risk than No-R&D stocks. Reassuringly, the
differences on CF and DR betas are similar in magnitude and statistical significance with
those reported in Table 2.3.
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It must be noted that, under the alternative R&D intensity breakpoints, there are
cases where no firms are allocated in portfolios. In these rare instances, we substitute
missing returns with those of portfolios in the same size and BE/ME classification and
with the closest R&D intensity. To maintain the diversification of idiosyncratic noise, we
employ the portfolio definition with the median NYSE R&D intensity cut-offs in our main
empirical analysis. This definition ensures that in any given month, each portfolio consists
of at least 9 firms.
2.6.3 Additional Benchmark Models
We also consider: the Carhart (1997) four-factor FF model (FF4); the Fama and French
(2015) five-factor model (FF5); the Khan (2008) four-factor model (Kahn-F4); and the
Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) Q-factor model (Q-FM). Table 2.9 presents the risk prices
and the evaluation metrics for the additional benchmark models and the main analysis
models. In turn, Table 2.10 presents the hedge portfolio abnormal returns. Below, we
briefly discuss their evaluation and trading strategy results.
[Insert Table 2.9 here.]
[Insert Table 2.10 here.]
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model augments the FF model with a return momen-
tum factor. Table 2.9’s results suggest that the addition of the momentum factor improves
the goodness of fit marginally. The momentum price of risk is statistically insignificant,
and the model violates the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors. The FF4 model also im-
plies statistical significant excess zero-beta rate and thus fails to fit the equity premium.
The trading strategy in Table 2.10 implies statistical significant abnormal returns within
the small subset of firms.
The Fama-French (2015) five-factor model augments the FF model with an investment
and a profitability factor.21 The FF5 is the best performing model. Overall, it explains
around 80% of the our cross-section. It violates the zero pricing errors hypothesis (except
for its unrestricted zero-beta rate version and under the alpha statistic). Similar to the
FF and FF4 models, the FF5 also fails in the estimation of the equity premium, since it
implies a zero-beta rate that is 14% higher than the prevailing risk-free rate. Table 2.10
21The investment factor is defined as the return on a portfolio of firms that invest conservatively (small
change in assets, scaled by 1-year-lagged assets) over the return of a portfolio of firms that invest
aggressively (large change in assets, scaled by 1-year-lagged assets). The profitability factor is defined as
the return on a portfolio of firms that have robust profitability (high operating profits, scaled by book
equity) over the return of a portfolio of firms that have weak profitability (low operating profits, scaled
by book equity).
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suggests that the FF5 model generates statistical insignificant abnormal returns, and hence
non-profitable mispricing, in four out of six hedge portfolios.
The Khan (2008) four-factor model replaces the market factor in the FF model with
the cash flow and discount rate news factors. Table 2.9 suggests that the Khan (2008)
four-factor model is rejected under both the alpha and the CPE statistics, and it fails
in the estimation of the equity premium. Particularly, Khan (2008)’ model implies an
unreasonable high excess zero beta rate (22% annually). The trading strategy in Table 2.10
also reveals that the model does not explain the R&D-return relation adequately, since it
implies a profitable R&D-related mispricing in small firms.
The Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) Q-Factor model expresses expected returns as a
function of assets’ betas to the market portfolio, a size factor, a profitability factor and
an investment factor.22 The Q-FM performs well. However, Tables 2.9 and 2.10 suggest
that it has four shortcomings. The Q-FM does not explain the equity premium, since
it implies a statistical significant excess zero-beta rate. At least one of its risk factors
(profitability) is not relevant to the cross-section of our 18 test portfolios, since its price of
risk is statistically insignificant under both zero-beta rate versions of the model. The Q-
FM is rejected, because it violates the zero pricing errors hypothesis under both the alpha
and the CPE statistics. Finally, the trading strategy in Table 2.10 implies statistical
significant abnormal returns, and thus exploitable R&D-related mispricing, within the
small subset of firms.
We conclude the section with a clarification. We do not discuss the FF5 model in
our main analysis for two reasons. Our test portfolios are defined in size and BE/ME
characteristics that are also used in the definition of all FF5 risk factors. This can po-
tentially result to mechanical associations between the test portfolios and the model’s risk
factors and, in turn, in the model’s exceptional performance (see Lo and MacKinlay 1990;
White 2000, for a discussion of biases arising from risk factor definitions). This concern
also applies to the FF, FF4, Khan-F4 and Q-FM factor models. More importantly, this
study does not seek for the best performing model, but it assesses the performance of the
ICAPM in explaining the R&D effect on returns. In that respect, the ICAPM needs to
perform relatively well in order to support the risk-duration hypothesis for the positive
R&D-returns relation.
22Each quarter, the profitability factor is defined as the return on a portfolio of firms that have high return
on (1-quarter-lagged) book value of equity over the return of a portfolio of firms that have low return on
(1-quarter-lagged) book value of equity. The investment factor is identical to the FF5 definition. Unlike
the FF factors, Q-FM’s size, profitability and investment factors are rebalanced monthly.
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2.7 Summary and Conclusion
The present study contributes to the long-standing debate about the relation between
R&D activity and future returns. Prior research considers this relation a result of mis-
pricing (Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al. 2005; Ali et al. 2012), a compensation for
risk inherent in R&D (Chambers et al. 2002) or a transformation of the value/growth
anomaly (Donelson and Resutek 2012). We note that this issue as well as the broader
investigation whether innovation is misvalued by the capital markets (e.g., Cohen et al.
2013; Hirshleifer et al. 2013) is a continuing debate. Our findings support the risk based
explanation for at least two reasons. First, R&D activity is associated with systematic risk
through the sensitivity to the market portfolio’s discount rate news. Second, the evidence
on mispricing is economically insignificant.
We acknowledge that our results may be subject to a number of limitations. First,
Chen and Zhao (2009) express concerns that the return decomposition into cash flow
and discount rate news is sensitive to the VAR’s specification. These concerns have been
allayed by Campbell et al. (2010) and Engsted et al. (2012). Second, Koh and Reeb
(2015) show that some firms may choose not to report their R&D expenses despite their
active engagement with R&D. We acknowledge that a more detailed investigation taking
into account patents’ filing would possibly yield stronger results. Finally, we follow prior
research in estimating our proxy for R&D intensity by capitalising and then, amortizing
current and past R&D expenditures using the amortization rates presented in Lev and
Sougiannis (1996). Arguably, the estimation approach we follow involves assumptions
which may bias our R&D intensity variable.
Our study responds to calls for considering alternative asset pricing models in assess-
ing the mispricing explanation of the relation between R&D activity and future returns
(Chambers et al. 2002; Skinner 2008). Donelson and Resutek (2012) also comment that
popular empirical asset pricing models are not well-specified, especially with respect to
certain subsets of firms. ICAPM shows promise as it accommodates investors’ exposure
to stochastic discount rates. This feature is important in evaluating the returns of R&D
intensive firms, given their long equity duration. However, we acknowledge that the em-
pirical application of ICAPM has its shortcomings. We hope that future developments in
asset pricing will show improvements in this respect.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of cash flow and negative of discount rate news
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Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of NCF (red line) and negative of NDR (green line) across time. The grey shaded
area corresponds to NBER recessions. The sample spans the period from July 1976 to December 2013.
32
Figure 2.2: Predicted Vs Realized returns (constrained zero-beta rate)
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(a) ICAPM with constrained zero-beta rate
R
ea
liz
ed
 e
xc
es
s 
re
tu
rn
0
5
10
15
Predicted excess return
0 5 10 15
1
2
4
5
7
8
10
11
13
14
16
17
3
6
9
12
15
18
(b) CAPM with constrained zero-beta rate
R
ea
liz
ed
 e
xc
es
s 
re
tu
rn
0
5
10
15
Predicted excess return
0 5 10 15
1
2
4
5
7
8
10
11
13
14
16
17
3
6
9
12
15
18
(d) FF with constrained zero-beta rate
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(c) Two-factor with constrained zero-beta rate
Clockwise from top left, the figures correspond to the ICAPM (a), the CAPM (b), the two-factor model (c) and
the Fama-French (1993) model (d), all with constrained zero-beta rates. The horizontal axis denotes the predicted
excess returns, obtained from the regressions of Table 2.4. The vertical axis denotes the realized excess returns.
Black dots represent the No-R&D and Low-R&D size and BE/ME portfolios, while red stars represent the High-
R&D size and BE/ME portfolios. The numbering of the portfolios follows our partitions and starts from 1, for the
No-R&D and Small/Growth portfolio, goes to 3 for the High-R&D and Small/Growth portfolio, 4 for the No-R&D
and Small/Medium portfolio and so on, until 18 which stands for the High-R&D and Large/Value portfolio.
33
Figure 2.3: Predicted Vs Realized returns (free zero-beta rate)
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(a) ICAPM with free zero-beta rate
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(b) CAPM with free zero-beta rate
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(d) FF with free zero-beta rate
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(c) Two-factor with free zero-beta rate
Clockwise from top left, the figures correspond to the ICAPM (a), the CAPM (b), the two-factor model (c) and the
Fama-French (1993) model (d), all with freely estimated zero-beta rates. The horizontal axis denotes the predicted
excess returns, obtained from the regressions of Table 2.4. The vertical axis denotes the realized excess returns.
Black dots represent the No-R&D and Low-R&D size and BE/ME portfolios, while red stars represent the High-
R&D size and BE/ME portfolios. The numbering of the portfolios follows our partitions and starts from 1, for the
No-R&D and Small/Growth portfolio, goes to 3 for the High-R&D and Small/Growth portfolio, 4 for the No-R&D
and Small/Medium portfolio and so on, until 18 which stands for the High-R&D and Large/Value portfolio.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the 18 size, BE/ME and R&D intensity
portfolios
Panel A: Annualized average excess returns on the test portfolios
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 6.97%* 11.63%*** 13.47%*** 7.65%*** 8.26%*** 10.35%***
L 5.21 12.92%*** 10.95%*** 6.10%** 8.62%** 7.99%**
H (High-R&D) 12.14%** 16.15%*** 17.59%*** 9.68%*** 10.40%*** 11.31%***
H - N 5.16%** 4.52%*** 4.13%*** 2.03% 2.14% 0.96%
Panel B: Average number of firms in each portfolio
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 301.30 360.10 378.70 121.75 109.06 62.34
L 238.71 120.84 66.06 109.46 48.57 15.90
H (High-R&D) 210.32 217.84 188.54 66.48 57.00 19.69
Entries on Panel A show the annualized average excess returns of the 18 test portfolios, in percentages, over the 450 months from July 1976
to December 2013. Panel B displays the average number of firms in each portfolio. The portfolios, which are constructed at the end of June,
are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size, 3 portfolios formed on the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (BE/ME)
and 3 portfolios formed on R&D intensity (the ratio of capitalized and amortized R&D to market value of equity). The size breakpoint for year
t is the median NYSE market value of equity at the end of June of year t. The BE/ME for June of year t is the book value of equity for the
last fiscal year end in t − 1 calendar year, divided by the ME for December of t − 1 calendar year. The BE/ME breakpoints are the 30th and
70th NYSE percentiles. R&D intensity for June of calendar year t is the capitalized and amortized R&D expenses for the last fiscal year end
in t− 1 calendar year, divided by ME for December of t− 1 calendar year. The No-R&D portfolios include all firm-year observations with no
records for R&D expenses. For firm-year observations with R&D records the breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE R&D intensity (Low-
R&D, High-R&D). “H − N” is the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D portfolios within each size and BE/ME subset. [*], [**] and
[***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Implied equity duration for the test portfolios
Panel A: Mean (Median) duration characteristics
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 15.39 16.40 18.36 10.39 14.86 16.78
(14.87) (16.15) (18.67) (10.34) (14.25) (16.78)
L 17.69 16.16 19.78 8.77 13.80 20.28
(16.62) (16.48) (18.72) (9.17) (13.34) (16.52)
H (High-R&D) 28.02 19.71 20.51 10.69 14.59 18.31
(30.90) (19.85) (20.00) (10.85) (13.71) (16.19)
Panel B: Sensitivity of Mean (Median) duration characteristics to cost of capital
r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20% r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20% r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20% r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20% r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20% r = 5% r = 10% r = 15% r = 20%
N (No-R&D) 39.31 21.04 15.21 12.65 43.08 22.78 16.15 13.21 48.98 25.75 18.12 14.58 25.83 13.91 10.28 8.86 38.87 20.56 14.71 12.08 44.44 23.42 15.96 13.43
(37.56) (20.12) (14.71) (12.32) (41.78) (22.28) (15.96) (13.16) (49.50) (26.26) (18.49) (14.86) (25.47) (13.74) (10.24) (8.79) (37.31) (19.56) (14.07) (11.59) (44.27) (23.52) (16.46) (13.49)
L 45.85 24.39 17.46 14.28 42.46 22.45 15.94 13.05 53.25 27.92 19.53 15.58 21.65 11.56 8.70 7.67 34.87 18.79 13.65 11.39 53.43 28.38 20.01 16.05
(42.50) (22.71) (16.42) (13.57) (42.22) (22.67) (16.28) (13.29) (49.94) (26.29) (18.51) (14.88) (22.94) (12.22) (9.09) (7.99) (34.27) (18.25) (13.19) (11.04) (42.60) (22.73) (16.32) (13.40)
H (High-R&D) 73.01 39.19 27.65 21.99 51.23 27.37 19.45 15.73 53.80 28.64 20.24 16.24 26.34 14.22 10.59 9.12 36.92 20.00 14.42 11.97 47.85 25.50 18.07 14.63
(79.45) (42.95) (30.49) (24.29) (52.08) (27.78) (19.58) (15.67) (52.07) (27.81) (19.74) (15.93) (26.64) (14.45) (10.75) (9.25) (35.11) (18.71) (13.55) (11.34) (43.72) (22.75) (15.99) (13.03)
Panel A shows the mean(median) implied equity duration for each test portfolio, estimated as in Dechow et al. (2004). The portfolios, which are constructed at the end of June, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size, 3 portfolios formed on the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (BE/ME) and 3 portfolios formed on the ratio of capitalized and amortized R&D to market value of equity
(R&D intensity). The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market value of equity at the end of June of year t. The BE/ME for June of year t is the book value of equity for the last fiscal year end in t− 1 calendar year, divided by the ME for December of t− 1 calendar year. The BE/ME breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. R&D intensity for June of calendar year t is the capitalized and amortized
R&D expenses for the last fiscal year end in t− 1 calendar year, divided by ME for December of t− 1 calendar year. The No-R&D portfolios include all firm-year observations with no records for R&D expenses. For firm-year observations with R&D records the breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE R&D intensity (Low-R&D, High-R&D).
Panel B presents the sensitivity of the mean(median) implied equity duration for each test portfolio to different cost of capital figures (r). The estimation is repeated for r = 5%, r = 10%, r = 15% and r = 20%.
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Table 2.3: Cash flow and discount rate beta for the test portfolios
Panel A: Cash Flow Beta
Size = Small Size = Big BE/ME V-G
(V alue−Growth)
BE/ME BE/ME Size = Small Size = Big
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.207** 0.181** 0.223*** 0.146* 0.130* 0.136** 0.016 -0.011
(2.03) (2.13) (2.55) (1.85) (1.80) (2.00) (0.42) (-0.30)
L 0.215* 0.198** 0.257*** 0.127 0.125* 0.158* 0.042 0.031
(1.81) (2.20) (2.55) (1.55) (1.78) (1.75) (0.80) (0.64)
H (High-R&D) 0.240* 0.234** 0.263** 0.141* 0.183** 0.221** 0.023 0.079**
(1.92) (2.19) (2.50) (1.75) (2.06) (2.27) (0.47) (2.08)
H-N 0.033 0.053 0.040 -0.005 0.053* 0.085*
(0.79) (1.49) (1.24) (-0.19) (1.70) (1.90)
Panel B: Discount Rate Beta
Size = Small Size = Big BE/ME V-G
(V alue−Growth)
BE/ME BE/ME Size = Small Size = Big
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 1.244*** 0.978*** 0.974*** 0.940*** 0.795*** 0.663*** -0.270*** -0.277***
(10.18) (9.47) (8.92) (10.33) (9.20) (7.93) (-5.10) (-4.97)
L 1.396*** 1.083*** 1.219*** 0.951*** 0.715*** 0.907*** -0.178** -0.044
(10.08) (9.85) (9.71) (9.77) (8.40) (7.71) (-2.23) (-0.49)
H (High-R&D) 1.500*** 1.313*** 1.242*** 0.888*** 0.960*** 1.080*** -0.257*** 0.192***
(10.13) (10.27) (9.63) (9.76) (9.29) (8.91) (-3.53) (2.57)
H-N 0.256*** 0.335*** 0.268*** -0.052 0.165*** 0.417***
(3.77) (5.96) (5.84) (-1.14) (3.09) (6.04)
Entries show the estimated cash flow (CF, Panel A) and discount rate (DR, Panel B) betas and their t-statistics in parentheses for the 18 test portfolios.
The t-statistics are based on bootstrap standard errors. The last two columns in each panel report the difference in betas between the value and the growth
portfolios. The last row in each panel reports the difference in betas between R&D intensive and No-R&D stocks. [*], [**] and [***] asterisks denote rejection
of the null hypothesis of a zero beta (or a zero beta difference) at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The sample spans the period from July
1976 to December 2013.
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Table 2.4: Cash flow and discount rate prices of risk
ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF
Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Panel A: Prices of risk
Rzb −Rrf 0 0.002 0 0.006* 0 0.005 0 0.009***
- (0.69) - (1.60) - (1.48) - (2.57)
[0.0%] [1.9%] [0.0%] [6.8%] [0.0%] [5.4%] [0.0%] [10.7%]
NCF 0.032** 0.024* 0.070*** 0.066***
(2.36) (1.68) (2.96) (2.85)
[38.2%] [28.4%] [83.8%] [79.3%]
NDR 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.008
- - (-1.09) (-1.48)
[2.5%] [2.5%] [-5.8%] [-9.9%]
ReM 0.007*** 0.002 0.006*** -0.002
(3.14) (0.55) (2.93) (-0.53)
[8.9%] [2.8%] [7.7%] [-2.7%]
SMB 0.002 0.003*
(1.24) (1.88)
[2.4%] [3.7%]
HML 0.003* 0.003
(1.70) (1.54)
[3.3%] [3.1%]
Panel B: Evaluation metrics
R2 23.6% 26.1% -15.3% 4.1% 40.1% 55.2% 42.3% 52.1%
alpha 58.12** 47.32** 65.26** 46.22** 57.68** 39.98** 51.05** 35.36**
> 27.59 > 26.30 > 27.59 > 26.30 > 26.30 > 25.00 > 25.00 > 23.69
CPE 0.021 0.019** 0.032** 0.025** 0.018 0.011 0.015** 0.012**
< 0.022 > 0.016 > 0.021 > 0.016 < 0.018 < 0.014 > 0.011 > 0.008
PEM 0.144 0.138 0.178 0.159 0.133 0.103 0.122 0.108
HJ 0.057 0.054 0.092 0.076 0.048 0.036 0.046 0.038
Entries show the results from the second step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) framework for the asset pricing models under consid-
eration. The first column for any given model restricts the zero-beta rate (Rzb) to equal the risk-free rate (Rrf ). In Panel A we can
see the price of risk; the Newey-West t-statistics, in parenthesis; and the annualized prices of risk, in square brackets. In Panel B we
can see the R2, alpha, CPE, PEM and HJ for any given asset pricing model. [*], [**] and [***] asterisks denote rejection of the null
hypothesis at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In the case of the t-statistic the null hypothesis is that the price of risk is equal to
zero, while in the cases of alpha and CPE the null hypothesis is that the pricing errors are, on average, equal to zero. For alpha and
CPE [**] asterisks denote rejection of the zero-pricing errors hypothesis since the statistic exceeds the 5% critical value shown below
each statistic. The 5% critical value, for alpha, is obtained from the normal distribution, while for CPE is obtained from a bootstrap
distribution. The asset pricing models are estimated using monthly observations over the period from July 1976 to December 2013.
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Table 2.5: Hedge portfolios
BE/ME ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF
Size Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Small
G 2.9% 3.2% 2.5% 4.1%* 3.5% 4.8%** 5.0%** 4.9%**
(1.02) (1.21) (0.89) (1.83) (1.31) (2.12) (2.43) (2.39)
M 1.2% 1.7% 1.2% 3.2%** 1.5% 3.2%** 3.7%*** 4.7%***
(0.59) (0.95) (0.63) (2.32) (0.82) (2.26) (2.71) (3.68)
V 1.4% 1.8% 1.2% 2.9%** 1.9% 3.2%** 2.7%** 4.0%***
(0.88) (1.21) (0.72) (2.25) (1.20) (2.44) (2.00) (3.11)
Big
G 2.2% 2.2% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7% 2.8%* 2.3%
(1.43) (1.39) (1.23) (1.23) (1.27) (1.09) (1.86) (1.50)
M -0.5% 0.0% -0.1% 1.3% -1.5% -0.6% 0.3% 1.9%
(-0.28) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.81) (-0.86) (-0.37) (0.21) (1.29)
V -3.4%* -2.6% -2.6% -0.3% -3.8%* -1.7% -2.4% 1.1%
(-1.65) (-1.10) (-1.20) (-0.10) (-1.76) (-0.71) (-1.09) (0.67)
Entries show the annualized average abnormal returns, in percentages, and their Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, of the hedge portfolios un-
der consideration. The risk-adjustment is from the model identified at the top of each column. We form the hedge portfolios by going long on the
R&D intensive stocks and short on the No-R&D stocks within each size and BE/ME bucket. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively. The sample spans the period from July 1976 to December 2013 (450 monthly observations).
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Table 2.6: Prices of risk using quarterly data
ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF
Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Panel A: Prices of risk
Rzb −Rrf 0 0.007 0 0.014 0 0.015 0 0.018*
- (0.89) - (1.43) - (1.49) - (1.66)
[0.0%] [2.7%] [0.0%] [5.7%] [0.0%] [6.0%] [0.0%] [7.4%]
NCF 0.162*** 0.108* 0.186*** 0.185***
(2.70) (1.68) (2.95) (2.92)
[65.0%] [43.4%] [74.5%] [74.1%]
NDR 0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.011
- - (0.41) (-0.82)
[2.9%] [2.9%] [1.7%] [-4.5%]
ReM 0.023*** 0.011 0.020*** 0.002
(3.53) (0.96) (3.06) (0.12)
[9.1%] [4.2%] [8.2%] [0.7%]
SMB 0.006 0.009*
(1.39) (1.78)
[2.5%] [3.5%]
HML 0.009 0.008
(1.53) (1.45)
[3.5%] [3.3%]
Panel B: Evaluation metrics
R2 25.6% 32.2% -5.0% 11.3% 26.2% 44.3% 50.3% 54.8%
alpha 59.76** 49.85** 70.18** 49.61** 59.56** 47.41** 54.57** 39.98**
> 27.59 > 26.30 > 27.59 > 26.30 > 26.30 > 25.00 > 25.00 > 23.69
CPE 0.055 0.046** 0.082** 0.066** 0.055 0.037** 0.036** 0.032**
< 0.079 > 0.036 > 0.075 > 0.041 < 0.056 > 0.030 > 0.034 > 0.022
PEM 0.234 0.215 0.286 0.258 0.235 0.194 0.190 0.179
HJ 0.061 0.053 0.088 0.075 0.062 0.047 0.042 0.038
Entries show the results from the second step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) framework for the asset pricing models under consid-
eration. The first column for any given model restricts the zero-beta rate (Rzb) to equal the risk-free rate (Rrf ). In Panel A we can see
the price of risk; the Newey-West t-statistics, in parenthesis; and the annualized prices of risk, in square brackets. In Panel B we can see
the R2, alpha, CPE, PEM and HJ for any given asset pricing model. [*], [**] and [***] asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis
at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In the case of the t-statistic the null hypothesis is that the price of risk is equal to zero, while
in the cases of alpha and CPE the null hypothesis is that the pricing errors are, on average, equal to zero. For alpha and CPE [**] as-
terisks denote rejection of the zero-pricing errors hypothesis since the statistic exceeds the 5% critical value shown below each statistic.
The 5% critical value, for alpha, is obtained from the normal distribution, while for CPE is obtained from a bootstrap distribution.
The asset pricing models are estimated using quarterly observations over the period from September 1976 to December 2013.
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Table 2.7: Hedge portfolios at a quarterly frequency
BE/ME ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF
Size Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Small
G 2.1% 2.8% 2.3% 3.9% 2.1% 4.1% 5.1%** 5.5%**
(0.61) (0.91) (0.68) (1.41) (0.63) (1.58) (1.97) (2.15)
M 1.7% 2.3% 1.1% 2.9%* 1.8% 4.0%*** 3.8%** 4.6%***
(0.72) (1.07) (0.49) (1.79) (0.80) (2.75) (2.39) (3.06)
V 1.5% 2.1% 1.1% 2.7%* 1.7% 3.6%*** 2.6%* 3.7%***
(0.80) (1.16) (0.58) (1.81) (0.89) (2.52) (1.70) (2.49)
Big
G 1.0% 1.3% 2.2% 2.0% 0.9% 0.8% 2.7%* 2.6%*
(0.65) (0.87) (1.40) (1.26) (0.56) (0.49) (1.77) (1.67)
M -1.7% -0.7% 0.6% 1.2% -2.1% -1.6% 0.8% 0.9%
(-0.93) (-0.38) (0.35) (0.77) (-1.15) (-0.89) (0.47) (0.55)
V 0.7% 0.4% -2.3% -0.6% 1.2% 3.4% -2.4% 0.1%
(0.23) (0.15) (-0.96) (-0.21) (0.47) (1.14) (-0.97) (0.04)
Entries show the annualized average abnormal returns, in percentages, and their Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, of the hedge portfolios un-
der consideration. The risk-adjustment is from the model identified at the top of each column. We form the hedge portfolios by going long on the
R&D intensive stocks and short on the No-R&D stocks within each size and BE/ME bucket. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively. The sample spans the period from September 1976 to December 2013 (150 quarterly observations).
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Table 2.8: Alternative definitions – 24 size, BE/ME and R&D intensity
portfolios
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
Panel A: Annualized average excess returns on the test portfolios
N (No-R&D) 6.97%* 11.63%*** 13.47%*** 7.65%*** 8.26%*** 10.35%***
L (Low-R&D) 2.99 12.12%*** 8.84%** 5.90%* 8.08%*** 8.01%**
M (Medium-R&D) 10.42%** 14.86%*** 14.74%*** 7.79%*** 10.08%*** 8.14%**
H (High-R&D) 13.88%*** 16.18%*** 17.71%*** 10.55%*** 10.94%*** 12.01%***
H - N 6.91%** 4.56%** 4.25%** 2.91% 2.69% 1.66%
Panel B: H - N differences in CF and DR betas
CF Betas: H - N 0.034 0.064 0.043 0.004 0.068* 0.080*
DR Betas: H - N 0.307*** 0.377*** 0.288*** 0.049 0.173*** 0.481***
Entries on Panel A show the annualized average excess returns of the 24 test portfolios, in percentages, over the 450 months from July 1976 to December 2013. Panel B displays the
differences in CF and DR betas between High and No-R&D portfolios. The portfolios are constructed at the end of June as the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size, 3 portfolios
formed on the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (BE/ME) and 4 portfolios formed on R&D intensity (the ratio of capitalized and amortized R&D to market value
of equity). The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market value of equity at the end of June of year t. The BE/ME for June of year t is the book value of equity for the
last fiscal year end in t − 1 calendar year, divided by the ME for December of t − 1 calendar year. The BE/ME breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. R&D intensity
for June of calendar year t is the capitalized and amortized R&D expenses for the last fiscal year end in t− 1 calendar year, divided by ME for December of t− 1 calendar year. The
No-R&D portfolios include all firm-year observations with no records for R&D expenses. For firm-year observations with R&D records the breakpoints for year t are the 30th and 70th
NYSE percentiles. (Low-R&D, Medium-R&D, High-R&D). “H − N” is the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D portfolios within each size and BE/ME subset. [*], [**] and
[***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Prices of risk with the main and the additional benchmark models
ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF FF4 FF5 Khan-F4 Q-FM
Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Panel A: Prices of risk
Rzb −Rrf 0 0.002 0 0.006* 0 0.005 0 0.009*** 0 0.008** 0 0.012*** 0 0.018*** 0 0.008**
- (0.69) - (1.60) - (1.48) - (2.57) - (1.98) - (3.47) - (4.35) - (2.34)
[0.0%] [1.9%] [0.0%] [6.8%] [0.0%] [5.4%] [0.0%] [10.7%] [0.0%] [9.1%] [0.0%] [14.4%] [0.0%] [22.2%] [0.0%] [9.8%]
NCF 0.032** 0.024* 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.021 0.074***
(2.36) (1.68) (2.96) (2.85) (1.09) (3.54)
[38.2%] [28.4%] [83.8%] [79.3%] [25.3%] [89.3%]
NDR 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.033***
- - (-1.09) (-1.48) (0.28) (-3.63)
[2.5%] [2.5%] [-5.8%] [-9.9%] [1.9%] [-39.8%]
ReM 0.007*** 0.002 0.006*** -0.002 0.008*** -0.000 0.006*** -0.005 0.006*** -0.002
(3.14) (0.55) (2.93) (-0.53) (3.34) (-0.06) (2.87) (-1.30) (2.94) (-0.40)
[8.9%] [2.8%] [7.7%] [-2.7%] [9.1%] [-0.3%] [7.5%] [-6.4%] [7.7%] [-2.0%]
SMB 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002 0.004***
(1.24) (1.88) (1.74) (1.39) (1.95) (2.70) (1.23) (2.51)
[2.4%] [3.7%] [3.6%] [2.8%] [3.7%] [5.3%] [2.4%] [5.2%]
HML 0.003* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.003*
(1.70) (1.54) (1.41) (1.39) (1.23) (1.03) (1.78) (1.69)
[3.4%] [3.1%] [2.9%] [2.8%] [2.4%] [2.0%] [3.5%] [3.4%]
UMD 0.010 0.006
(1.41) (0.77)
[12.4%] [7.3%]
CMA 0.007*** 0.009***
(3.95) (4.87)
[8.2%] [10.3%]
RMW -0.000 -0.001
(-0.25) (-0.43)
[-0.5%] [-1.0%]
ME 0.003** 0.003**
(1.93) (1.97)
[3.9%] [4.0%]
I/A 0.003** 0.003**
(2.29) (1.97)
[3.8%] [3.3%]
ROE 0.003 -0.003
(-0.19) (-1.03)
[-0.6%] [-3.0%]
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Table 2.9: Prices of risk with the main and the additional benchmark models (Cont.)
ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF FF4 FF5 Khan-F4 Q-FM
Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Panel B: Evaluation metrics
R2 23.6% 26.1% -15.3% 4.1% 40.1% 55.2% 42.3% 52.1% 47.3% 53.3% 71.5% 88.3% 45.8% 66.9% 56.8% 63.8%
alpha 58.12** 47.32** 65.26** 46.22** 57.68** 39.98** 51.05** 35.36** 44.57** 32.94** 30.10** 15.79 48.85** 29.75** 37.18** 28.40**
> 27.59 > 26.30 > 27.59 > 26.30 > 26.30 > 25.00 > 25.00 > 23.69 > 23.69 > 22.36 > 22.36 < 21.02 > 23.69 > 22.36 > 23.69 > 22.36
CPE 0.021 0.019** 0.032** 0.025** 0.018 0.011 0.015** 0.012** 0.014** 0.012** 0.009** 0.004** 0.014** 0.009** 0.012** 0.009**
< 0.022 > 0.016 > 0.021 > 0.016 < 0.018 < 0.014 > 0.011 > 0.008 > 0.010 > 0.008 > 0.007 > 0.003 > 0.010 > 0.007 > 0.008 > 0.006
PEM 0.144 0.138 0.178 0.159 0.133 0.103 0.122 0.108 0.119 0.109 0.097 0.061 0.120 0.093 0.109 0.097
HJ 0.057 0.054 0.092 0.076 0.048 0.036 0.046 0.038 0.042 0.037 0.023 0.009 0.043 0.026 0.034 0.029
Entries show the results from the second step Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation for the asset pricing models under consideration. The first column for any given model restricts the zero-beta rate (Rzb) to equal the risk-free rate (Rrf ). Panel A presents the prices of risk, the Newey-West t-statistics in parenthesis and the annualized prices of
risk in square brackets. Panel B shows the R2, alpha, CPE, PEM and HJ for any given asset pricing model. [*], [**] and [***] asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In the case of the t-statistic the null hypothesis is that the price of risk is equal to zero, while in the cases of alpha and CPE the
null hypothesis is that the pricing errors are, on average, equal to zero. For alpha and CPE [**] asterisks denotes rejection of the zero-pricing errors hypothesis since the statistic exceeds the 5% critical value denoted below each statistic. The 5% critical value, for alpha, is obtained from the normal distribution, while for CPE is obtained from a
bootstrap distribution. The asset pricing models are estimated using monthly observations over the period from July 1976 to December 2013. ReM is the excess value-weighted market return. SMB, HML, CMA and RMW are the small-minus-big, high-minus-low, conservative-minus-aggressive and robust-minus-weak Fama-French (1993; 2015)
factors. UMD is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. I/A and ROE are the investment and profitability Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) factors.
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Table 2.10: Hedge portfolios with the main and the additional benchmark models
BE/ME ICAPM CAPM Two-Factor FF FF4 FF5 Khan-F4 Q-FM
Size Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb Rrf = Rzb Rrf 6= Rzb
Small
G 2.9% 3.2% 2.5% 4.1%* 3.5% 4.8%** 5.0%** 4.9%** 4.3%** 4.5%** 0.2% -0.8% 4.6%** 3.9%** 3.7%** 3.3%*
(1.02) (1.21) (0.89) (1.83) (1.31) (2.12) (2.43) (2.39) (2.10) (2.28) (0.27) (-0.94) (2.37) (2.01) (1.99) (1.80)
M 1.2% 1.7% 1.2% 3.2%** 1.5% 3.2%** 3.7%*** 4.7%*** 3.7%*** 4.6%*** 0.6% 1.3% 3.2%*** 3.3%*** 3.5%*** 4.0%***
(0.59) (0.95) (0.63) (2.32) (0.82) (2.26) (2.71) (3.68) (2.73) (3.59) (0.67) (1.56) (2.89) (2.96) (3.22) (3.70)
V 1.4% 1.8% 1.2% 2.9%** 1.9% 3.2%** 2.7%** 4.0%*** 3.0%** 3.9%*** 1.0% 2.4%** 2.3%* 4.0%*** 2.7%** 3.4%***
(0.88) (1.21) (0.72) (2.25) (1.20) (2.44) (2.00) (3.11) (2.25) (3.09) (0.94) (2.19) (1.91) (3.13) (2.36) (2.97)
Big
G 2.2% 2.2% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7% 2.8%* 2.3% 3.0%** 2.5%* 0.9% -0.3% 2.6%* 1.5% 2.4%** 1.4%
(1.43) (1.39) (1.23) (1.23) (1.27) (1.09) (1.86) (1.50) (1.97) (1.61) (0.82) (-0.28) (1.74) (1.05) (2.06) (1.25)
M -0.5% 0.0% -0.1% 1.3% -1.5% -0.6% 0.3% 1.9% 1.7% 2.4%* -1.0% 1.1% -0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 1.7%
(-0.28) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.81) (-0.86) (-0.37) (0.21) (1.29) (1.11) (1.67) (-0.63) (0.76) (-0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (1.14)
V -3.4%* -2.6% -2.6% -0.3% -3.8%* -1.7% -2.4% 1.1% -0.5% 1.6% -4.9%*** -0.5% -2.9% 1.6% -2.6% 0.4%
(-1.65) (-1.10) (-1.20) (-0.10) (-1.76) (-0.71) (-1.09) (0.67) (-0.32) (1.31) (-2.48) (-0.37) (-1.43) (0.98) (-1.20) (0.24)
Entries show annualized average abnormal returns, in percentages, and their Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, of the hedge portfolios under consideration. The risk-adjustment is from the model identified at the top of each column. We form the hedge portfolios by going long on
the R&D intensive stocks and short on the No-R&D stocks within each size and BE/ME bucket. The sample spans the period from July 1976 to December 2013 (450 monthly observations).
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Chapter 3
What Drives R&D Intensive Stock
Returns?
A Variance Decomposition
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Does expensing R&D and thus, omitting the R&D investment from the balance sheet
as prescribed by SFAS No.2 (1974) compromise the usefulness of financial statements’
information? Critics of the SFAS No.2 (1974) accounting treatment argue that it biases
earnings and book values of equity figures so that they lose their ability to represent the
value and performance of R&D intensive firms (e.g., Lev and Zarowin 1999; Chan et al.
2001; Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al. 2005; Beaver et al. 2012; Ciftci et al. 2014).23
Other studies demonstrate that financial reporting information on R&D becomes relevant
for market participants in relation to indicators of uncertainty in future benefits, such as
non-financial performance metrics (Xu et al. 2007) and size (Ciftci and Cready 2011).
Following Kothari et al. (2002), we consider that the uncertainty of future benefits
from currently incurred costs is an issue of information reliability. Therefore, conventional
value relevance tests as joint tests of relevance and reliability (Barth et al. 2001) may lead
to biased inference with respect to the usefulness of financial reporting information on
R&D. The present study circumvents this shortcoming by assessing the value relevance
of financial reporting information on R&D based on Vuolteenaho (2002)’s return variance
decomposition framework. This methodology has been introduced to accounting research
by Callen and Segal (2004), discussed extensively in Callen (2009) and employed by a
number of subsequent studies.24
23Francis and Schipper (1999) and Collins et al. (1997) also note an association between intangible intensity
and a decline in the value relevance of earnings as opposed to the value relevance of book values.
24Callen et al. (2005, 2006); Clatworthy et al. (2012); Shan et al. (2014); Hou, Zhang and Zhuang (2015).
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Prior research (Kothari et al. 2002; Amir et al. 2007) demonstrates that financial
reporting information on the R&D investment is associated with significant variability in
future realised earnings. In this study, we predict that the R&D investment intensity does
not only increase future reported earnings variability, but it also induces expectations of
future earnings variability which, in turn, drive stock return variability. This idea can
also be found in Kothari et al. (2002) who argue that stock return variability reflects the
market’s assessment of a firm’s cash flow uncertainty. Notably, the link between stock
return variability and ex-ante variability of future cash flows point to an aspect of value
relevance that was introduced by Beaver (1968) by the term “information content”.
The return variance decomposition model attunes well with the value relevance aspect
that we examine in the present study. From this perspective, information that is value
relevant affects market participants’ revisions of expectations regarding future cash flows
(cash flow news), and/or discount rates (discount rate news) thereby driving returns vari-
ance (Callen 2009). The extent to which information about future cash flow uncertainty
is reflected in returns variance, is captured by the cash flow news variance contribution
to returns. Note also a role for stochastic discount rates in Vuolteenaho (2002)’s return
variance decomposition model. This is important since the variance contribution of cash
flow news could be overstated (understated) with positive (negative) discount rate news
(Callen 2009).
A further contribution of the present study is to show that financial reporting infor-
mation on R&D provides useful information with respect to risk, i.e., it is risk relevant.
Drawing upon Beaver et al. (1970) and Kothari et al. (2002), we consider earnings vari-
ability as an indication of risk. Whilst this may be a good proxy for an ex-post assessment
of risk, we cannot argue the same with respect to the variance contribution of cash flow
news (or, how information about future cash flow uncertainty is incorporated in return
variance). Easton and Monahan (2016) point out that Vuolteenaho (2002)’s stock return
decomposition model is a tautology which holds regardless of whether investors’ expecta-
tions are driven by changes in sentiment or formed on the basis of underlying fundamentals.
This point is pertinent in our context since returns of R&D intensive firms are potentially
prone to the influence of sentiment; R&D intensive firms are more difficult to value and
thus, costlier to arbitrage (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2006; Cornell et al. 2014). Insofar
current R&D accounting compromises information quality, R&D intensive firms are more
likely to be affected by sentiment than risk. We address this challenge by drawing upon
the intuition in Beaver et al. (1970)’s “accounting betas” using the Campbell et al. (2010)
methodology. More specifically, we assess risk relevance by means of the sensitivity of the
firm’s cash flow news to market news as an indication that systematic risk is driven by
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information conveyed by fundamentals. The implicit assumption is that, rationally priced
risk should be driven by cash flow news. On the other hand, evidence of a relation between
R&D intensity and the sensitivity of discount rate news to the market news would denote
sentiment-driven valuations (i.e., valuations that are based on optimism/pessimism in the
market rather than fundamentals).
In our empirical analysis, having controlled for the size and book-to-market (BE/ME)
effects, we consider firms which do not invest in R&D (No-R&D), firms with low R&D
investment (Low-R&D) and R&D intensive firms (High-R&D). We establish that the dif-
ference in terms of the cash flow news variance contribution between High-R&D firms
and No-R&D firms is positive and statistically significant. Our results are consistent with
the idea that the financial reporting information on R&D provides useful information in
assessing the uncertainty of future benefits. Moreover, concerns about the impact of dis-
count rates variability in the assessment of value relevance are justified, since we observe a
similar pattern with respect to the variance contribution of discount rate news to returns.
When we extend our analysis to the examination of the sensitivity of cash flow news
to the market news, our results suggest that the financial reporting information on R&D
provides useful information in assessing risk. This is because fundamentals, and not sen-
timent, drive the systematic risk of R&D intensive firms. Specifically, we document that
the stocks of R&D intensive firms exhibit significantly higher sensitivity of their cash flow
news to the market’s discount rate news relatively to No-R&D firms.25 Rather counter-
intuitively, stocks of R&D intensive firms exhibit a significantly lower sensitivity of their
cash flow news to the market’s cash flow news relatively to No-R&D firms. We partly
attribute that result to the effect of counter-cyclical R&D activity (Shleifer 1986; Fran-
cois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003; Barlevy 2007), although those insights warrant further research.
More important, we do not observe any particular pattern for the sensitivity of discount
rate news to the market’s news which reinforces our inference about the risk relevance of
financial reporting information.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the return variance
decomposition model and estimation and outlines the methodology for estimating the cash
flow and discount rate news to the market news. Section 3.3 discusses the sample and the
variables employed in this chapter. Section 3.4 presents our findings and Section 3.5 our
robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.
25Motivated by Campbell (1993)’s Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), Campbell et al.
(2010) decompose the market news into a cash flow and a discount rate news component.
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3.2 Methodology and Estimation
3.2.1 Stock Return Variance Decomposition
We define value relevance in terms of return variability and we use Vuolteenaho (2002)’s
return variance decomposition. In particular, we assess the value relevance of the financial
reporting information on R&D as the extent to which this information affects market
participants’ revisions of expectations regarding discount rates (discount rate news) and/or
future cash flows (cash flow news), thereby driving returns variance.
The starting point of the return variance decomposition is a representation of unex-
pected stock returns as a log-linear function of the present-value of unexpected changes
in future expected dividend growth and the present-value of unexpected changes in future
expected discount rates proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b). More formally:
rt+1 − Et(rt+1) = ∆Et+1
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j −∆Et+1
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+1+j + kt+1 (3.1)
where ∆ is the first difference operator; Et+1 is the expectations operator; rt+1 is the
annual log return over the annual log risk-free rate; dt+1 is the annual log dividend; ρ is
the log-linearization discount factor; kt+1 is an approximation error. Equation (3.1) states
that return news have two sources, namely, discounted future cash flow news or/and
discounted future discount rate news.
Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) use the identity in (3.1) to decom-
pose aggregate stock returns. Vuolteenaho (2002) extends their work to the firm-level,
assuming cross-sectional stationarity in the BE/ME ratio and using the accounting clean
surplus relation. Additionally, in Vuolteenaho (2002) the basic cash flow fundamental
is earnings over book value of equity (ROE) instead of dividend growth. Vuolteenaho
(2002)’s firm-level return decomposition model is shown in equation (3.2):
ri,t+1 − Et(ri,t+1) = + ∆Et+1
∞∑
j=0
ρjroei,t+1+j + ki,t+1
−∆Et+1
∞∑
j=1
ρjri,t+1+j
=NCFi,t+1 −NDRi,t+1 (3.2)
The left-hand side of equation (3.2) is the unexpected (log) stock return (i.e., ri,t+1 −
Et(ri,t+1)); NCFi,t+1 denotes the (log) cash flow news (i.e, ∆Et+1
∑∞
j=0ρ
jroei,t+1+j +
ki,t+1); NDRi,t+1 denotes the (log) discount rate news (i.e, ∆Et+1
∑∞
j=1ρ
jri,t+1+j). The
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term ki,t+1 in the first part of (3.2) is an approximation error which in an empirical
setting can be ascribed to either the cash flow or the discount rate news; our inference is
robust to the choice of how the approximation error is accommodated (see Section 3.5.1).
Intuitively, an unanticipated upward revision in the firm’s ROE conveys good news about
the firm’s prospects and induces a positive shock to stock returns. Note that the cash
flow news refers to revisions in the discounted expectations of earnings over the lifetime of
the firm which equivalently could be thought as expectations of cash flows. Moreover, an
unanticipated upward revision in the firm’s discount rate causes a negative shock to stock
returns.
Taking variances of both sides of equation (3.2) and accounting for the covariance term,
yields Vuolteenaho (2002)’s variance decomposition of unexpected stock returns. This is:
var(ri,t+1 − Et(ri,t+1)) = + var(NCFi,t+1)
+ var(NDRi,t+1)
− 2cov(NCFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1) (3.3)
3.2.2 Estimation of the Stock Return Variance Components
The estimation of equations (3.2) and (3.3) rely on a first order vector autoregressive
model VAR(1) to extract the firm-level cash flow and discount rate news (e.g., Campbell
1991; Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al. 2002; Callen and Segal 2004; Callen et al. 2005,
2009). We define zi,t+1 to be a firm-specific vector of cross-sectionally demeaned (i.e.,
market-adjusted) state variables describing a firm i at time t + 1 with the excess return
as its first element. zi,t+1 follows a log-linear VAR(1) process:
zi,t+1 = Γzi,t + υi,t+1 (3.4)
where Γ is the coefficient matrix and υi,t+1 is a vector of error terms. The VAR(1)
coefficient matrix Γ is assumed to be constant over time and across firms. The errors
vector υi,t+1 has a covariance matrix Σ that is assumed to be independent of anything
known at time t.
The VAR(1) model in equation (3.4) is the starting block for estimating the return
decomposition in equation (3.2) (see Campbell 1991). We define e1′ ≡ [1, 0, ..., 0] and the
impulse response function for discount rates:
λ≡e1′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1 (3.5)
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Following related literature ρ is a constant log-linear discount factor, equal to 0.967 annu-
ally. The impulse response function in (3.5) is used to obtain the cash flow and discount
rate news. This is:
NCFi,t+1 ≡ (e1′ + λ′)υi,t+1 (3.6)
NDRi,t+1 ≡ λ′υi,t+1 (3.7)
Considering that the first element in the zi,t+1 vector is excess returns, equations (3.6)
and (3.7) imply that when returns are unpredictable (i.e., the first line of Γ set to null),
discount rate news is equal to zero and the entire unexpected return is attributed to cash
flow news.
We then proceed to the estimation of the variance decomposition model in equation
(3.3) by using the impulse response function of equation (3.5) along with the residuals
covariance matrix Σ, as follows:
var(NCFi,t+1) ≡ (e1′ + λ′)Σ(e1 + λ) (3.8)
var(NDRi,t+1) ≡ λ′Σλ (3.9)
cov(NCFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1) ≡ λ′Σ(e1 + λ) (3.10)
Our hypothesis is that information on the R&D investment affects the returns’ variance
and more specifically, the cash flow news variance which reflects the uncertainty in future
benefits. Evidence of a pronounced return variability which cannot be diversified away
within a portfolio of firms with substantial R&D investment in Chambers et al. (2002)
may also suggest that discount rate news may exhibit a similar pattern to the cash flow
news in relation to the R&D intensity. To test our hypothesis, we compare the cash flow
and discount rate news variance of R&D intensive firms to the cash flow and discount rate
news variance of firms that do not report any R&D activity, respectively. Note that given
the lack of priors, we refrain from making any predictions regarding the covariance term
between discount rate and cash flow news.
3.2.3 Estimation of the Cash Flow and Discount Rate News Sensitivity
to Market News
To assess the risk relevance of financial reporting information on R&D, we extend the
analysis of the properties of cash flow and discount rate news into an examination of their
respective sensitivity to the market news. This approach reflects also the investigation
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of systematic risk by means of “accounting betas”, or “accounting risk” in Beaver et al.
(1970). In our setting, we draw upon the procedure outlined in Campbell et al. (2010).
This procedure involves the estimation of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a)’s market
cash flow (NCFM ) and discount rate (NDRM ) news. Motivated by Campbell (1993)’s
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), Campbell et al. (2010) decompose
the market news into a cash flow and a discount rate news component. According to
ICAPM investors care more about permanent cash-flow-driven movements than about
temporary discount-rate-driven movements in the aggregate stock market. We also follow
this decomposition as we believe it will provide more insight on the sensitivities that we
examine here.
Both market’s cash flow and discount rate news rely on a VAR(1) process. The market-
level VAR(1) is similar to the firm-level one [equation (3.4)], except the freely estimated
intercepts:
zt+1 = c+ Γzt + ut+1 (3.11)
where zt is the (k× 1) vector of the k market-wide state variables with the excess market
return as its first element, c is the (k × 1) vector of intercepts, Γ is the (k×k) matrix
of coefficients, and ut+1 is the (k × 1) vector of the i.i.d. disturbance terms. Based on
equation (3.11), NCFM and NDRM are a linear function of the disturbance terms:
NDRM,t+1≡e1′λut+1 (3.12)
NCFM,t+1≡(e1′ + e1′λ)ut+1 (3.13)
where e1 is a vector with first element one and the remaining elements zero, λ ≡ ρΓ(I −
ρΓ)−1 maps the state variables shocks into the two market news components and ρ is the
log-linearization discount factor. We set ρ = 0.967 annually. Subsequently, the firm-level
cash flow and discount rate news are estimated following Vuolteenaho (2002) (as set out
in Section 3.2.2).
Finally, Campbell et al. (2010) assess whether fundamentals or sentiment drive sys-
tematic risk by means of the sensitivities of firm-level cash flow and discount rate news to
market-level cash flow and discount rate news. We use Campbell et al. (2010)’s definitions,
where i denotes firm-level news and M denotes market-level news:
βNCFi,NCFM≡
cov(NCFi,t+1, NCFM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1 − EtrM,t+1) (3.14)
βNCFi,NDRM≡
cov(NCFi,t+1,−NDRM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1 − EtrM,t+1) (3.15)
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βNDRi,NCFM≡
cov(−NDRi,t+1, NCFM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1 − EtrM,t+1) (3.16)
βNDRi,NDRM≡
cov(−NDRi,t+1,−NDRM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1 − EtrM,t+1) (3.17)
where βNCFi,NCFM (βNCFi,NDRM ) is the sensitivity of firm-level cash flow news to market
cash flow (discount rate) news and βNDRi,NCFM (βNDRi,NDRM ) is the sensitivity of firm-
level discount rate news to market cash flow (discount rate) news.
To estimate equations (3.14) to (3.17), we run regressions of the two firm-level news
series on the normalized market-level cash flow news (NCFM,t+1×var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1)var(NCFM,t+1) )
and on the normalized market-level discount rate news (NDRM,t+1×var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1)var(NDRM,t+1) ).
Note that we estimate the sensitivity of cash flow and discount rates news to the market
news across partitions of firm-year observations based on BE/ME, size and R&D intensity.
Earlier, we set out that the firm level cash flow news variance is predicted to reflect the
uncertainty in future benefits associated with the R&D intensity. Here, we wish to test
whether systematic risk, as the sensitivity of cash flow news to the market news is driven by
this information as well. On the other hand, an indication that the sensitivity of discount
rate to the market discount rate and cash flow news increases as a function of R&D would
suggest that R&D intensity is positively associated with the influence of sentiment on
stock returns. This would be an outcome that would corroborate the criticism of the
accounting treatment of R&D. Notably, we cannot exclude the presence of sentiment as
a determinant of risk among R&D intensive firms. However, as long as the presence of
sentiment in R&D intensive firms’ returns is not more pronounced than the presence in
firms that do not engage with R&D, then we still get support for our hypothesis.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Main Data
We obtain data from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection for the period of 1975 to
2012. We collect data starting from 1975 since that is the date the GAAP standard that
requires the expensing of R&D costs became effective (i.e., SFAS No. 2 1974). We extract
prices, shares outstanding, returns, dividends, delisting returns and delisting prices from
the CRSP monthly stockfile. We extract all relevant accounting information from the
COMPUSTAT annual dataset for North America. We align accounting data for fiscal
years ending in calendar year t − 1 with stock price data at June of calendar year t. We
use the (minimum) six-month lag to ensure that accounting information is observable
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to all market participants; and to align accounting information with stock prices across
firms (e.g., Fama and French 1992, 1993). As a risk-free we use the rolled-over one-month
T-Bill developed by Ibbotson Associates and available in Professor Kenneth R. French’s
website.26
Firms satisfy the following COMPUSTAT-related requirements. First, we use non-
financial firms, thereby excluding firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
between 6000 and 6999. Second, we retain firm-year observations with positive assets and
sales figures and non-negative R&D expenditures.27 For firm-year observations with miss-
ing R&D we assign the value of zero. Third, to mitigate the bias in the way COMPUSTAT
adds firms to its files, we require firms to appear in them for at least two years.28 Finally,
we require firms to have valid book value of equity figures for calendar years t − 1 and
t − 2. The estimation of the book value of equity follows Daniel and Titman (2006) and
is described in Appendix B.
Firms also meet a number of CRSP-related requirements. First, we only use firms
with ordinary common equity listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, thus excluding
ADRs, REITs and units of beneficial interest. Second, we require firms to have valid
market value of equity figures for calendar years t − 1 and t − 2. Third, in order to
avoid stale prices or market microstructure issues, we require firm-year observations to
have a valid trade figure in the month immediately preceding the calendar period t return
(Vuolteenaho 2002). Finally, to minimise data errors, we exclude firm-year observations
with market value of equity less than $10 million and BE/ME figure more than 100 or less
than 1/100. With the above requirements in place, we end up with a sample of 83, 487
firm-year observations.
3.3.2 Firm-level VAR State Variables
The three state variables in the firm-level VAR(1) of equation (3.4) are: (a) the annual
log excess stock return (rei ), (b) the excess log return on book value of equity (roe
e
i ) and (c)
the log book-to-market ratio (be/mei). The choice of state variables is based on prior re-
search’s evidence of their ability to explain firm-level return variation. In addition, be/mei
is required since Vuolteenaho (2002)’s model relies on the BE/ME stationarity assump-
tion. Each year, all state variables are winsorised at the 1% level and cross-sectionally
adjusted.
26http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
27According to COMPUSTAT, the cases of negative R&D expenditures are very rare. Indeed, in this
chapter’s sample there are only seven firm-years with negative R&D expenditures. However, these are
not data errors. As explained by COMPUSTAT, the negative R&D expenses likely reflect adjustments
of funds allocated in earlier years.
28For an extended discussion of the COMPUSTAT-related biases, see Kothari et al. (1995).
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For the first state variable, annual returns are compounded from monthly returns
recorded from the beginning of July of calendar year t to the end of June of calendar
year t + 1. We include delisting returns when available in CRSP.29 To avoid the impact
of log-transformed extreme values we reduce the weight of stock returns by 10%. This
is, we define stock returns as an annually rebalanced portfolio, consisting of 90% of the
firm’s common stock and of 10% of Treasury bills (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al.
2002; Campbell et al. 2010). To get excess log returns we subtract the annual log risk-free
rate.30
For the second state variable, we use the earnings (net income) reported in COMPUS-
TAT (COMPUSTAT mnemonic NI). Where earnings are missing, we compute them with
the clean surplus formula i.e., Xi,t = ∆tBEi + DIVi,t, where X is net income; ∆tBE is
the closing book value of equity less the beginning of period book value of equity; DIV
is the dividend.31 Following Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen et al. (2002), we eliminate
unreasonable low earnings values by not allowing firms to lose more than their book value
of equity. Therefore, the return on book value of equity is truncated to -100%. Finally,
to ensure that (3.2) holds exactly, we subtract log risk-free rate from the log-transformed
return on book value of equity.
The last state variable is the BE/ME ratio computed as the book value of equity for
calendar year t− 1, divided by the market value of equity for December of calendar year
t− 1. Following Campbell et al. (2010), to avoid influential log-transformed observations,
we shrink the BE/ME ratio toward one. This is, we define the log BE/ME ratio as:
be/mei,t = log[(0.90BEi,t + 0.10MEi,t)/MEi,t].
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the VAR(1) state variables. Both panels of
Table 3.1 are estimated with the COMPUSTAT-CRSP intersection, consisting of 83, 487
firm-year observations.
[Insert Table 3.1 here.]
29Following Beaver et al. (2007), when both monthly and delisting returns are available the delisting return
is computed as DLRt,t+k = ((1 +Rt,t+j−1)(1 +DLRt,t+j))− 1. When delisting returns are missing we
follow the next procedure. If a firm was listed on NYSE or AMEX and has been dropped by the exchange
or the SEC (delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591 but not 501 and 502), we assume -30% delisting
return (Shumway 1997). If a firm was listed on NASDAQ and has been dropped by the exchange or the
SEC (delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591 but not 501 and 502), we assume -55% delisting return
(Shumway and Warther 1999). If a firm was listed on any of the three exchanges and has been or will
be liquidated (delisting codes ranging from 400 to 490), we assume -100% delisting return (Prakash and
Sinha 2012).
30Annual risk-free returns are compounded from monthly returns recorded from the beginning of July of
calendar year t to the end of June of calendar year t+ 1.
31This variable re-definition is due to Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen et al. (2002), and it assumes that the
clean surplus relation holds. This is, with missing earnings, we attribute all changes in the book value of
equity to either income or dividends (Feltham and Ohlson 1995). This is a gross simplification of reality,
since, for example, dividends may include non-cash dividends that have zero marginal effect on the book
value of equity. In those instances, an errors-in-variables problem potentially arises in the estimation
of earnings. However, missing earnings (net income) figures are extremely rare. In the sample of this
chapter only 401 firm-years have missing earnings (0.48% of the sample).
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Panel A presents means, standard deviations and percentiles for the three state variables.
The first state variable (rei ) varies considerably and is left-skewed. The second state
variable (roeei ) varies similarly, albeit more modestly, to r
e
i , while it is left-skewed too.
The last state variable (be/mei) has the highest variation, while it is not significantly
skewed. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the market-adjusted state variables.
Subtracting the cross-sectional means from the data, reduces the variations of all state
variables but roeei . Notably, all data features are consistent with those observed in prior
research (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al. 2002).
3.3.3 Market-level VAR State Variables
In order to extract the cash flow and the discount rate market news, we implement a
VAR(1) model using a number of state variables which predict aggregate stock returns.
We use the following state variables: excess log market return (reM,t), smoothed price-to-
earnings ratio (PE), term yield (TY ), small stocks value spread (V S) and default spread
(DEF ). Appendix C repots and discusses the market-level VAR(1) results.
The state variables cover the period from December 1929 to December 2012 with
annually frequency, yielding 84 time series observations. reM,t is the difference between
the log value-weighted stock market return and the log one-month Treasury bill rate,
both obtained from CRSP. PE is the ratio of the S&P 500 price over the 10-year moving
average of the S&P 500 earnings, taken from Professor Robert J. Shiller webpage.32 TY
is the difference between the log-yield of the ten-year Treasury bond and the log-yield
of the three-month Treasury bill. The yield on the ten-year Treasury bond is obtained
from Professor Robert J. Shiller’s webpage and the yield on the three-month Treasury bill
from CRSP. V S is the difference between the log-BE/ME of the small value portfolio and
the log-BE/ME of the small growth portfolio at the end of June. The data employed to
construct V S are obtained from Professor Kenneth R. French’s webpage.33 DEF is the
difference between the log-yields of Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bonds. The data
on corporate bonds are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (FRED).34
The annual series for the market-level VAR state variables TY , PE, V S and DEF are
equal to their corresponding end-of-June values. For reM,t, annual returns are compounded
from monthly returns from the beginning of July of calendar year t to the end of June of
calendar year t+ 1. This approach is outlined in Campbell et al. (2010, pg. 322, ft. 8).
32PE as well as the ten-year Treasury bond rate can be retrieved from http://www.econ.yale.edu/
~shiller/data.htm.
33Data on the returns of the standard Fama and French (1992, 1993) size and BE/ME sorted portfolios
are retrievable from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
34Data on corporate bond yields can be retrieved from http://research.stlouisfed.org/.
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3.3.4 Group Variables
We partition firm-year observations based on firm-level size, BE/ME and a measure of
R&D intensity. All control variables are winsorised at the 1% level, on an annual basis.
The size figure is the price at the end of June times the number of shares outstanding.
When price is missing, we use the alternative price and the delisting price with that order.
As set out earlier, the BE/ME ratio is the book value of equity for calendar year t-1,
divided by the market value of equity at the end of December of calendar year t − 1.
Our R&D intensity variable is based on the “off-balance sheet” asset capturing financial
reporting information that is available to market participants but omitted from the balance
sheet. The underlying assumption is that market participants perceive prior and current
R&D expenditures as an investment with uncertain outcomes. We estimate the magnitude
of the R&D asset as the capitalized and amortized current and past R&D expenditures
(COMPUSTAT mnemonic RDX) that would have been on the balance sheet in calendar
year t− 1, had that accounting treatment been allowed [see equation (A.1), Appendix A].
We capitalize and amortize the R&D expenditures by incorporating Lev and Sougiannis
(1996)’s industry-specific amortization schedule. Then, following prior research (e.g., Chan
et al. 2001), our measure of R&D intensity is deflated by the market value of equity.35
The estimation of R&D asset is described in Appendix A.
We classify firm-year observations at the end of June of calendar year t as follows.
We first group firm-year observations according to their size. We use the median NYSE
market value of equity as the size breakpoint. This yields two size classifications, namely
the Small and Big size subsets. Next, we group our firm-year observations based on
their BE/ME using the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles as cut-off points. This results in
three BE/ME classifications, namely the growth (G), Medium (M) and value (V) BE/ME
subsets. Finally, we group firms according to their R&D intensity. The first subset includes
all firm-year observations with no records on R&D expenses. Firms with R&D expenses
are classified in two categories using the median NYSE R&D intensity as cut-off point.
Collectively, this approach yields three R&D intensity classifications, namely the No-R&D
(N), Low-R&D (L) and High-R&D (H) subsets. Note that with this setting R&D intensive
firms correspond to the High-R&D subset. We use the terms “High-R&D” and “R&D
intensive” interchangeably.
35Scaling with market value of equity presumably leads to a spurious relation between R&D and returns
(e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002). This is not an issue for us since we focus on the
variance contributions of the return news components and not on ERCs. Moreover, we want to evaluate
variance decomposition results obtained with an R&D intensity measure that has been associated with
the strongest traces of abnormal performance. Untabulated results using assets as a scale variable
produce similar findings.
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3.4 Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Results
3.4.1.1 Variance Decomposition Results
We estimate the firm-level VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ along with the errors matrix
υ and the errors covariance matrix Σ, using the market-adjusted state variables. We
employ the weighted least squares approach (WLS) and compute one pooled regression
for each state variable (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al. 2002; Hecht and Vuolteenaho
2006; Campbell et al. 2010). Similarly to the Fama-MacBeth procedure (1973), the WLS
approach weights each cross-section equally, thereby ensuring that the coefficients are not
significantly biased by the larger cross-sections toward the end of the sample (Campbell
et al. 2010). In practice, for each firm-year and pooled regression, we deflate the dependent
and independent variables by the number of firms in the corresponding cross-section.
Table 3.2 presents the transposed VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ along with their jack-
knife t-statistics, in square brackets.36 We comment on the statistical significance of our
findings by reference to the jackknife t-statistics.
[Insert Table 3.2 here.]
The first predictive regression of the VAR(1) shows that re is high when past roee and
be/me are high (both statistically significant at 1%). The second predictive regression of
the VAR(1) shows that roee is high when past roee and re are high and past be/me is low
(all statistically significant at 1%). The third predictive regression of the VAR(1) shows
that be/me is high when past be/me and roee are high and past re is low (all statistically
significant at 1%).
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the mappings of the state variables into cash flow and
discount rate news as computed following the equations (3.6) and (3.7). Panel B of Ta-
ble 3.3 shows the variance decomposition of unexpected stock returns computed according
to equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10).
[Insert Table 3.3 here.]
In Table 3.3, Panel A, the firm-level partial relation between discount rate news and
unexpected returns is negative, as prescribed by identity (3.2). Turning to Panel B,
our findings confirm prior research documenting that the main driver of firm-level stock
returns is cash flow news (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002; Callen 2009). Specifically, the cash flow
36In order to reduce cross-sectional correlation bias, we employ Shao and Rao (1993)’s jackknife method
for robust standard errors. The Shao and Rao (1993) jackknife methodology is outlined in Appendix E.
Results with WLS and Newey-West standard errors are available upon request.
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news variance is 0.181 (i.e., the standard deviation is 43%), while the discount rate news
variance is 0.009 (i.e., the standard deviation is 10%). Finally, the correlation between the
two news terms is positive and statistically significant. This is in-line with the findings
documented in existing studies (e.g., Hecht and Vuolteenaho 2006; Campbell et al. 2010).
3.4.1.2 Variance Decomposition Results: The Impact of R&D
Table 3.4 presents the unexpected returns variance decomposition as a function of
size, BE/ME and R&D intensity. To ensure that we capture effects that clearly pertain
to R&D, we estimate the stock return variance decomposition conditionally upon firm
size, BE/ME and R&D intensity. We are motivated to apply this approach given that
R&D intensity is interdependent with the BE/ME and size effects on stock returns. (e.g.,
Chan et al. 2001; Lev and Sougiannis 1999; Donelson and Resutek 2012). In practice, a
separate variance decomposition is estimated for each size, BE/ME and R&D intensity
intersection, assuming that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ is common for all stocks while
allowing the VAR(1) error covariance matrix Σ to vary across groups of firms with similar
characteristics (see also Vuolteenaho 2002). Here, the return and the return variance
components of equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) are computed from a covariance matrix Σ
that is a function of size, BE/ME and R&D intensity.
[Insert Table 3.4 here.]
Several findings emerge in Table 3.4. First, the main driver of unexpected return
variance is cash flow news, i.e., fundamentals [see equation (3.3)]; this holds across all
BE/ME, size and R&D intensity partitions. For instance, the variance contribution of
cash flow news is much larger compared to that of discount rate news across all portfolios;
the cash flow news variance is from 15 to 37 times larger than the discount rate news
variance.
Second, cash flow news variance increases with R&D intensity. In particular, the cash
flow news variance of High R&D firms is larger than the corresponding variance of No-
R&D firms; the H −N difference in cash flow news variances is positive and statistically
significant across all the Small size partitions and, to a lesser extent, across the Big size
partitions. These results suggest that the financial reporting of R&D is value relevant, es-
pecially for small size firms, in the sense that it conveys information about the uncertainty
in future benefits. The weaker results in the Big size partitions may just reflect that larger
firms are better positioned than smaller firms to spread or diversify R&D investment risks
(see Ciftci and Cready 2011). Therefore, such evidence does not necessarily negate our
hypothesis that the financial reporting information on R&D is value relevant.
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Third, the discount rate news variance also increases with R&D intensity, i.e., the
H − N difference in discount rate news variances is positive and statistically significant
across all the small size partitions and, to a lesser extent, across the big size partitions.
Fourth, the covariance between the discount rate and cash flow news is positive. Those
findings validate Callen (2009)’s concerns that the assumption of constant discount rates
(a typical assumption in conventional value relevance tests) may bias inference.
Overall, we find support to our hypothesis that financial reporting information on
R&D conveys value relevant information about the uncertainty of future benefits in mar-
ket participants’ assessments. Our evidence here also complements prior research which
associates financial reporting information on R&D with future realised earnings variabil-
ity (Kothari et al. 2002; Amir et al. 2007) and returns variability (Chambers et al. 2002).
However, we are the first to demonstrate the direct effect of the market’s assessment of a
firm’s cash flow uncertainty on stock return variance in terms of the variance contribution
of cash flow news to returns.
3.4.2 Discussion: Fundamentals against Sentiment Tests
So far, our results suggest that the R&D reporting information is value relevant in the
sense that it provides information on uncertainty. We go one step further and examine
whether fundamentals or sentiment explain the systematic risk of R&D intensive firms.
To this end, we use Campbell et al. (2010)’s methodology (see Section 3.2.3). According
to this, rationally priced risk is reflected on the sensitivity of the stock’s cash flow news
(fundamentals) to the market’s news while sentiment is reflected on the sensitivity of the
stock’s discount rate news (fundamentals) to the market’s news.
Following Campbell et al. (2010), we examine the sensitivity of firms’ cash flow and
discount rate news to market news. That is, we estimate the coefficients of firm-level
cash flow and discount rate news on market-level cash flow and discount rate news [see
equations (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), and (3.17)]. The estimation of the market-level cash flow
and discount rate news is reported and discussed in Appendix C. Note that we consider
on partitions of observations defined by size, BE/ME and R&D intensity intersections.
[Insert Table 3.5 here.]
In the case of firm-level cash flow news, Table 3.5 shows their sensitivity to market-
level cash flow news (βNCFi,NCFM , Panel A) and to discount rate news (βNCFi,NDRM ,
Panel B).37 In Panel A of Table 3.5 we can see that the cash flow news of High-R&D firms
37Note that the coefficients presented here are not directly comparable with those estimated by Campbell
et al. (2010). Campbell et al. (2010) estimate the sensitivity of portfolios’ discount rate and cash flow
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are less sensitive to market cash flow news than the cash flow news of No-R&D firms,
i.e., the H −N difference in βNCFi,NCFM is negative. At first glance, this appears to be
counterintuitive, given that the pronounced financial constraints of R&D intensive firms
may exacerbate risk during recessions, i.e., during adverse market cash flow shocks (Li
2011). Accounting and finance research so far provide limited evidence on the effect of
business cycles to the risk related to R&D activity. We therefore draw some insight from
the economics literature to interpret these results. We acknowledge that future research
could shed more light into the implications of this research for the relevance of financial
reporting information.
We propose that the lower sensitivity of High R&D firms to the market level cash flow
news may be attributed to the implications of counter–cyclical R&D activity. Economists
have long recognised that there is a time lag between innovation and implementation
(Shleifer 1986; Francois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003). Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) argue
that entrepreneurs engage in R&D in recessions and then wait to implement their ideas
in booms. Moreover, Barlevy (2007) notes that the increase in R&D during recessions
could be seen as an acceleration in the development of existing projects, given less costly
resources. From this perspective, we argue that future benefits of R&D intensive firms
during recessions may be perceived by the market as relatively less risky than firms with
no R&D investment, in the sense that their expected cash flows are higher. However, we
note that the magnitude of this coefficient, and thus the influence of this type of sensitivity
is rather small, at least in comparison to the magnitude of coefficients reported in Panel
B.
The results reported in Panel B of Table 3.5 confirm our initial intuition that the risk
of R&D intensive firms is driven by the sensitivity of their cash flows to the market’s
discount rate shocks. This finding is also more consistent with Li (2011)’s findings of an
association between R&D intensity, financial constraints and risk. It can be seen that in all
size and BE/ME intersections, the difference between No-R&D and High R&D is positive
and significant. Overall, we conclude that the results reported in Table 3.5 suggest that
financial reporting information on R&D conveys useful information on the sensitivity of
the stock’s cash flow news (fundamentals) to the market’s news and support the idea that
this information is risk relevant.
[Insert Table 3.6 here.]
In the case of firm-level discount rate news, Table 3.6 shows their sensitivity to market-
news to the market news components. Instead here, we estimate firm-level sensitivities of cash flow and
discount rate news to the market news to maintain continuity with the findings discussed in the previous
section.
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level cash flow news (βNDRi,NCFM , Panel A) and to discount rate news (βNDRi,NDRM ,
Panel B). In Panel A we can see that there is no R&D intensity effect on βNDRi,NCFM
in most of the cases, i.e., βNDRi,NCFM does not change significantly across the R&D
dimension (H −N). We document analogous results for βNDRi,NDRM in Panel B. Hence,
our findings suggest that R&D intensity has no significant impact on the sensitivities of
firm-level discount rate news to market-level news.
In sum, the analysis of this section supports that the risk of R&D intensive firms is
driven by the higher sensitivity of their fundamentals to market-wide movements rather
than the sensitivity of discount rates to market-wide movements, pointing to the risk
relevance of the financial reporting on R&D.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Direct Estimation of Cash Flow News
The indirect method used throughout Section 3.4 estimates cash flow news and cash
flow news variance, residually (i.e., indirect approach). The indirect approach incorporates
the approximation error (k) of the return decomposition [see equation (3.2)] into cash flow
news and in turn cash flow news variance. Therefore, the importance of cash flow news
in the return variance decompositions might be overstated. As a robustness check, we
measure cash flow news directly. The direct estimation of cash flow news circumvents
any potential undesirable impact of the approximation error. However, the direct method
violates equation (3.3) since the return variance components do not add up to the observed
return variances. The direct approach is described below.
We use the second state variable of the VAR(1) of equation (3.4) (i.e., roeei ). Then,
we define e2′ ≡ [0, 1, ..., 0] and the impulse response function for cash flows.
λ2≡e2′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1 (3.18)
With equation (3.18) at hand, cash flow news can now be expressed as follows.
NCFi,t+1 ≡ λ2′υi,t+1 (3.19)
There is no change in the estimation of discount rate news and discount rate news variance
[see equations (3.7) and (3.9)]. Finally, cash flow news variance and the covariance term
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are estimated with the residual covariance matrix Σ as the expressions below show.
var(NCFi,t+1) ≡ λ2′Σλ2 (3.20)
cov(NCFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1) ≡ λ′Σλ2 (3.21)
The residual covariance matrix Σ again varies as a function of size, BE/ME and R&D
intensity. The main interest is to assess whether the choice between directly and indirectly
computed cash flow news changes our inference with respect to the return decomposition
as discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.2. Specifically, we check whether the indirect method
biases the impact of R&D intensity on the variance contribution of cash flow and discount
rate news.
[Insert Table 3.7 here.]
Table 3.7 presents the return variance decomposition results conditionally on firm size,
BE/ME and R&D intensity using directly estimated cash flow news. We draw four main
observations from Table 3.7. First, cash flow news variance increases as R&D intensity
increases within any given size, and BE/ME classification. Second, differences in cash flow
news variances between High-R&D and No-R&D partitions are positive and statistical
significant across all size and BE/ME firm groups. Third, differences in cash flow news
variances between High-R&D and No-R&D partitions are larger than those presented on
Table 3.4. Fourth, the variance contribution of discount rate news increases with R&D
intensity. These observations suggest that under both the direct and indirect methods, the
importance of cash flow news as the main return variance driver, is an increasing function
of R&D intensity. The choice between direct and indirect method has no significant
consequence on the interplay between R&D intensity and the variance contribution of
cash flow and discount rate news to stock returns.
3.5.2 Industry-specific Estimation
This section evaluates the sensitivity of our results to the measure of R&D intensity
employed here. To this end, we define an alternative industry-based indicator of R&D
intensity. In particular, we compare the variance contributions of cash flow and dis-
count rate news of industries that historically exhibit high R&D expenses (Chemicals &
Pharmaceutics; Machinery & Computer Hardware; Electrical & Electronics) to industries
that historically exhibit low R&D expenses (Food & Kindred Products; Transportation;
Wholesale & Durable Goods). In practice, we estimate a separate return variance decom-
position for each industry, allowing the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ and the VAR(1)-error
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covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms in the same industry.
[Insert Table 3.8 here.]
Table 3.8 lends support to Subsection 3.4.1.2’s results. Specifically, the importance of
cash flow news, as the main return variance driver, is higher in industries with considerable
R&D outlays. Accordingly, the importance of discount rate news, as the second return
variance driver, increases in R&D intensive industries. In other words, the way we define
and measure R&D intensity does not affect our conclusions.
3.5.3 “Richer” Firm-level VAR(2) Estimation
Up to now we have assumed that the time-series of the state variables are interrelated
with a fist-order VAR process [i.e., VAR(1)]. This is a simplification of reality, which has
been employed by all related accounting and finance studies. To this day, there is no
theoretically motivated economic model to justify the VAR(1) choice. Hence, our results
might be sensitive to the inclusion of only one lag per state variable. In this section we
assume “richer” interrelations, using two lags per state variable [i.e., VAR(2)]. To this
end, we follow Callen (2009, pg. 152), who suggests to consider up to two lags for each
state variable. Results from this exercise indicate the lag order of the VAR does not alter
our main conclusions.
[Insert Table 3.9 here.]
Table 3.9 presents the parameter estimates, jackknife t-statistics, Adj.R2 and F values
from the VAR(2) specification. The predictive variables now include two lags of: (1) re; (2)
roee; and (3) be/me. The results from this “richer” specification are qualitatively similar
to the main results obtained from the VAR(1) (see Table 3.2). Due to the additional state
variable lags, the statistical significance of some parameter estimates is lower. However,
the first auto-regression of the system effectively maintained its predictive power (F value
of 166.79; statistical significant at lower than %). Thus, the return decomposition is still
valid.
[Insert Table 3.10 here.]
Table 3.10 presents the mappings of the state variables into cash flow and discount
rate news (Panel A); the variance-covariance matrix of the news and their correlation
(Panel B). These are estimated using the coefficient matrix and the errors vector from
the VAR(2). Again the results are qualitatively similar to those reported by the VAR(1)-
originated Table 3.3. The partial relation between discount rate news and unexpected
returns is still negative. The main driver of firm-level stock returns is still cash flow news
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with 0.167 variance (i.e., 41% standard deviation), while the discount rate news variance
is 0.004 (i.e., 6% standard deviation). The news correlation is positive and statistically
significant, albeit smaller than the one estimated with VAR(1) inputs. In general, our
results do not seem to be qualitatively sensitive to the VAR’s lag order.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
We provide evidence that omitting the R&D investment from the balance sheet as pre-
scribed by SFAS No.2 (1974) does not compromise the usefulness of financial statements’
information. Using a return variance decomposition approach, we find that a measure
of R&D intensity (a proxy for the omitted R&D asset constructed by capitalised past
and current R&D expenditures) contains information that is reflected in the manner that
market participants’ revise their expectations regarding discount rates and future cash
flows. We find that the cash flow and discount rate news variance increase with R&D
intensity, with the cash flow news variance being the dominant contributor to unexpected
return variance. Our findings are consistent with prior research’s findings on the associa-
tion between R&D intensity and uncertainty in future benefits using realised earnings and
returns (Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002; Kothari et al. 2002; Amir et al. 2007).
The risk relevance perspective is also consistent with the rational of expensing rather
than capitalising R&D costs in SFAS No.2 (1974). In particular, paragraph 50 of SFAS
No.2 (1974, pg. 14) supports that “. . . the relationship between current research and
development costs and the amount of resultant future benefits to an enterprise is so un-
certain that capitalization of any research and development costs is not useful in assessing
the earnings potential of the enterprise”. SFAS’s argument implies that accounting for
R&D is not designed with the purpose to convey information about the magnitude of
future benefits but rather, to convey information about future benefits’ uncertainty. Our
evidence maps into the standard setters’ intention as stated in SFAS No.2 (1974).
Similar views are also noted by Penman and Reggiani (2013) who argue that expens-
ing R&D is an expression of conservative accounting which aims at communicating the
uncertainty in the future benefits that R&D investment generates. In the same vein, our
results suggest that market participants do not see the omission of the R&D asset as an
accounting distortion. Instead they view it as information useful in determining the vari-
ance of expected cash flows and the evaluation of risk. We extent our investigation to
confirm this intuition in terms of the impact of R&D intensity on the sensitivity of the
cash flow component of unexpected returns to the market news. Interestingly, our results
also show that R&D intensity does not affect the sensitivity of the discount rate compo-
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nent of unexpected returns to the market news. Evidence to the contrary would imply
that inadequate information on R&D would tempt market participants to set discount
rates that are influenced by changes in temporary movements in aggregate stock prices
or, market news, with this occurrence to be more pronounced in R&D intensive firms.
Collectively, we conclude that financial reporting information on R&D is value relevant
and conveys useful information for the evaluation of risk.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the VAR(1) state variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min 25%-pct Median 75%-pct Max
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the basic data
ri
e -0.024 0.454 -2.750 -0.237 0.012 0.232 1.899
roei
e 0.003 0.301 -2.019 -0.035 0.054 0.125 1.220
be/mei -0.522 0.630 -2.144 -0.953 -0.509 -0.087 1.864
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the market-adjusted data
ri
e 0.000 0.425 -2.584 -0.201 0.026 0.236 1.942
roei
e 0.000 0.299 -1.946 -0.043 0.046 0.126 0.989
be/mei 0.000 0.606 -1.808 -0.407 0.020 0.408 2.072
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the firm-level state variables included in the VAR(1). ri
e is the log return
of firm i over the log risk-free rate; roei
e is the log US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book value of equity of firm i
over the log risk-free rate; be/mei is the log ratio of book value of equity over the market value of equity of firm i.
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the market-adjusted firm-level state variables included in the VAR(1).
The variables, described in panel A, are market-adjusted by subtracting the cross-sectional average each year. Both panels of
Table 3.1 are estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year obser-
vations.
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Table 3.2: Firm-level VAR(1) parameter estimates
rt+1
e roet+1
e be/met+1
rt
e 0.015 0.093*** -0.331***
[0.38] [5.09] [-16.99]
roet
e 0.106*** 0.365*** 0.147***
[3.19] [25.63] [6.58]
be/met 0.063*** -0.068*** 0.799***
[3.18] [-10.43] [62.93]
Adj.R2 1.30% 15.37% 66.15%
F 367.55*** 5056.76*** 54375.10***
Table 3.2 shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for the first-order firm-level VAR(1) model of
equation (3.4). The state variables included in the firm-level VAR(1) are the re which is the market-
adjusted log stock return over the log risk-free rate; the roee which is the market-adjusted log return
on (beginning of period) book value of equity over the log risk-free rate; and the be/me which is the
market-adjusted log ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. The table reports the es-
timated coefficients on the state variables and at the bottom the corresponding Adj.R2 and F values,
testing the null hypothesis. Below each coefficient the table reports, WLS t-statistics; Newey-West
t-statistics, in parentheses; and jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*], [**] and [***] indicate
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The firm-level VAR(1) is estimated from the
pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year observations.
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Table 3.3: Cash flow and discount rate news properties
Panel A: Mappings of the state Panel B: Variance-covariance matrix
on the estimated news and correlation
NCF NDR NCF NDR
Return shock 0.967 -0.033 NCF 0.181 0.006
ROE shock 0.198 0.198 NDR 0.006 0.009
BE/ME shock 0.202 0.202 Correlation 0.144***
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the functions (e1′ + e1′λ, e1′λ) that map the shocks in the state-variables of the firm-level
VAR(1) of Table 3.2 to cash flow and discount rate news. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we define λ ≡ ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1
where Γ is the estimated VAR(1) coefficient matrix form Table 3.2 and ρ is set to 0.967 annually.
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the variance-covariance matrix and the correlation matrix of the estimated news terms. [*],
[**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Both panels of Table 3.3 are estimated from
the pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year observations.
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Table 3.4: Variance decomposition as a function of firm size, BE/ME and
R&D intensity
Variance of cash flow news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.233*** 0.151*** 0.179*** 0.101*** 0.073*** 0.065***
[12.21 ] [11.09 ] [11.23 ] [7.98 ] [8.24 ] [7.34 ]
L 0.245*** 0.149*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.072*** 0.069***
[9.29 ] [11.85 ] [13.81 ] [4.47 ] [5.86 ] [6.36 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.304*** 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.116*** 0.071*** 0.083***
[10.01 ] [9.05 ] [9.54 ] [6.25 ] [9.28 ] [7.80 ]
H-N 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.027** 0.016 -0.002 0.018**
Variance of discount rate news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[14.23 ] [18.56 ] [11.98 ] [11.99 ] [7.90 ] [8.15 ]
L 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[18.14 ] [10.72 ] [8.86 ] [9.16 ] [6.73 ] [5.39 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[22.18 ] [13.29 ] [8.59 ] [8.74 ] [6.38 ] [7.39 ]
H-N 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
Covariance of news terms
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*
[9.65 ] [4.37 ] [1.57 ] [3.62 ] [0.88 ] [1.69 ]
L 0.010*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
[6.39 ] [1.88 ] [0.31 ] [1.37 ] [-0.68 ] [1.38 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.013*** 0.002* 0.002* 0.005*** 0.001 0.002***
[5.50 ] [1.86 ] [1.88 ] [3.35 ] [0.76 ] [3.04 ]
H-N 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003** 0.000 0.000
Table 3.4 shows the variance decomposition of the demeaned excess returns for stocks classified based on the intersection of
their size, BE/ME and R&D intensity characteristics. “Small” denotes the lowest size and “Large” the highest size stocks.
“Growth” denotes the lowest BE/ME and “Value” the highest BE/ME stocks. “High-R&D” denotes the highest R&D in-
tensity stocks, while “No-R&D” refers to stocks with no records of R&D expenses. “H-N” denotes the difference between
High-R&D and No-R&D subsets within same size and BE/ME buckets. The table estimates a separate variance decompo-
sition for each size, BE/ME and R&D intensity intersection, assuming that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ is common for
all stocks while allowing the VAR(1)-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms. The table reports jackknife t-statistics,
in square brackets. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The variance decomposi-
tion of Table 3.4 is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year
observations.
70
Table 3.5: Responses to cash flow news as function of firm size, BE/ME
and R&D intensity
Panel A: Firm cash flow news on Market cash flow news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) -0.039*** 0.094*** 0.132*** -0.033** 0.027** 0.078***
-2.49 8.82 11.94 -2.23 2.05 4.85
L -0.149*** 0.053*** 0.069** -0.261*** -0.015 0.015
-7.90 2.93 2.46 -13.26 -0.77 0.43
H (High-R&D) -0.112*** -0.064*** 0.014 -0.130*** -0.029* 0.092***
-5.46 -4.04 0.81 -5.90 -1.62 2.54
H-N -0.072*** -0.158*** -0.117*** -0.097*** -0.055*** 0.014
-2.80 -8.27 -5.63 -3.63 -2.53 0.35
Panel B: Firm cash flow news on Market discount rate news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.010 -0.277*** -0.250*** -0.010 -0.076** -0.236***
0.25 -10.28 -8.86 -0.27 -2.33 -5.91
L 0.220*** -0.060 -0.049 0.558*** -0.047 -0.089
4.51 -1.27 -0.70 11.48 -0.96 -1.06
H (High-R&D) 0.294*** 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.314*** 0.082* 0.021
5.78 4.04 3.16 6.05 1.88 0.23
H-N 0.284*** 0.438*** 0.388*** 0.324*** 0.158*** 0.257***
4.34 9.09 7.46 5.07 2.90 2.62
Table 3.5 shows the responses of market news components to firm-level cash flow news. These responses are
βNCFi,NCFM≡
cov(NCFi,t+1,NCFM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1) and βNCFi,NDRM≡
cov(NCFi,t+1,−NDRM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1) and are presented in Panel A and B,
respectively. “Small” denotes the lowest size and “Large” the highest size stocks. “Growth” denotes the lowest BE/ME and
“Value” the highest BE/ME stocks. “High-R&D” denotes the highest R&D intensity stocks, while “No-R&D” refers to stocks
with no records of R&D expenses. “H-N” denotes the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D subsets within same size and
BE/ME bucket. The firm-level cash flow news are estimated with a separate variance decomposition for each size, BE/ME and
R&D intensity intersection, assuming that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ is common for all stocks while allowing the VAR(1)-
error covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms. The market-level news are extracted with a VAR(1), using macroeconomic state
variables as inputs. The table reports t-statistics that do not account for estimation uncertainty in the extraction of the market-
level news terms. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Responses to discount rate news as function of firm size,
BE/ME and R&D intensity
Panel A: Firm discount rate news on Market cash flow news.
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.012*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.002 0.000 -0.016***
3.31 0.43 -5.83 0.83 0.09 -5.16
L 0.019*** -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.006* -0.022***
4.77 -0.49 -0.84 0.00 -1.87 -3.51
H (High-R&D) 0.009* 0.002 -0.016*** -0.002 -0.008** -0.019***
1.63 0.74 -4.91 -0.49 -2.10 -2.75
H-N -0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.003
-0.60 0.39 -1.22 -0.84 -1.82 -0.41
Panel B: Firm discount rate news on Market discount rate news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.012 -0.009* 0.000 -0.018*** -0.004 0.017**
1.23 -1.89 0.03 -2.47 -0.74 2.15
L -0.023** -0.008 -0.014 -0.009 0.004 0.008
-2.20 -0.93 -1.17 -1.19 0.43 0.54
H (High-R&D) 0.018 -0.016** 0.006 -0.011 0.009 -0.030*
1.36 -2.03 0.80 -0.95 1.03 -1.74
H-N 0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.007 0.014 -0.047***
0.35 -0.67 0.66 0.49 1.27 -2.47
Table 3.6 shows the responses of market news components to firm-level discount rate news. These responses are
βNDRi,NCFM≡
cov(−NDRi,t+1,NCFM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1) and βNDRi,NDRM≡
cov(−NDRi,t+1,−NDRM,t+1)
var(rM,t+1−EtrM,t+1) and are presented in Panel A
and B, respectively. “Small” denotes the lowest size and “Large” the highest size stocks. “Growth” denotes the lowest BE/ME
and “Value” the highest BE/ME stocks. “High-R&D” denotes the highest R&D intensity stocks, while “No-R&D” refers to
stocks with no records of R&D expenses. “H-N” denotes the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D subsets within same
size and BE/ME bucket. The firm-level discount rate news are estimated with a separate variance decomposition for each
size, BE/ME and R&D intensity intersection, assuming that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ is common for all stocks while
allowing the VAR(1)-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms. The market-level news are extracted with a VAR(1), us-
ing macroeconomic state variables as inputs. The table reports t-statistics that do not account for estimation uncertainty in
the extraction of the market-level news terms. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Direct-method variance decomposition as a function of size,
BE/ME and R&D intensity
Variance of cash flow news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.290*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.069*** 0.037*** 0.038***
[12.46 ] [13.88 ] [11.17 ] [9.72 ] [9.13 ] [6.49 ]
L 0.297*** 0.101*** 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.038*** 0.085***
[13.77 ] [8.17 ] [10.81 ] [5.81 ] [4.11 ] [2.94 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.612*** 0.217*** 0.156*** 0.137*** 0.079*** 0.089***
[19.63 ] [10.68 ] [7.56 ] [7.50 ] [4.70 ] [4.16 ]
H-N 0.321*** 0.118*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.043** 0.051**
Variance of discount rate news
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[14.23 ] [18.56 ] [11.98 ] [11.99 ] [7.90 ] [8.15 ]
L 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[18.14 ] [10.72 ] [8.86 ] [9.16 ] [6.73 ] [5.39 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[22.18 ] [13.29 ] [8.59 ] [8.74 ] [6.38 ] [7.39 ]
H-N 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
Covariance of news terms
Size=Small Size=Big
BE/ME BE/ME
G M V G M V
(Growth) (Value) (Growth) (Value)
R&D intensity
N (No-R&D) 0.036*** 0.007*** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001
[9.87 ] [8.18 ] [1.84 ] [4.98 ] [0.87 ] [-1.37 ]
L 0.032*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.003**
[11.12 ] [3.39 ] [0.17 ] [4.47 ] [0.74 ] [1.95 ]
H (High-R&D) 0.075*** 0.018*** 0.006** 0.014*** 0.005** 0.002
[20.46 ] [8.70 ] [4.11 ] [6.18 ] [2.16 ] [1.11 ]
H-N 0.039*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.004** 0.002
Table 3.7 shows the variance decomposition of the demeaned excess returns for stocks classified based on the intersection of
their size, BE/ME and R&D intensity characteristics. Cash flow news variance estimates are directly obtained from the sec-
ond state-variable regression of the VAR(1). “Small” denotes the lowest size and “Large” the highest size stocks. “Growth”
denotes the lowest BE/ME and “Value” the highest BE/ME stocks. “High-R&D” denotes the highest R&D intensity and
“No-R&D” stocks with no records on R&D expenses. “H-N” denotes the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D sub-
sets within same size and BE/ME bucket. The table estimates a separate variance decomposition for each size, BE/ME
and R&D intensity intersection, assuming that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ is common for all stocks while allowing
the VAR(1)-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms. The table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*],
[**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Table 3.7 uses the pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-
COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year observations.
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Table 3.8: Industry specific variance decomposition
SIC Var(NCF) Var(NDR) Cov(NCF,NDR) CorrNCF,NDR
Panel A: Variable decomposition for low R&D industries.
20 0.102*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.205***
[9.47 ] [16.28 ] [5.90 ]
40 0.045*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.165**
[4.56 ] [7.31 ] [2.94 ]
50 0.170*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.074***
[2.85 ] [2.83 ] [2.87 ]
Panel B: Variable decomposition for high R&D industries.
28 0.179*** 0.012*** 0.000 0.007
[14.80 ] [10.50 ] [0.18 ]
35 0.173*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.120***
[14.35 ] [13.18 ] [3.98 ]
36 0.197*** 0.007*** -0.003** -0.083***
[15.02 ] [10.13 ] [-2.09 ]
Table 3.8 shows the variance decomposition of the demeaned excess returns for indicative low and high R&D indus-
tries. Panel A reports estimates for firms in industries with low R&D outlays, while panel B for firms in industries with
high R&D outlays, where industries are classified with the two-digit level SIC codes. The first three columns show the
variance of the cash flow news, the variance of the discount rate news and the covariance of the news terms. The table
estimates a separate variance decomposition for each industry reported in the table, allowing the VAR(1) coefficient
matrix Γ and the VAR(1)-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across firms in the same industry. The last column shows
the correlation coefficients of the news terms. The table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*], [**] and
[***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Table 3.8 reports estimates from industries included
in the pooled 1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 83,487 firm-year observations.
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Table 3.9: Firm-level VAR(2) parameter estimates
rt+1
e roet+1
e be/met+1
rt
e 0.005 0.081*** -0.336***
[0.13] [4.99] [-17.81]
roet
e 0.097*** 0.334*** 0.236***
[2.98] [27.50] [13.16]
be/met 0.024 -0.118*** 0.600***
[1.58] [-10.06] [31.90]
rt-1
e -0.036 0.124*** -0.308***
[-1.30] [8.21] [-14.83]
roet-1
e 0.056*** 0.142*** 0.044***
[3.40] [13.56] [5.02]
be/met-1 0.033* 0.076*** 0.237***
[1.76] [8.42] [11.76]
Adj.R2 1.31% 24.71% 71.51%
F 166.79*** 4094.00*** 31301.50***
Table 3.9 presents the long VAR results; pooled-WLS parameter estimates for the second-order firm-level VAR(2).
The state variables are the re which is the market-adjusted log stock return over the log risk-free rate; the roee which
is the market-adjusted log return on (beginning of period) book value of equity over the log risk-free rate; and the
be/me which is the market-adjusted log ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. The table reports the
estimated coefficients on the state variables and at the bottom the corresponding Adj.R2 and F values, testing the
null hypothesis. Below each coefficient the table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*], [**] and [***]
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The firm-level VAR(2) is estimated from the pooled
1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 74,837 firm-year observations with non-missing 1-year
and 2-year-lagged state variables.
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Table 3.10: Cash flow and discount rate news properties [VAR(2)]
Panel A: Mappings of the state Panel B: Variance-covariance matrix
on the estimated news and correlation
NCF NDR NCF NDR
Return shock 0.971 -0.029 NCF 0.167 0.000
ROE shock 0.215 0.215 NDR 0.000 0.004
BE/ME shock 0.064 0.064 Correlation 0.010**
Panel A of Table 3.10 shows the functions (e1′+e1′λ, e1′λ) that map the shocks in the state-variables of the firm-level VAR(2)
of Table 3.9 to cash flow and discount rate news.
Panel B of Table 3.10 shows the variance-covariance matrix and the correlation matrix of the estimated news terms. [*], [**]
and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Both panels of Table 3.10 are estimated from the pooled
1975 to 2012 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 74,837 firm-year observations with non-missing 1-year and 2-
year-lagged state variables.
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Chapter 4
Common and Idiosyncratic
Earnings, Return Variance
and the R&D Impact
4.1 Introduction
We examine whether the financial reporting information on R&D influences market
participants’ assessments with regard to the importance of idiosyncratic earnings relative
to industry-common (henceforth, common) earnings in driving US stock returns. Common
earnings denote the component of firm earnings attributable to systematic factors, such
as industry or/and market (e.g., Brown and Ball 1967; Magee 1974; Schmalensee 1985;
McGahan and Porter 2002; Ball et al. 2009). In turn, idiosyncratic earnings refer to the
remaining firm-specific component of earnings.
The motivation for this exercise arises from concepts mainly examined in strategy and
economics literature with respect to the effects of R&D activity on the firm’s competitive
advantage. On one hand, the “resource-based” view postulates that intangibles, and R&D
activity, allow the company to differentiate itself from its rivals (Hall 1993b; Villalonga
2004; Brown and Kimbrough 2011). On the other hand, it is claimed that R&D-related
innovation becomes a “public good” as it spillovers to competitors (Arrow 1962; Mansfield
1985; Jaffe 1986; Mansfield 1986; Cohen and Levinthal 1989). As long as R&D investment
supports the firm’s efforts to differentiate itself from its competitors, R&D investment
is likely to give rise to idiosyncratic earnings. However, as long as R&D-related innova-
tion becomes quickly a “public good”, R&D investment would give rise to the common
component of earnings.
To the best of our knowledge there is very limited evidence on the market assessment of
the relation between R&D activity and common or idiosyncratic earnings. A recent study
by Brown and Kimbrough (2011) demonstrate that R&D intensity is positively associated
with their estimate of idiosyncratic (non-common) earnings. Additionally, Brown and
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Kimbrough (2011) find that R&D intensity leads to a negative relation between their
measure of returns non-commonality and idiosyncratic earnings, implying that investors
anticipate R&D activity to engender commonalities among firms in the long-run. However,
their evidence is rather one-sided as it ignores the effect of R&D intensity on common
earnings. We argue first, that both idiosyncratic and common earnings are value relevant
as they represent distinct outcomes of the R&D activity. However, it has yet to become
clear whether, and under which circumstances, common or idiosyncratic earnings prevail
in the market’s assessments. The present study aims to contribute evidence in this respect.
We revisit this issue from the perspective of the return variance.38 We observe the
importance of idiosyncratic and common earnings in market participants’ assessment by
means of their respective variance contributions to stock returns. This is also an alternative
measure of value relevance which is based on the extent to which revisions of expectations
about future earnings (cash ow news) and/or revisions of expectations about future dis-
count rates (discount rate news) affect the revisions of expectations about future returns
or, return news Callen et al. (2006). To this end, we extend Vuolteenaho (2002)’s variance
decomposition methodology. Vuolteenaho (2002)’s model decomposes unexpected stock
return variance into cash flow news variance, discount rate news variance and their covari-
ance. We disaggregate cash flow news further into common and idiosyncratic cash glow
news allowing for the additional covariance terms.
The empirical results of our analysis are summarised as follows. First, we show that
for a sample of US firms over the period 1975 to 2013, idiosyncratic cash flow news are
more important than common cash flow news in explaining return variance, indicating the
pronounced influence of idiosyncratic news in driving return variance. Second, we demon-
strate that the relative importance of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news increases
with firm-level R&D intensity. Third, the relation between the relative importance of
idiosyncratic cash flow news and firm-level R&D intensity varies depending on the R&D
industry concentration.
We are the first to examine the impact of R&D on the market assessment or, value
relevance of both idiosyncratic earnings and common earnings. We demonstrate that both
components are value relevant, in-line with a view that R&D investment aims to pursue
innovation as well as to assimilate innovation developed by rivals. However, the results
indicate that, on average, the market perceives the outcome of R&D activity in a manner
that is consistent with the “resource-based” view, i.e., more pronounced R&D activity
38The variance decomposition methodology is preferred here to conventional tests of value relevance. Con-
ventional tests of value relevance are joint tests of relevance and reliability (Barth et al. 2001) and thus,
may be biased by the reliability issues of financial reporting information on R&D discussed in Kothari
et al. (2002). Conventional value relevance tests also assume constant discount rates which also may bias
inference (Callen 2009).
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leads to outcomes that enable the firm to differentiate itself from rivals. Interestingly, the
market perceives that this relation becomes weaker under circumstances of higher industry
concentration. This result is in-line with the insight in Ho et al. (2006) that high visibility
of competitors’ actions in high concentration industries forces firms to adopt similar levels
of R&D investment in order to appear on the cutting edge to “keep up with the Joneses”.
Thus, this result implies that the financial reporting information on R&D enables market
assessments that are informed by the underlying economics of the industry where the firm
operates.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses how related litera-
ture applies in our context. Section 4.3 introduces the variance decomposition framework,
defines the valuation model and summarises the estimation procedure. Section 4.4 de-
scribes the data and the construction of variables employed by this chapter. Section 4.5
discusses the variance decomposition results. Section 4.6 outlines the robustness checks.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 R&D Activity and Common/Idiosyncratic Earnings
The “resource-based” literature views investments in intangible assets, and particu-
larly R&D, as enabling the firm to differentiate and enhance its ability to generate and
sustain competitive advantages over rivals. Hall (1993b) supports that intangibles are a
key source of competitive advantage. Nelson (1991) argues that differences among firms
are not attributed to fundamental variations in the segments or product markets where
they operate but instead to the variation in the investment in intangibles, such as R&D.
Notably, Nelson (1991) suggests that although intangible innovation requires considerable
resources to acquire or develop internally, intangible innovation serves also as a barrier
against imitators. Furthermore, Villalonga (2004) argues that intangible assets, including
R&D, have an important role in sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage and valuations.
Finally, Brown and Kimbrough (2011) find that idiosyncratic (non-common) earnings are
significantly associated with R&D intensity.
On the other hand, the industrial organization literature suggests that although R&D
investment is a key driver of aggregate economic growth, it is also a “public good” from
which multiple firms can benefit. Mansfield (1985) shows that the industrial innovation
spillovers to rival firms occur rapidly (6 to 18 months). Jaffe (1986) provides more insight
on the R&D innovation diffusion by showing that firms adjust their technological positions
in response to profit possibilities. Additionally, he finds that such adjustments result to
the excess returns dissipation. Bloom et al. (2013) confirm Jaffe (1986)’s evidence on
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spillovers and extend it by also looking at product market spillovers. While the Jaffe
(1986) and the Bloom et al. (2013) results point out to R&D activity which is driven
by firms’ responses to their rivals’ R&D innovation, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) offer a
more balanced perspective. Firms invest in R&D to develop and maintain their broader
capabilities to assimilate and exploit externally available information but, at the same
time, to also pursue directly new process and product innovation.
In sum, it appears that on one hand, R&D investment is critical in the creation of a
competitive advantage which rapidly becomes “public good” as rivals will seek to assimilate
it. In this chapter, we follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and consider that on average,
R&D activity is directed towards building abilities that enable differentiation and, at
the same time, assimilation of existing innovations. Similarly to Brown and Kimbrough
(2011) we consider idiosyncratic earnings as a manifestation of the efforts directed towards
differentiation. Additionally, we consider common earnings as a manifestation of the efforts
to assimilate existing abilities. Brown and Kimbrough (2011)’s findings suggest that R&D
intensity is positively associated with idiosyncratic earnings. Their evidence is nevertheless
one-sided, as it ignores the effect of R&D intensity on common earnings. Insofar market
participants understand the dual role of R&D activity, we expect that both common and
idiosyncratic earnings matter in market participants’ assessments. However, it is an open
question whether common or idiosyncratic earnings prevail in the market’s assessments,
on average.
Our discussion would have been incomplete without acknowledging that companies
have access to an array of formal (patents, trademarks, registered designs and copyright)
and informal (secrecy, confidentiality agreements, lead time, research design complexity)
mechanisms to protect the outcomes of their R&D, and other intangible investments, from
expropriation by rivals (Hall et al. 2014). Prior research has so far focused on the effi-
ciency of patents to prevent R&D spillovers (Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987; Cockburn
and Griliches 1988). However, Cockburn and Griliches (1988) argue that the effective-
ness of patents, as a mechanism for appropriating the returns from R&D, varies. Hall
et al. (2014) note that firms engaging with R&D are more likely to opt for patents than
other innovating firms, presumably because they are more likely to have patentable inven-
tions. Nevertheless, they also note that overall, companies appear to use a combination
of different appropriation mechanisms even for the same invention.
We acknowledge that the presence of appropriation mechanisms capture only one as-
pect of industry structure (i.e., entry barriers). In this chapter, we consider that market
participants take into account a wider set of industry-specific information in their assess-
ments. To this end, rather than focusing on appropriation mechanisms, we opt instead to
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capture this information by using a measure of R&D activity concentration. Prior research
provides conflicting evidence on the influence of industry concentration on the outcomes
of innovation and R&D investment. On one hand, Schumpeter (1952) observes that high
concentration induces more innovation as opposed to low concentration. This would im-
ply that under circumstances of high industry concentration, market participants would
regard R&D intensity to be associated with more pronounced idiosyncratic earnings.
On the contrary, Grabowski and Mueller (1978) and Connolly and Hirschey (1984)
notice that concentration has a negative effect on profitability. More recently, Ho et al.
(2006) establish evidence which indicates diminishing marginal returns for R&D invest-
ment in high concentration industries. They propose that the visibility of competitors’
actions in high concentration industries forces firms to adopt similar levels of R&D in-
vestment irrespectively of the expected returns, in order to appear on the cutting edge to
“keep up with the Joneses”. This insight leads to an alternative prediction whereby under
circumstances of high industry concentration, market participants would regard R&D in-
tensity to be associated with less pronounced idiosyncratic earnings (or more pronounced
common earnings).
Given the conflicting indications in prior research, we refrain from making a directional
hypothesis. Nevertheless, insofar market assessment of the R&D activity outcomes is in-
formed by the underlying economics of the industry where the firm operates, concentration
should determine the balance in the importance of idiosyncratic and common earnings in
driving returns.
4.3 Methodology and Estimation
4.3.1 Methodology
The present study adopts a variance decomposition approach to determine whether in-
formation on common earnings or idiosyncratic earnings drive the US stock returns. The
methodology here is based on the Vuolteenaho (2002)’s variance decomposition model,
already discussed in Chapter 3. In the present chapter, we extend this model to ac-
commodate a further disaggregation of cash flow news into its idiosyncratic and common
component. We start from the unexpected return decomposition to cash flow and discount
rates news as proposed in Vuolteenaho (2002). Recall:
ri,t+1 − Et(ri,t+1) = ∆Et+1
∞∑
j=0
ρjroei,t+1+j −∆Et+1
∞∑
j=1
ρjri,t+1+j + ki,t+1 (4.1)
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where ∆ is the first difference operator; Et+1 is the expectations operator; ri,t+1 is the
annual log equity return over the annual log risk-free rate; roei,t+1 is the log return on
book equity; ρ is the log-linearization discount factor; ki,t+1 is an approximation error.
Note that lowercase letters denote log-transformed variables.
We break equation (4.1)’s roe into common and idiosyncratic earnings (hereafter
termed as common and idiosyncratic cash flows to follow the conventional terminology, see
e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002) scaled by the book value of equity. To this end, we make use of
the log approximation: log(1 +ROE)≈ROE which is based on a Taylor series expansion
around zero. Formally, the ROE decomposition steps are:
roei,t+1 = log(1 +
Xt+1
BEt
)
≈Xt+1
BEt
≈CXt+1
BEt
+
IXt+1
BEt
≈ROECt+1 +ROEIt+1
≈ln(1 +ROECt+1) + ln(1 +ROEIt+1)
≈roect+1 + roeit+1 (4.2)
where BE denotes the firm’s book value of equity, X denotes firm earnings, CXt+1 is
the common component of firm earnings, IXt+1 is the idiosyncratic component of firm
earnings, ROECt+1 (ROEIt+1) is the common (idiosyncratic) component of ROE and
roect+1 (roeit+1) is the log common (idiosyncratic) component of ROE.
Substituting (4.2) into (4.1) yields our unexpected stock return decomposition model:
ri,t+1 − Et(ri,t+1) = + ∆Et+1
∞∑
j=0
ρjroeci,t+1+j
+ ∆Et+1
∞∑
j=0
ρjroeii,t+1+j + ki,t+1
−∆Et+1
∞∑
j=1
ρjri,t+1+j
=NCCFi,t+1 +NICFi,t+1 −NDRi,t+1 (4.3)
where the left-hand side of equation (4.3) is the unexpected stock return; ρ is a constant
log-linear discount factor; NCCFi,t+1 denotes the common cash flow news component;
NICFi,t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic cash flow news component; and NDRi,t+1 denotes
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the discount rate news component. Equation (4.3) states that an increase in the expected
future common or/and idiosyncratic component of cash flow conveys good news about
the firm’s prospects and stock return shocks are positive. On the contrary, an increase in
expected future discount rates conveys bad news about the firm’s prospects and induces
negative shocks to stock returns.
Taking variances of both sides of equation (4.3) and accounting for the covariance
terms yields our unexpected stock return variance decomposition model. This is:
var(ri,t+1 − Et(ri,t+1)) = + var(NCCFi,t+1) + var(NICFi,t+1) + var(NDRi,t+1)
− 2cov(NCCFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1)− 2cov(NICFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1)
+ 2cov(NCCFi,t+1, NICFi,t+1) (4.4)
Equation (4.4) quantifies the variance contributions of common cash flow, idiosyncratic
cash flow and discount rate news to unexpected stock returns. The greater the variance of
any variable on the right-hand side of equation (4.4), the more power it has in describing
stock returns.
4.3.2 Estimation
To estimate equations (4.3) and (4.4), we initially extract the three news terms. We
estimate the discount rates and the common cash flow news directly, while we compute
the idiosyncratic cash flow news residually (i.e., indirectly).39 To this end, we use with a
first-order vector autoregressive model (Campbell 1991; Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al.
2002; Callen and Segal 2004; Callen et al. 2005, 2009), namely the following VAR(1):
zi,t+1 = Γzi,t + υi,t+1 (4.5)
where zi,t+1 is a firm-specific vector of state variables that describes a firm i at time t+ 1
and Γ is the coefficient matrix and υi,t+1 is the vector of error terms. We assume that the
coefficient matrix Γ is constant over time and across firms. We also assume that the errors
vector υi,t+1 has a covariance matrix Σ which is independent of anything known at time
t. There is no constant term in equation (4.5) because we use cross-sectionally demeaned
state variables (i.e., market-adjusted).
We use four annually market-adjusted firm-specific state variables (denoted with an
39Chen and Zhao (2009) highlight that the selection of VAR(1) state variables affects the unbiased esti-
mation of the residually computed term. However, Campbell et al. (2010) argue that the choice between
the direct and the indirect method has no effect on their stock return decompositions. To comply with
equations (4.3) and (4.4) and to report components that do add up to the observed unexpected stock
returns and return variances, we follow the standard Vuolteenaho (2002) indirect method.
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overline): the log excess stock return (rei ); the log common ROE (roeci); the log idiosyn-
cratic ROE (roeii); and the log book-to-market ratio (be/mei). Following related research,
the state variables are chosen based on their ability to explain firm-level return variation.
The inclusion of be/mei is necessary, since the stock return decomposition is derived on
Vuolteenaho (2002)’s BE/ME stationarity assumption. Intuitively, the VAR(1) model in
(4.5) is the following system of auto-regressions without intercepts.
rei,t+1 = Γ1,1r
e
i,t + Γ1,2roeci,t + Γ1,3roeii,t + Γ1,4be/mei,t + υ1,t+1 (4.5a)
roeci,t+1 = Γ2,1r
e
i,t + Γ2,2roeci,t + Γ2,3roeii,t + Γ2,4be/mei,t + υ2,t+1 (4.5b)
roeii,t+1 = Γ3,1r
e
i,t + Γ3,2roeci,t + Γ3,3roeii,t + Γ3,4be/mei,t + υ3,t+1 (4.5c)
be/mei,t+1 = Γ4,1r
e
i,t + Γ4,2roeci,t + Γ4,3roeii,t + Γ4,4be/mei,t + υ4,i,t+1 (4.5d)
We use weighted least squares (WLS) to estimate the VAR(1) model in (4.5). As the
Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, the WLS approach weights each cross-section equally,
and thus fitted values are unbiased to the larger cross-sections at the end of the sample
(Campbell et al. 2010). Empirically, for each firm-year and pooled WLS regression the
dependent and independent variables are deflated by the number of firms in the corre-
sponding cross-section (Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al. 2002).
We then obtain the impulse response functions which map the shocks in the VAR(1)
state-variables into the three unexpected stock return components. We define e1′ ≡
[1, 0, 0, 0] and e2′ ≡ [0, 1, 0, 0], and we estimate the impulse response functions for each
unexpected return component as follows:
Discount rate news: λ1≡e1′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1 (4.6)
Common cash flow news: λ2≡e2′I(I − ρΓ)−1 (4.7)
Idiosyncratic cash flow news: λ3≡(e1′ − e2′)I(I − ρΓ)−1 (4.8)
Following Vuolteenaho (2002) we set the constant log-linear discount factor, ρ, equal to
0.967.
The product of the errors vector υi,t+1 with the impulse response functions in (4.7),
(4.8) and (4.6) provide the common cash flow, the idiosyncratic cash flow and the discount
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rate news components, respectively. This is:
NCCFi,t+1≡λ2′υi,t+1 (4.9)
NICFi,t+1≡λ3′υi,t+1 (4.10)
NDRi,t+1≡λ1′υi,t+1 (4.11)
Given that the first element in zi,t+1 is returns, equations (4.9)–(4.11) suggest that with
unpredictable returns, discount rates are zero and the unexpected return is solely due to
common cash flow news and/or idiosyncratic cash flow news.
Finally, to compute the stock return variance components in (4.4) we combine the
impulse response functions with the residuals covariance matrix Σ. This is:
var(NCCFi,t+1)≡λ2′Σλ2 (4.12)
var(NICFi,t+1)≡λ3′Σλ3 (4.13)
var(NDRi,t+1)≡λ1′Σλ1 (4.14)
cov(NCCFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1)≡λ2′Σλ1 (4.15)
cov(NICFi,t+1, NDRi,t+1)≡λ3′Σλ1 (4.16)
cov(NCCFi,t+1, NICFi,t+1)≡λ2′Σλ3 (4.17)
The variables of interest here are the idiosyncratic and the common cash flow news
variances, [var(NCCFi,t+1) and var(NICFi,t+1), respectively]. Evidence that the idiosyn-
cratic cash flow news variance increases as a function of R&D intensity would indicate that
the market perceives that R&D activity enables the firm to differentiate from its rivals.
On the other hand, evidence that the common cash flow news variance increases as a
function of R&D intensity would indicate that the market perceives that R&D activity
engenders commonalities among firms. This would be consistent with the view of R&D
activity as a “public good” or, alternatively R&D activity directed towards assimilating
rivals’ innovations. While we expect that both components would be associated with R&D
intensity, it is an empirical question whose influence prevails. To this end, we also test
the difference between idiosyncratic and common cash flow news variances and we test its
association with R&D intensity.
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4.4 Data
4.4.1 Main Data
Our sample consists of firm-year observations in the intersection of the COMPUSTAT
fundamentals annual file and the CRSP monthly stock market file from 1975 to 2013. We
start in 1975 because that is the date SFAS No. 2, the accounting standard requiring the
immediate expense of R&D costs, took effect (see SFAS No. 2 1974). COMPUSTAT’s
accounting variables for fiscal years ending in calendar year t − 1 are connected with
CRSP’s stock market variables at June of calendar year t. The (minimum) six-month
lag: (1) ensures all market participants observe the accounting information; (2) aligns
accounting data with stock market data across firms (e.g., Fama and French 1992, 1993).
Our risk-free rate is the Ibbotson Associates’ rolled-over one-month T-Bill, available in
Professor Kenneth R. French’s website.40
We apply five COMPUSTAT-related filters. First, we use non-financial firms (i.e.,
excluding firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and
6999). Second, we delete firm-year observations that are not assigned to any of the 48
Fama-French industry categories. Third, we require firm-year observations to have positive
assets and sales and non-negative R&D.41 Missing R&D records are assigned the value of
zero. Fourth, firms must be in COMPUSTAT’s files for at least two years to minimise
the bias in the way COMPUSTAT initiates firm coverage.42 Finally, in-sample firms have
valid book value of equity figures for calendar years t − 1 and t − 2. The book value of
equity is estimated as in Daniel and Titman (2006) (see Appendix B).
We also apply four CRSP-related filters. First, we use firms with ordinary common
equity listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (i.e., excluding ADRs, REITs and units of
beneficial interest). Second, in-sample firms have valid market value of equity figures for
calendar years t− 1 and t− 2. Third, we circumvent stale prices or market microstructure
issues by requiring firms to be actively traded in the month immediately preceding the
calendar period t stock return (Vuolteenaho 2002). Finally, we minimise data errors by
excluding firm-year observations with market value of equity less than $10 million and
book-to-market (BE/ME) more than 100 or less than 1/100.
40http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
41COMPUSTAT explained that, the cases of negative R&D expenditures are very rare. Indeed, in this
chapter’s sample there are only five firm-years with negative R&D expenditures. However, these are
not data errors. COMPUSTAT suggested that, the negative R&D expenses likely reflect adjustments of
funds allocated in previous fiscal years.
42Kothari et al. (1995) extensively discuss the COMPUSTAT-related biases.
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4.4.2 Firm-level VAR state variables
The four state variables included in the VAR(1) of equation (4.5) are: (a) the annual log
excess stock return (ri
e); (b) the log common part of ROE (roaci); (c) the log idiosyncratic
part of ROE (roaii); and (d) the log book-to-market ratio (be/mei). Each year, all state
variables are winsorised at the 1% level and cross-sectionally adjusted.
Annual returns are compounded from monthly returns recorded from the beginning of
July of calendar year t to the end of June of calendar year t+1. We include delisting returns
when available in CRSP.43 The log transformation turns extreme values into unreasonable
and potentially influential observations. To mitigate the log transformation effect we define
stock returns as an annually rebalanced portfolio, consisting of 90% of the firm’s common
stock and of 10% investment in Treasury bills (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen et al. 2002;
Campbell et al. 2010). For excess log returns, we subtract the annual log risk-free rate.44
For the second and third state variables, we partition firm-level ROE into common
and idiosyncratic components. ROE is defined as earnings for calendar year t− 1 divided
by book value of equity for calendar year t − 2. We use COMPUSTAT earnings (net
income – COMPUSTAT mnemonic NI) and substitute missing values with clean surplus
earnings (i.e., X i,t = ∆tBEi + DIV i,t , where X is net income; ∆tBE is the closing less
the beginning book value of equity; DIV is dividends).45 Then, we decompose ROE to
its common and idiosyncratic component (see Hui et al. 2016 and references therein).
Each year the common component of return on equity (ROEC) is the average ROE of
firms in the industry, where industries are defined with the 48 Fama-French industry
categorization.46
In turn, each year the idiosyncratic part of return on equity (ROEI) is firm’s total
ROE less the estimated common component, described above. Both components of ROE
43Following Beaver et al. (2007), when both monthly and delisting returns are available the delisting return
is computed as DLRt,t+k = ((1 +Rt,t+j−1)(1 +DLRt,t+j))− 1. When delisting returns are missing we
follow the next procedure. If a firm was listed on NYSE or AMEX and has been dropped by the exchange
or the SEC (delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591 but not 501 and 502), we assume -30% delisting
return (Shumway 1997). If a firm was listed on NASDAQ and has been dropped by the exchange or the
SEC (delisting codes ranging from 500 to 591 but not 501 and 502), we assume -55% delisting return
(Shumway and Warther 1999). If a firm was listed on any of the three exchanges and has been or will
be liquidated (delisting codes ranging from 400 to 490), we assume -100% delisting return (Prakash and
Sinha 2012).
44Annual risk-free returns are compounded from monthly returns recorded from the beginning of July of
calendar year t to the end of June of calendar year t+ 1.
45We follow Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen et al. (2002) in this re-definition of missing earnings figures.
This convention assumes that the clean surplus relation holds. When earnings are missing, we assume
that all changes in the book value of equity are recorded to either income or dividends (Feltham and
Ohlson 1995). This does not always hold, since, for example, dividends may include non-cash dividends
that do not affect book value of equity. In those cases, an errors-in-variables problem potentially arises.
However, missing earnings (net income) figures are very rare. In the sample of this chapter only 124
firm-years have missing earnings (0.29% of the sample).
46Using instead the two-digit SIC code industry classification does not change the results.
87
are log transformed (i.e., roec and roei).47 Missing values due to the log transformation
are deleted.
Finally, the BE/ME for June of year t is the book value of equity for calendar year t−1,
divided by the market value of equity for December of calendar year t−1. Following Camp-
bell et al. (2010), we circumvent the influence of extreme log-transformed observations by
shrinking the log BE/ME ratio. This is: be/mei,t = log[(0.90BEi,t + 0.10MEi,t)/MEi,t];
where BE is the book value of equity for calendar year t − 1; ME is the market value of
equity for December of calendar year t− 1.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the firm-level state variables (Panel A)
and their market-adjusted counterparts (Panel B). Both panels of Table 4.1 use the
COMPUSTAT-CRSP intersection which consists of 44, 172 firm-year observations. In
Panel A we can see that roeci and roeii have the lowest variations, while be/mei has the
highest variation. Panel B confirms that unlevering the data from their means results in
the reduction of the variation of all state variables.
[Insert Table 4.1 here.]
4.4.3 R&D Variables
In Subsection 4.5.1.2 we conduct variance decomposition analyses that are conditioned
on R&D intensity. In that respect, our approach is to rank firms into R&D intensity
quintiles. The quintile ranking is repeated for two alternative R&D intensity measures
to mitigate concerns about spurious relations between R&D and returns due to scaling
variables (e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002). Accordingly, the two R&D
intensity variables differ in the scalar they employ.48
The first ranking variable is the R&D intensity estimated as the capitalized and amor-
tized R&D for calendar year t − 1, divided by assets for calendar year t − 1. This is:
R&D intensityi,t = (R&DCi,t)/ASSETSi,t
The second ranking variable is the R&D intensity ratio computed as the capitalized
and amortized R&D for calendar year t − 1, divided by the market value of equity for
December of calendar year t− 1. This is: R&D intensityi,t = (R&DCi,t)/MEi,t
Under both R&D intensity variables, R&DCi,t represent the capitalized and amor-
tized current and past R&D expenditures (COMPUSTAT mnemonic RDX) that would
have been on the balance sheet in calendar year t − 1, if that accounting treatment has
47To maintain the equality of the return decomposition model in (4.3), and since we use excess returns on
the left-hand side of the equation, we subtract the annual log risk-free rate from roec too. Subtracting
the annual log risk-free rate from roei has no effect on the results.
48We avoid sales as scalar because they introduce significant level of skewness in the distribution of the
ranking variable.
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been allowed [see in Appendix A, equation (A.1)]. We capitalize and amortize the R&D
expenditures using Lev and Sougiannis (1996)’s approach and industry amortization as
described in Appendix A.
We construct our R&D intensity subsets as follows. At June of calendar year t we
classify firms into R&D quintiles, where R&D quintiles are defined using the R&D capital
divided by assets and, alternatively, the R&D capital divided by market value of equity.
This classification yields five groups, namely the Low-R&D, Q2, Q3, Q4 and High-R&D
subsets. The remaining firm-year observations with missing R&D figures consist the con-
trol group (i.e., No-R&D). Henceforth, we use the term “High-R&D” and “R&D intensive”
interchangeably.
4.4.4 R&D Concentration
We use a variation of the standard Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure
industry R&D concentration.49 We calculate the R&D concentration measure, HHIR&D,
for each industry sector as follows:
HHIR&D =
n∑
i=1
R&DSh2i,j (4.18)
where n is the number of firms in the j−th industry sector and R&DShi,j is the R&D share
of the i− th firm in the j − th industry sector (i.e., R&D expenditures for calendar year
t− 1, over total R&D expenditures). HHIR&D is only estimated for non-zero R&D firms.
Higher values for HHIR&D denote higher R&D concentration within a specific industry
sector. Following Gaspar and Massa (2006), we define industries with the two-digit level
SIC codes.
In our empirical analysis, we use the hhiR&D (i.e., the log transformation of HHIR&D).
The hhiR&D ranges between 0.039 and 0.693. It has a mean value of 0.112 and a standard
deviation of 0.117. Figure 4.1 shows the evolution over time of the average hhiR&D across
all industry sectors. The figure suggests that, on average, R&D concentration decreased
steadily up to 2003. Since 2003, there is a slight increase in R&D concentration which,
potentially, reflects the dominance of conglomerates such as Apple, Google, Microsoft and
Yahoo.
[Insert Figure 4.1 here.]
[Insert Figure 4.2 here.]
49The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of Herfindahl (1950) and Hirschman (1945) is widely used in the in-
dustrial organization literature (e.g., Hou and Robinson 2006; Giroud and Mueller 2011).
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Figure 4.2 shows the evolution over time of the average hhiR&D for some indicative
industry sectors. It suggests that the decrease in R&D concentration up to 2003 -observed
in Figure 4.1- comes mainly from non-traditionally R&D active industries (denoted as
“Rest”, black solid line). In industries that are traditionally R&D intensive (such as phar-
maceuticals, computers etc.), R&D concentration does not change much over time. The
exception is the Transportation industry (SIC: 37 – violet dashed line) in which R&D con-
centration increases. Collectively, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that the R&D concentration
decreases, and the number of industries actively investing in R&D is increasing.
4.4.5 Control Variables
We also employ a set of control variables. We use: (1) firm size, defined as the price at
the end of June of calendar year t times the shares outstanding;50 (2) the BE/ME ratio,
defined as the book value of equity for calendar year t− 1, divided by the market value of
equity for December of calendar year t− 1; and (3) the leverage ratio, defined as the book
value of equity for calendar year t − 1, divided by the sum of book value of equity and
book debt for calendar year t− 1. The book debt is the sum of debt in current liabilities
(COMPUSTAT mnemonic LCT), total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT mnemonic DLTT),
and preferred stock (COMPUSTAT mnemonic PSTK). All variables are log transformed
and winsorised at the 1% level.
4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Results
4.5.1.1 Variance Decomposition
Table 4.2 shows the VAR(1) transposed coefficient matrix Γ. Effectively, the columns
in Table 4.2 represent the regression models in equations (4.5a), (4.5b), (4.5c) and (4.5d).
The table reports parameter estimates along with their jackknife t-statistics,51 Adjusted
R2s and F values, testing the null hypothesis for each regression model, are reported at
the bottom of the table.
[Insert Table 4.2 here.]
In Table 4.2 we can see that roei and be/me are significant predictors of re; an increase
in roei and be/me forecasts higher re. Furthermore, re predicts only roei and be/me; an
50Where price is missing we use the alternative price and the delisting price with that order.
51To account for cross-sectional correlation, we use Shao and Rao (1993)’s jackknife method for robust
standard errors. Appendix E contains details of the Shao and Rao (1993) jackknife methodology.
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increase in re forecasts higher roei and lower be/me. Finally, the null hypothesis that all
coefficients are jointly zero is rejected for all predictive regressions (significant F values at
the 1% level).
Table 4.3 summarises the properties of the NCCF, NICF and NDR firm-level stock
return components.
[Insert Table 4.3 here.]
Panel A of Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix of the three estimated news components.
We can see that NCCF and NICF are negatively correlated, while NDR and NCCF
(NICF ) are positively (negatively) correlated. Panel B reports (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8)s’
impulse response functions that map the innovations to the state variables into the three
stock return components. A notable feature is that lower than expected discount rates,
captured by NDR, are justified by the underlying improvement to firm-specific cash flows,
captured by NICF (first row of Panel B). Panel B’s negative NICF -NDR interaction is
more consistent with investors favourably valuing firms that earn rents above the industry
average.
Finally, Panel C of Table 4.3 presents the results of the firm-level unexpected stock
return variance decomposition. All stock return variance components are significant. The
NCCF variance is 0.122 (standard deviation, 35%), while the NICF variance is 0.274
(standard deviation, 52%). The difference (DIFF ) between the cash flow news parts is
significant at a 1% level. The NDR variance is 0.004 (standard deviation, 6%). Intuitively,
Panel C’s results support that, approximately, NICF are two times more important than
NCCF in driving firm-level stock returns.
4.5.1.2 Variance Decomposition: The Impact of R&D
Table 4.4 presents the return variance decomposition results conditional on R&D. Here
we estimate a variance decomposition for each R&D intensity subset separately. To this
end, we assume that the VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ and error covariance matrix Σ is
constant across firms. We focus on differences between R&D intensive and No-R&D firms
(i.e., H −N). The analysis is conducted for each R&D intensity measure.
[Insert Table 4.4 here.]
Panel A of Table 4.4 reports the NCCF , NICF and NDR variances, and the NICF−
NCCF difference (DIFF ) by groups formed on the R&D capital to assets ratio. We
draw three main observations from the results. First, the variance contributions of both
NCCF and NICF increase with R&D intensity. This suggests that the importance of
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total cash flows as the main return driver increases with R&D intensity, consistent with
our results in Chapter 3. Second, the increase in the variance contribution of NDR is
not economically large, but it is statistical significant. Third and foremost, the variance
contribution of NICF is higher regardless of R&D intensity, and the DIFF increases with
R&D intensity. Specifically, moving from No-R&D to High-R&D firms, the difference
between the variance contribution of NICF and the variance contribution of NCCF
increases by 0.087 (significant at the 5% level). Panel B of Table 4.4 reports results using
groups formed on the R&D capital to market value of equity ratio. The results are similar.
Overall, the results in this section confirm that the return variance decomposition
into NCCF , NICF and NDR depends on firm-level R&D intensity. In specific, the
importance of NICF as the main return driver increases with R&D intensity. These
results are in-line with Brown and Kimbrough (2011), who find that intangible assets
-inclusive of R&D- allow firms to establish competitive advantages. The next section
investigates the link among R&D intensity, R&D concentration and the increasing DIFF
along the R&D dimension.
4.5.2 Discussion: The Impact of Industry R&D Concentration
Section 4.5.1.2’s results suggest that R&D intensity determines the rate at which id-
iosyncratic cash flow news variance prevails over the common cash flow news variance.
This finding supports that the market assesses the effect of R&D activity on the firm’s
competitive advantage by reference to the “resource-based” view rather than the “pub-
lic good” view. Nevertheless, we note that this result holds on average. In this section,
we consider that market participants take into account a wider set of industry-specific
information in their assessments. To this end, we extend this analysis by introducing
a measure of R&D investment concentration. The choice of a concentration variable is
motivated by suggestions in prior research that it influences the direction of R&D efforts
either towards differentiation (Schumpeter 1952) or towards assimilation of existing inno-
vations (Ho et al. 2006). In our setting, we employ this variable to investigate whether
industry-specific information affects the market assessments of the R&D activity. Given
the conflicting indications, we refrain from making a directional prediction here.
In Table 4.5 we examine whether the effect of R&D intensity on the difference (DIFF )
between the variance contributions of NICF and NCCF depends on R&D concentration.
To this end, we construct the variable RankhhiR&D which ranks firms into quintiles based
on the industry-years of hhiR&D; the first quintile corresponds to low R&D concentration
and the fifth to high R&D concentration. We then run pooled regressions of DIFF
on R&D intensity, RankhhiR&D , the interaction between RankhhiR&D and R&D intensity,
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and a set of control variables. The control variables include size, be/me and leverage (see
Section 4.4.5). To account for firm heterogeneity, the standard errors, and thus t-statistics,
are clustered by firms and firm-years.52 We again repeat the analysis for Section 4.4.3’s
two R&D intensity measures.
[Insert Table 4.5 here.]
Table 4.5 shows the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics for the regression under
consideration for both alternative R&D intensity measures (Model 1: capitalized and
amortized R&D divided by assets and Model 2: capitalized and amortized R&D divided
by market value of equity). We can see that the estimated coefficients for the R&D
intensity, RankhhiR&D and their interaction is significant. More specifically, the estimated
coefficient of R&D intensity is positive (0.329 for Model 1 and 0.221 for Model 2), while the
interaction term is negative (−0.029 for Model 1 and −0.014 for Model 2). This suggests
that increasing R&D concentration moderates the relationship between R&D intensity
and the relative importance of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news. In other words,
under circumstances of high R&D concentration, market participants would regard R&D
intensity to be associated with less pronounced idiosyncratic earnings importance or more
pronounced common earnings importance.
Our results are consistent with effect of concentration on R&D activity discussed by
Ho et al. (2006). Ho et al. (2006) argue that the visibility of competitors’ actions in high
concentration industries forces firms to adopt similar levels of R&D investment in order to
appear on the cutting edge to “keep up with the Joneses”. We would envisage that such
a scenario may be the case in industries dominated by a few firms (e.g., on a global scale,
that could be Boeing and Airbus directing their R&D efforts towards long-haul aircrafts).
Nevertheless, the results here support our prediction that the market assessment of the
R&D intensity is informed by industry economics.
4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 OLS Estimation for the Impact of R&D
Subsection 4.5.1.2’s return variance decomposition by R&D intensity groups is based on
arbitrarily chosen R&D breakpoints. This section assesses whether the difference between
the variance contributions of NICF and NCCF is also statistically linked to firm-level
52Petersen (2009)’s simulation evidence suggests that robust standard errors need to be clustered on two
dimensions when the sample consists of both large N and large T (i.e., large number of firms and
long time series). A Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach also adjusted for the Newey-West correction is
the second best approach. Untabulated results confirm that our findings are robust to the alternative
Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation.
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R&D intensity. In that respect, we regress the difference (DIFF ) in variance contributions
(Panel C, Table 4.3) on the R&D intensity measures. To confirm that the importance of
NICF increases -hence more positive DIFF - with R&D intensity, we need a statistical
significant and economically large positive coefficient.
Table 4.6 shows estimates from pooled regressions of DIFF on the R&D intensity
measures and a set of control variables (size, be/me and leverage). The statistical sig-
nificance is derived by double-clustered t-statistics. The analysis is again repeated for the
two alternative R&D intensity metrics.
[Insert Table 4.6 here.]
All estimated coefficients are significant. Most importantly, the estimated coefficient on
R&D intensity is positive (0.227) and significant at less than 1%. The result also holds
for the other R&D intensity proxy (0.215). Hence, Table 4.6 supports Panels A and B
of Table 4.4 by reaffirming that, the relative importance of NICF over NCCF increases
with R&D intensity.
4.6.2 Fixed-effects Estimation
Equation (4.5)’s VAR(1) is estimated with WLS regressions. Hence, all results reported
in Section 4.5 are sensitive to the WLS choice. In this section we employ an alternative es-
timation. We estimate the VAR(1) regressions using fixed-effects (panel data) techniques,
controlling for cross-sectional correlation and firm heterogeneity.
Table 4.7 shows the fixed-effects parameter estimates for the VAR(1) system of regres-
sions. The point estimates are identical, both in magnitude and statistical significance,
with those reported in the WLS Table 4.2.
[Insert Table 4.7 here.]
Table 4.8 provides a summary for the behaviour of the NCCF , NICF and NDR firm-level
stock return components using the fixed-effects VAR(1) estimates.
[Insert Table 4.8 here.]
Results reported in Panels A, B and C, are analogous to those documented in the WLS
Table 4.3. Finally, Table 4.9 presents the fixed-effects estimation of the return variance
decomposition by R&D intensity groups. Panel A uses the R&DCi,t/ASSETSi,t ratio,
while Panel B uses the R&DCi,t/MEi,t ratio as R&D intensity proxies.
[Insert Table 4.9 here.]
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Both panels of Table 4.9 report results that are qualitatively similar with those obtained
in the WLS-derived Table 4.4.
Overall, the choice between fixed-effects and WLS is inconsequential. Results obtained
with the fixed-effects technique confirm our main two findings, namely, that NICF are
the main drivers of stock returns, and that their relative importance over NCCF increases
with R&D intensity.
4.6.3 Alternative Variance Decomposition Estimation for the R&D Im-
pact
In Subsection 4.5.1.2 we measure the impact of R&D by estimating separate variance
decompositions for each R&D intensity group allowing firms within each group to share
the same VAR(1) coefficient matrix Γ and error covariance matrix Σ. To assess the
sensitivity of this analysis, we also estimate the variance contributions as a function of
R&D intensity with the procedure outlined in Vuolteenaho (2002). We estimate a separate
variance decomposition for each R&D intensity subset, assuming that the VAR coefficient
matrix Γ is common for all stocks while allowing the VAR-error covariance matrix Σ to
vary across R&D subsets.
Table 4.10’s figures represent the relative variance contributions of NCCF , NICF and
NDR, and the NICF − NCCF variance contribution difference as a function of R&D
intensity. The table’s organisation is similar to Table 4.4’s.
[Insert Table 4.10 here.]
The results obtained using Vuolteenaho (2002)’s conditional variance decomposition method-
ology are consistent with those reported in Table 4.4. In short, both specifications show
that the relative importance of NICF over NCCF increases with R&D intensity.
4.7 Summary and Conclusion
The effect of the R&D activity on the firm’s competitive advantage has been a lengthy
debate in the economics and strategy literature. On one hand, the “resource-based” view
postulates that intangibles allow the company to differentiate itself from its rivals (Hall
1993b; Villalonga 2004; Brown and Kimbrough 2011). On the other hand, it is claimed that
R&D-related innovation becomes a “public good” as it spillovers to competitors (Arrow
1962; Mansfield 1985; Jaffe 1986; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Bloom et al. 2013). It has yet
to become clear how those concepts affect the market’s assessment of the R&D activity.
We examine this question by looking at the effect of the R&D activity on how industry-
common and idiosyncratic earnings drive return variance. In particular, we observe the
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importance of idiosyncratic and common earnings in market participants’ assessment by
means of their respective variance contributions to stock returns. To this end, we extend
Vuolteenaho (2002)’s variance decomposition methodology. Vuolteenaho (2002)’s model
decomposes unexpected stock return variance into cash flow news variance, discount rate
news variance and their covariance. We disaggregate cash flow news variance further into
common and idiosyncratic cash flow news variance allowing for the additional covariance
terms.
Applying the return variance decomposition model on a sample of US firms over the
period 1975 to 2013, we show that both idiosyncratic and common cash flow variances
increase with R&D intensity. This result reflects that, the market perceives that R&D
investment aims to pursue innovation as well as to assimilate innovation developed by
rivals. However, we also find out that R&D intensity is also associated with the rate
at which idiosyncratic cash flow news variance prevails over the common cash flow news
variance. This finding supports that, the market assesses the effect of R&D activity on the
firm’s competitive advantage by reference to the “resource-based” view rather than the
“public good” view. Nevertheless, we also show that the relation between R&D intensity
and the relative importance of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news depends on a
measure of the concentration of R&D investment. This result implies that the market’s
assessment of the R&D activity is informed by the underlying industry economics.
The research reported here contributes to the literature which examines the capital
market implications of the financial reporting information on R&D. Further to supporting
that R&D information is value relevant, from a return variance perspective, we also show
that it conveys useful information about the dual role of R&D investment (i.e, differenti-
ation and assimilation of existing innovation). However, further research could shed more
light on our findings with respect to the influence of the industry economics. Such in-
vestigation could focus in particular to merger activity or other structural breaks (arising
from changes in legislation and regulation, for instance) which are likely to affect R&D
investment concentration.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of average R&D concentration across all industries
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Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the average hhiR&D (i.e., log R&D concentration) across all industries. The R&D
concentration is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares (R&D expenditures for calendar year t-1 over
total industry R&D expenditures) of firms in the industry. The higher hhiR&D, the higher the R&D concentration.
The R&D concentration is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of
35,344 firm-year observations with non-zero R&D expenditures.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of R&D concentration by industry
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Figure 4.2 shows the average hhiR&D (i.e., log R&D concentration) across time for some of the industries under
consideration. The higher hhiR&D, the higher the R&D concentration. The industries in the graph are: Chem-
icals & Pharmaceutics (SIC: 28); Machinery & Computer Hardware (SIC:35); Electrical & Electronics (SIC: 36);
Transportation Equipment & Vehicles (SIC: 37); Scientific Instruments (SIC: 38) and all other R&D industries. The
R&D concentration for each industry is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection,
consisting of 35,344 firm-year observations with non-zero R&D expenditures.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the VAR state variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min 25%-pct Median 75%-pct Max
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the basic data
ri
e -0.011 0.451 -2.682 -0.240 0.018 0.249 2.005
roeci -0.038 0.242 -2.062 -0.089 0.011 0.077 0.772
roeii -0.011 0.364 -3.056 -0.094 0.035 0.155 1.857
be/mei -0.583 0.615 -2.125 -1.013 -0.590 -0.163 1.779
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the mean-adjusted data
ri
e 0.000 0.421 -2.473 -0.210 0.021 0.234 1.928
roeci 0.000 0.234 -1.990 -0.051 0.029 0.117 0.798
roeii 0.000 0.362 -3.021 -0.087 0.044 0.169 1.871
be/mei 0.000 0.589 -1.573 -0.406 -0.005 0.395 2.048
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the firm-level state variables included in the VAR. ri
e is the log excess
return of firm i; roeci is the common component of the log US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book equity of firm i;
roeii is the idiosyncratic component of the log US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book equity of firm i; be/mei is the
log ratio of book value of equity over the market value of equity of firm i.
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the mean-adjusted firm-level state variables included in the VAR. The vari-
ables, described in panel A, are mean-adjusted by subtracting the cross-sectional average each year. Both panels of Table 4.1
are estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.2: WLS VAR parameter estimates
rt+1
e roect+1 roeit+1 be/met+1
rt
e -0.021 0.011 0.070*** -0.342***
[-0.48] [1.09] [6.10] [-19.96]
roect 0.040 0.389*** 0.084** 0.123***
[1.02] [7.01] [2.35] [3.48]
roeit 0.071** 0.050*** 0.297*** 0.096***
[2.32] [4.42] [13.73] [5.11]
be/met 0.044** 0.028*** -0.089*** 0.789***
[2.01] [3.57] [-8.34] [64.72]
Adj.R2 1.12% 14.35% 11.36% 64.72%
F 72.32*** 1767.90*** 1352.41*** 19350.10***
Table 4.2 shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for a first-order firm-level VAR model. The state variables included
in the firm-level VAR are the re which is the mean-adjusted log excess stock return; the roec which is the log-transformed
mean-adjusted common component of the US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book equity; the roei which is the
log-transformed mean-adjusted idiosyncratic component of the US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book equity;
and the be/me which is the mean-adjusted log ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. The table reports
the estimated coefficients on the state variables and at the bottom the corresponding Adj.R2 and F values, testing the
null hypothesis. Below each coefficient the table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*], [**] and [***] indi-
cate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The firm-level VAR is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013
CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.3: Properties of common cash flow, idiosyncratic cash flow and discount rate news
Panel A: Correlation matrix Panel B: Mappings of the state variables
on the estimated news
NCCF NICF NDR NCCF NICF NDR
NCCF 1 -0.634*** 0.229*** Return shock -0.019 0.964 -0.056
NICF -0.634*** 1 -0.302*** ROEC shock 1.644 -1.544 0.100
NDR 0.296*** -0.302*** 1 ROEI shock 0.127 -0.012 0.115
BE/ME shock 0.136 -0.002 0.139
Panel C: Return Variance Decomposition
var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) cov(NCCF,NDR) cov(NICF,NDR) cov(NCCF,NICF ) DIFF
0.122*** 0.274*** 0.004*** 0.007*** -0.010*** -0.116*** 0.152***
[5.33 ] [10.65 ] [16.85 ] [5.97 ] [-7.24 ] [-5.41 ] [8.90 ]
Panel A of Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix of the estimated news terms.
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the functions (λ2, λ3, λ1) that map the shocks in the state-variables of the firm-level VAR of Table 4.2 to common cash flow news, idiosyncratic
cash flow news and discount rate news, respectively. We define λ2 ≡ e1′I(I − ρΓ)−1, λ3 ≡ (e1′ − e2′)I(I − ρΓ)−1 and λ1 ≡ e1′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1 where Γ is the estimated VAR
coefficient matrix form Table 4.2, ρ is set to 0.967 annually, e2 = [0, 1, 0, 0] and e1 = [1, 0, 0, 0].
Panel C of Table 4.3 shows the return variance decomposition into common cash flow, idiosyncratic cash flow and discount rate news variances along with their covariance terms.
The decomposition is of the following form var(re) = var(NCCF ) + var(NICF ) + var(NDR)− 2cov(NCCF,NDR)− 2cov(NICF,NDR) + 2cov(NCCF,NICF ). DIFF is
the difference between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news. Jackknife t-statistics are reported in square brackets. [*], [**]
and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All panels of Table 4.3 are estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection,
consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.4: Relative variance contributions of common and idiosyncratic
cash flow news for each R&D subset
Panel A: R&DC/ASSETS
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.047*** 0.205*** 0.002*** 0.158***
[3.15 ] [9.79 ] [12.41 ] [11.67 ]
Q1 0.069*** 0.194*** 0.004*** 0.125***
[4.66 ] [10.82 ] [16.66 ] [10.85 ]
Q2 0.087*** 0.192*** 0.003*** 0.105***
[6.49 ] [13.01 ] [15.98 ] [10.42 ]
Q3 0.101*** 0.234*** 0.004*** 0.134***
[4.59 ] [9.69 ] [13.90 ] [9.87 ]
Q4 0.106*** 0.272*** 0.003*** 0.165***
[4.42 ] [9.10 ] [13.91 ] [11.70 ]
High-R&D 0.180*** 0.426*** 0.003*** 0.246***
[3.09 ] [7.01 ] [11.76 ] [12.65 ]
H-N 0.133*** 0.220*** 0.001*** 0.087**
Panel B: R&DC/ME
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.047*** 0.205*** 0.002*** 0.158***
[3.15 ] [9.79 ] [12.41 ] [11.67 ]
Q1 0.095*** 0.228*** 0.003*** 0.132***
[6.48 ] [12.29 ] [16.63 ] [9.70 ]
Q2 0.106*** 0.243*** 0.005*** 0.137***
[6.00 ] [10.98 ] [13.14 ] [9.02 ]
Q3 0.110*** 0.244*** 0.003*** 0.134***
[5.42 ] [11.50 ] [12.29 ] [8.19 ]
Q4 0.147*** 0.327*** 0.003*** 0.180***
[4.01 ] [8.10 ] [11.43 ] [9.76 ]
High-R&D 0.152*** 0.346*** 0.006*** 0.194***
[3.43 ] [7.70 ] [13.85 ] [9.88 ]
H-N 0.105*** 0.141*** 0.004*** 0.036**
Table 4.4 reports the results of a separate variance decomposition for each R&D intensity subset, allowing the VAR
coefficient matrix Γ and the VAR-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across the R&D subsets. DIFF is the difference
between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news. “High-R&D” denotes
firms falling in the highest R&D intensity quintile, while “No-R&D” refers to all stocks with no records of R&D costs.
“H-N” refers to the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D subsets for the denoted variables. The R&D quintiles
of Panel A use the capitalized and amortized R&D costs for calendar year t-1, divided by assets for calendar year t-1.
The R&D quintiles of Panel B use the capitalized and amortized R&D costs for calendar year t-1, divided by the mar-
ket value of equity for December of calendar year t-1. The table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*],
[**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The variance decomposition of Table 4.4 is
estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.5: Relative importance of common and idiosyncratic cash flow
news and R&D concentration
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable: DIFF DIFF
constant 0.241*** 0.272***
9.02 8.96
size -0.027*** -0.028***
-11.92 -12.72
be/me -0.024*** -0.055***
-3.27 -5.88
leverage -0.039*** -0.005
-4.31 0.48
RankhhiR&D -0.007* -0.009*
-1.72 -1.89
r&dc/assets 0.329***
7.53
r&dc/assets×RankhhiR&D -0.029*
-1.78
r&dc/me 0.221***
4.95
r&dc/me×RankhhiR&D -0.014*
-1.77
R2 3.62% 2.60%
Table 4.5 shows pooled regression estimates and t-statistics, in italics, computed from standard errors that have been
double clustered by individual firms and firm-years. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively. Under Model 1 the log R&D intensity is the capitalized and amortized R&D for calendar year t-1,
divided by assets for calendar year t-1. Under Model 2 the log R&D intensity is the capitalized and amortized R&D
for calendar year t-1, divided by market value of equity for December of calendar year t-1. The dependent variable
is the difference between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news as
summarised in Table 4.4. We sort the industry-years of hhiR&D into quintiles. Variable RankhhiR&D denotes the
quintile ranking. The independent variables include the interaction terms between the R&D intensity variables and
the ranked R&D concentration (RankhhiR&D ); and a set of control variables. size is the log market value of equity
for June of calendar year t. be/me is the log ratio of the book value of equity for calendar year t-1, divided by the
market value of equity for December of t-1 calendar year. leverage is the log ratio of the book value of equity over
the sum of book value of equity and book debt for calendar year t-1. At the bottom, we tabulate the R2 of each
model. The regressions of Table 4.5 are estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection,
consisting of 35,344 firm-year observations with non-zero R&D expenditures.
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Table 4.6: OLS tests for the R&D effect on the relative variance contri-
bution of common and idiosyncratic cash flow news
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable: DIFF DIFF
constant 0.236*** 0.243***
11.72 10.59
size -0.027*** -0.029***
-10.93 -10.35
be/me -0.025*** -0.048***
-2.89 -4.45
leverage -0.036*** -0.016*
-3.53 -1.67
r&dc/assets 0.227***
3.29
r&dc/me 0.215***
4.82
R2 2.35% 2.26%
Table 4.6 shows estimates from pooled regressions. Below each coefficient, the table reports t-statistics, in
italics, computed from standard errors that have been double clustered by individual firms and firm-years
and, at the bottom the corresponding R2. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. Under both models, the dependent variable is the difference between the variance of idiosyn-
cratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news as summarised in Panel C of Table 4.3.
Under Model 1 the log R&D intensity is the capitalized and amortized R&D for calendar year t-1, divided by
assets for calendar year t-1. Under Model 2 the log R&D intensity is the capitalized and amortized R&D for
calendar year t-1, divided by market value of equity for December of calendar year t-1. size is the log market
value of equity for June of calendar year t. be/me is the log ratio of the book value of equity for calendar year
t-1, divided by the market value of equity for December of t-1 calendar year. leverage is the log ratio of the
book value of equity over the sum of book value of equity and book debt for calendar year t-1. The regres-
sions of Table 4.6 are estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting
of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.7: Fixed-effects VAR parameter estimates
rt+1
e roect+1 roeit+1 be/met+1
rt
e -0.011** 0.012*** 0.072*** -0.345***
-2.32 4.82 17.97 -85.67
roect 0.038*** 0.372*** 0.088*** 0.119***
4.03 76.04 11.48 15.47
roeit 0.071*** 0.048*** 0.296*** 0.096***
11.91 15.58 61.45 19.73
be/met 0.047*** 0.026*** -0.087*** 0.797***
13.38 14.17 -30.65 277.53
R2 1.31% 13.04% 11.39% 65.87%
Table 4.7 shows the fixed-effects parameter estimates for a first-order firm-level VAR model. The fixed-effects
regressions account for cross-sectional correlations and firm heterogeneity. The state variables included in
the firm-level VAR are the re which is the mean-adjusted log excess stock return; the roec which is the log-
transformed mean-adjusted industry components of the US GAAP return on (beginning of period) book equity;
the roei which is the log-transformed mean-adjusted idiosyncratic component of the US GAAP return on (be-
ginning of period) book equity; and the be/me which is the mean-adjusted log ratio of book value of equity to
market value of equity. The table reports the estimated coefficients on the state variables and the corresponding
R2. Below each coefficient the table reports, t-statistics, in italics. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels
of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The fixed-effects VAR regressions of Table 4.7 are estimated from the pooled
1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.8: Properties of common cash flow, idiosyncratic cash flow and discount rate news (fixed-effects VAR)
Panel A: Correlation matrix Panel B: Mappings of the state variables
on the estimated news
NCCF NICF NDR NCCF NICF NDR
NCCF 1 -0.619*** 0.273*** Return shock -0.015 0.962 -0.053
NICF -0.619*** 1 -0.244*** ROEC shock 1.599 -1.502 0.097
NDR 0.273*** -0.244*** 1 ROEI shock 0.119 -0.002 0.117
BE/ME shock 0.127 0.027 0.154
Panel C: Return Variance Decomposition
var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) cov(NCCF,NDR) cov(NICF,NDR) cov(NCCF,NICF ) DIFF
0.116*** 0.269*** 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.009*** -0.109*** 0.153***
[5.28 ] [10.72 ] [16.86 ] [5.90 ] [-6.41 ] [-5.33 ] [8.96 ]
Panel A of Table 4.8 shows the correlation matrix of the estimated news terms.
Panel B of Table 4.8 shows the functions (λ2, λ3, λ1) that map the shocks in the state-variables of the fixed-effects firm-level VAR of Table 4.7 to common cash flow news,
idiosyncratic cash flow news and discount rate news, respectively. We define λ2 ≡ e1′I(I − ρΓ)−1, λ3 ≡ (e1′ − e2′)I(I − ρΓ)−1 and λ1 ≡ e1′ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1 where Γ is the esti-
mated fixed-effects VAR coefficient matrix form Table 4.7, ρ is set to 0.967 annually, e2 = [0, 1, 0, 0] and e1 = [1, 0, 0, 0].
Panel C of Table 4.8 shows the return variance decomposition into common cash flow, idiosyncratic cash flow and discount rate news variances along with their covariance
terms. The decomposition is of the following form var(re) = var(NCCF ) + var(NICF ) + var(NDR) − 2cov(NCCF,NDR) − 2cov(NICF,NDR) + 2cov(NCCF,NICF ).
DIFF is the difference between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news. Jackknife t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
[*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All panels of Table 4.8 use the results from the fixed-effects VAR of Table 4.7 and are estimated
from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.9: Relative variance contributions of common and idiosyncratic
cash flow news for each R&D subset (fixed-effects VAR)
Panel A: R&DC/ASSETS
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.047*** 0.208*** 0.002*** 0.161***
[3.16 ] [9.86 ] [12.31 ] [11.67 ]
Q1 0.066*** 0.192*** 0.004*** 0.126***
[4.67 ] [10.90 ] [16.78 ] [10.96 ]
Q2 0.084*** 0.188*** 0.004*** 0.104***
[6.45 ] [13.08 ] [15.77 ] [10.46 ]
Q3 0.097*** 0.231*** 0.005*** 0.135***
[4.57 ] [9.72 ] [13.66 ] [10.00 ]
Q4 0.104*** 0.270*** 0.003*** 0.167***
[4.39 ] [9.12 ] [14.01 ] [11.70 ]
High-R&D 0.176*** 0.419*** 0.003*** 0.243***
[3.09 ] [7.12 ] [12.53 ] [12.45 ]
H-N 0.129*** 0.210*** 0.001*** 0.082**
Panel B: R&DC/ME
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.047*** 0.208*** 0.002*** 0.161***
[3.16 ] [9.86 ] [12.31 ] [11.67 ]
Q1 0.092*** 0.223*** 0.005*** 0.132***
[6.45 ] [12.32 ] [17.55 ] [9.75 ]
Q2 0.099*** 0.237*** 0.006*** 0.138***
[5.95 ] [11.02 ] [13.51 ] [9.13 ]
Q3 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.003*** 0.135***
[5.37 ] [11.53 ] [12.94 ] [8.26 ]
Q4 0.141*** 0.318*** 0.003*** 0.177***
[3.97 ] [8.10 ] [11.79 ] [9.74 ]
High-R&D 0.149*** 0.346*** 0.005*** 0.198***
[3.43 ] [7.76 ] [13.85 ] [10.02 ]
H-N 0.102*** 0.138*** 0.004*** 0.036**
Table 4.9 reports the results of a separate variance decomposition for each R&D intensity subset, allowing the VAR
coefficient matrix Γ and the VAR-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across the R&D subsets. DIFF is the difference
between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of common cash flow news. “High-R&D” denotes
firms falling in the highest R&D intensity quintile, while “No-R&D” refers to all stocks with no records of R&D costs.
“H-N” refers to the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D subsets for the denoted variables. The R&D quintiles
of Panel A use the capitalized and amortized R&D costs for calendar year t-1, divided by assets for calendar year t-1.
The R&D quintiles of Panel B use the capitalized and amortized R&D costs for calendar year t-1, divided by the mar-
ket value of equity for December of calendar year t-1. The table reports jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*],
[**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The variance decomposition of Table 4.9 uses
the results from the fixed-effects VAR of Table 4.7 and is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT
intersection, consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Table 4.10: Relative variance contributions of common and idiosyncratic
cash flow news as a function of R&D
Panel A: R&DC/ASSETS
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.135*** 0.295*** 0.004*** 0.160***
[3.51 ] [6.86 ] [14.71 ] [8.15 ]
Q1 0.115*** 0.234*** 0.003*** 0.120***
[4.69 ] [9.44 ] [17.37 ] [7.89 ]
Q2 0.095*** 0.201*** 0.003*** 0.105***
[6.34 ] [12.23 ] [15.14 ] [9.58 ]
Q3 0.096*** 0.233*** 0.004*** 0.137***
[4.56 ] [9.93 ] [13.42 ] [9.31 ]
Q4 0.107*** 0.268*** 0.004*** 0.161***
[4.36 ] [9.15 ] [13.55 ] [9.98 ]
High-R&D 0.174*** 0.412*** 0.008*** 0.237***
[2.93 ] [7.25 ] [15.27 ] [7.75 ]
H-N 0.039* 0.117*** 0.004*** 0.078***
Panel B: R&DC/ME
R&D intensity var(NCCF ) var(NICF ) var(NDR) DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (2− 1)
No-R&D 0.135*** 0.295*** 0.004*** 0.160
[3.51 ] [6.86 ] [14.71 ] [8.15 ]
Q1 0.123*** 0.242*** 0.003*** 0.118
[6.37 ] [11.68 ] [16.91 ] [8.75 ]
Q2 0.107*** 0.233*** 0.003*** 0.125
[5.91 ] [10.34 ] [14.80 ] [8.53 ]
Q3 0.105*** 0.238*** 0.004*** 0.133
[5.22 ] [11.13 ] [14.86 ] [8.77 ]
Q4 0.120*** 0.270*** 0.005*** 0.150
[3.79 ] [8.26 ] [13.81 ] [8.62 ]
High-R&D 0.137*** 0.348*** 0.007*** 0.211
[3.18 ] [8.10 ] [13.20 ] [8.64 ]
H-N 0.002 0.053*** 0.004*** 0.051***
Table 4.10 reports the results of a separate variance decomposition for each R&D intensity subset, assuming that the
VAR coefficient matrix Γ is common for all stocks while allowing the VAR-error covariance matrix Σ to vary across
R&D subsets. DIFF is the difference between the variance of idiosyncratic cash flow news and the variance of com-
mon cash flow news. “High-R&D” denotes firms falling in the highest R&D intensity quintile, while “No-R&D” refers
to all stocks with no records of R&D costs. “H-N” refers to the difference between High-R&D and No-R&D subsets
for the denoted variables. The R&D quintiles of Panel A use the capitalized and amortized R&D costs for calendar
year t-1, divided by assets for calendar year t-1. The R&D quintiles of Panel B use the capitalized and amortized R&D
costs for calendar year t-1, divided by the market value of equity for December of calendar year t-1. The table reports
jackknife t-statistics, in square brackets. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
The variance decomposition of Table 4.10 is estimated from the pooled 1975 to 2013 CRSP-COMPUSTAT intersection,
consisting of 42,200 firm-year observations.
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Chapter 5
Limitations and Conclusions
5.1 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research
We acknowledge that the inferences from the empirical tests conducted in this thesis
are subject to limitations. Those limitations arise mostly from the assumptions that are
inherent in our variables estimation and are outlined below.
First, an important assumption during our estimation of cash flow and discount rate
news pertains to the choice of state variables included in the VAR models. We note
that our choice of variables follows prior research (Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004a,b;
Campbell et al. 2012, 2013, for the market news estimation; and Vuolteenaho 2002; Cohen
et al. 2002; Hecht and Vuolteenaho 2006; Hou, Zhang and Zhuang 2015, for the firm-level
news estimation). Nevertheless, we are aware of Chen and Zhao (2009)’s concerns with
respect to the sensitivity of the estimation of market’s return news components to the
choice of state variables employed in the VAR specification.
Chen and Zhao (2009) argue that the directly-computed discount rate news are mea-
sured with error due to the well-documented low predictive power of the state variables;
and inevitably the residually-computed cash flow news inherit all modeling noise. Chen
and Zhao (2009) show that different combinations of state variables produce different
modeling noise, questioning the robustness of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a)’s VAR
specification, which we also employ. Thus, the discount rate (cash flow) beta differences
(similarities) between High and No-R&D portfolios we document might be, partly, an
artefact of the set of state variables we use.
In response, Campbell et al. (2010) and Engsted et al. (2012) point out some mistakes
in Chen and Zhao (2009)’s VAR specifications. Specifically, Engsted et al. (2012) show
that an aggregate stock return decomposition is robust if the VAR includes: (1) price as
part of a stationary ratio, such as dividend-price or price-to-earnings; and (2) additional
state variables that capture part of the predictable variation in returns/dividends growth
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that is left unexplained by the stationary price-related ratio.53 Some VARs of Chen and
Zhao (2009)’s analysis do not have a price-related state variable, and, thus, Campbell
et al. (2010) and Engsted et al. (2012) take issue with their criticism.
We argue that our results are stable enough, since we carefully define our VAR models
to include a price-related stationary state variable (and book-to-market in the firm-level
decomposition). Moreover, we do not arbitrarily pick the remaining state variables, but
employ state variables that are often found to predict stock returns.54 In support, our
bootstrap simulation confirms that the aggregate-level VAR specification is stable, since
errors-in-variables cannot deem our discount rate (cash flow) beta differences statistically
insignificant (significant).
Second, two related assumptions in the estimation of cash flow and discount rate news
are: (1) the time-series of the state variables follow 1-order VAR processes; (2) the VAR
coefficient matrices are assumed to be constant over time and -at the firm-level- across
firms. With respect to the first assumption, this is a simplification of reality used by all
related literature. Callen (2009) notes that this assumption may compromise the economic
interpretation of the estimated news. However, Callen (2009) also advices that is unlikely
to find more than two lags for each state variable to be efficient. Supportively, the 2-order
VAR in Chapter 3’s robustness checks yields similar results to the 1-order VAR. Hence, we
believe that lag order does not appear to be a matter of concern for our VAR specifications.
With respect to the second assumption, we trade-off time variation for more statistical
power. As most accounting and finance researchers, we estimate the VAR parameters
at the system-wide level, and assume that these parameters are constant across time
and firms (see Callen 2009, and references therein). A rolling-window VAR or fitting
the VAR for different time-periods, generates more relevant news, since the estimation
conditions on the most related information set. However, both the aggregate and the
firm return decompositions require return predictability in order to be valid. The higher
the return predictability, the lower the model noise, and the lower the misspecification
error in the residually-computed term. Following Campbell and Yogo (2006)’s suggestion,
we achieve return predictability with long time-series (i.e., 1929-2013 aggregate VAR).
Results from a 1976-2013 aggregate VAR suggest almost zero return predictability. Hence,
short time-series result to ICAPM inferences that are subject to extensive misspecification
errors. At the firm-level, we do not impose any forward-looking survival requirement;
53Note that for the firm level one needs: (1) book-to-market as state variable; and (2) state variables
that capture predictable variation in returns/ROE that is not captured by the book-to-market. This
is because Vuolteenaho (2002) defines the firm-level return decomposition by using the clean surplus
relation and assuming stationarity in the book-to-market ratio.
54Chen and Zhao (2009) also report that only when adding a significant number of state variables, the
predictive power is increased, and, hence, the modeling noise is reduced. To avoid multicollinearity
issues, we do not keep adding state variables that have not been often used by related literature.
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hence many firms have very short time-series. Estimating rolling-window or sub-sample
VAR parameters is, to a large extent, infeasible and leads to unstable parameters. This is
especially the case in the small cross-sections toward the beginning of our samples.
Third, our results rely on an estimate of the R&D asset which follows Lev and Sougian-
nis (1996). This estimate relies on a number of capitalisation and amortisation assump-
tions as described in Appendix A. In particular, we adopt Lev and Sougiannis (1996)’s
industry-specific amortisation rates. Industry-specific assumptions reflect the variation in
the useful-life spans across industries (Shi 2003). Amir et al. (2007) repeat the procedure
of Lev and Sougiannis (1996) on an updated sample and their results are similar. Moreover
this R&D asset estimate does not exclude firms that can capitalize software development
costs under SFAS No. 86 (1985). Instead, it already accounts for the capitalization of
software development costs. This should not be an issue, since according to Aboody and
Lev (1998) the capitalization rates are very low. Indeed, most software firms choose to
always expense, notwithstanding the fact the their software products are profitable (Mohd
2005).55
Fourth, in a recent paper Koh and Reeb (2015) document that some firms do not
record R&D expenses despite engaging with R&D activity. This “hidden” engagement
with R&D can be proven by the presence of patents. We acknowledge that this may affect
our inferences from the partitions and portfolios of firms that we classify as having no or,
tentatively, low R&D activity. Nevertheless, misclassified R&D active firms would bias our
results against, rather than in favour of, finding significant positive differences in terms of
equity duration, excess returns, priced risk and return variance components between High-
and No-R&D firms. The results reported here may have been stronger had we controlled
for firms which exhibit no R&D expenses and at the same time, file for patents.
Fifth, the present thesis builds upon the view that the conservative principle, underpin-
ning the accounting treatment of R&D, reveals useful information about risk. We provide
supporting evidence by reference to an ICAPM asset pricing model (Chapter 2). A sim-
ilar view motivates Penman and Yehuda (2015) to develop an accounting-based model
of firm-level expected returns and expected cash flows. Instead, this thesis employs the
Vuolteenaho (2002) model to estimate cash flow and discount rate news and, specifically,
to estimate the variance contribution of those news to the variance of unexpected returns.
Penman and Yehuda (2015) support their model over Vuolteenaho (2002)’s model arguing
that it is unable to accommodate earnings growth that arise from conservative accounting,
such as the treatment of R&D costs.56
55Mohd (2005) lists a number of reasons software firms do not capitalize software development costs.
Overall, these firms choose secrecy over more disclosure and also want to signal high earnings quality.
56Their criticism relies on their understanding of the time-series properties of the premium of the market
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We acknowledge that Vuolteenaho (2002) does not explicitly model the effect of con-
servative accounting on expected earnings and book values of equity. However, we note
the rich dynamics informing the estimation of the cash flow and discount rate news in
the VAR specification we employ. Notably, these dynamics draw upon the time-series of
reported ROE and book-to-market ratios. The results presented in Chapter 3 show that
our estimates of cash flow and discount rate news variance increase with R&D intensity,
with the cash flow news variance being the dominant contributor to unexpected return
variance. Those results are consistent with Penman and Yehuda (2015)’s view that ac-
counting conveys information about risk. Future research could extent the Penman and
Yehuda (2015) framework to estimate variances of cash flow and discount rate news and
confirm the results reported by this thesis.
The research presented by the chapters of this thesis could be extended in many ways.
For instance, the conducted tests do not take into account strategic considerations with
respect to R&D activity. Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) analytically show that large firms
may decide to let small firms conduct R&D and then subsequently acquire the companies
that have successfully innovated. That may have implications for our results which may
vary depending on whether research activity is conducted “in-house” or relies on existing
research that has been acquired.57 An R&D strategy based on acquisitions may underlie
our results with respect to large as opposed to small firms (e.g., lower variance of cash flow
news). Merger activity may also affect to some extent our measure of R&D investment
concentration in Chapter 4. However, it is difficult to assess whether this factor affects
Chapter 4’s results. Those open questions are also interesting extensions of this thesis’s
research focus.
Cohen et al. (2013) show that past R&D track record may also provide insight into the
firm’s potential to generate future benefits out of the R&D investment. It may follow that
past R&D track record determines how market participants perceive uncertainty in future
cash flows arising from R&D investments. Interestingly, Cohen et al. (2013) document that
the US capital market appears to ignore the implications of past successes when valuing
future innovation. It is an open question how this variable would affect our results.
Another possible extension of our research is to inform the value relevance of profit and
value over the book value of equity. In their framework, Penman and Yehuda (2015) envision an expansion
of the premium, whilst, as they argue, this premium in Vuolteenaho (2002) is assumed to decline over
time. An infinite expansion of premiums is neither necessary for Penman and Yehuda (2015)’s finite
model to hold nor is realistic, assuming a normal liquidation of the firm at the end of its life (e.g., by
which time, the firm has realised the earnings from the investment on R&D, and it has no other growth
options in place). On the other hand, the derivation of the Vuolteenaho (2002) model does not explicitly
assume a decline in the premium of the market value over the book value of equity.
57We do not take into account acquired in-progress R&D (AIPR&D). It is only in (2007) that the US
GAAP allowed the capitalisation of AIPR&D as an indefinite lived intangible asset, annually tested for
impairment (SFAS No. 141-R 2007). We expect that this should not affect our inference.
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loss making firms that are R&D active. The conservative treatment of R&D often leads
to significant losses in firms which nevertheless, enjoy high valuations (Darrough and Ye
2007). This puzzling regularity is also examined in Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009),
who find that although earnings of profit firms are likely to contain information on the
future benefits of R&D activity, earnings of loss firms do not contain such information.
At this point, we could only conjecture that a variance decomposition model would shed
further light on this topic by identifying differences in terms of cash flow and discount rate
news variance. This investigation could further draw upon the sensitivities of cash flow
and discount rate news to the market news to infer whether the valuations of loss making
firms are driven by risk or sentiment (e.g., the “dot-com” bubble case).
While we find that the treatment of R&D provides information that is overall relevant,
conveying risk as well as reflecting common and idiosyncratic components of earnings,
we assume a constant level of disclosure which enables those assessments. It is unknown
whether variation in related disclosure would affect the results reported here. A similar
point could be made with respect to the information conveyed by the capitalisation of
development expenses imposed on firms reporting under IAS No. 38. Further research
could investigate the implications of both variations in disclosure and development costs
capitalisation. For example, insofar capitalisation conveys that future benefits are less
uncertain, we might expect capitalisers to exhibit a less pronounced relation between
R&D intensity and cash flow news variance.
Finally, future research can extend more the investigation into the relation between
conservative accounting and R&D. Recall, conservative accounting has two forms, namely,
unconditional and conditional (Beaver and Ryan 2005). Unconditional conservatism re-
quires the understatement of net assets due to the rigid accounting rules for specific in-
vestments like R&D. Conditional conservatism requires the writing-down of book values
under bad circumstances, but not its writing-up under good, but not certain, ones. There
is an interplay between the two conservative forms. Beaver and Ryan (2005) argue that
conditional conservatism builds-up “reserves” that can buffer earnings shocks, recorded
under unconditional conservatism standards. Empirically, literature has developed mea-
sures of unconditional (e.g, Penman and Zhang 2002) as well as conditional conservatism
(e.g., Basu 1997).
Conditional conservatism measures are indirectly relevant in the case of R&D. In that
respect, a related measure is Callen et al. (2009)’s conditional conservatism measure.
Like this thesis, Callen et al. (2009) use Vuolteenaho (2002)’s firm-level log-linear return
decomposition into cash flow and discount rate news. In doing so, they approximate the
non-linear association between accounting and non-accounting information in investors’
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assessments. They are therefore able to separate the two information sources and to
measure the total shock to current and future expected earnings recognized in current
earnings. Future research can use Callen et al. (2009)’s conditional conservatism measure
to investigate whether R&D intensive firms are better-equipped to withstand earnings
shocks. In theory, they have build-up “buffer reserves” from years of expensed R&D.
5.2 Conclusions
The treatment of the R&D activity on the financial statements has raised a long lasting
stream of research. Using novel methodologies for the first time in this stream of research
(an ICAPM model, return variance decomposition) allows the examination of the main
debates from an alternative perspective.
The research in this thesis responds to calls for considering alternative asset pricing
models in assessing the mispricing explanation of the positive relation between R&D activ-
ity and future returns (Chambers et al. 2002; Skinner 2008; Donelson and Resutek 2012).
The choice of the ICAPM is advantageous as it allows for stochastic expected returns and
accommodates investors’ intertemporal preferences. Intertemporal preferences arise when
investors with a long horizon hedge against shocks to total wealth as well as unfavorable
shifts in the investment opportunity set (Merton 1973). Considering intertemporal pref-
erences is important here, because R&D activity results to benefits that materialise over
multiple periods in the future, and thus we need to account for the inherent risk. We
identify this type of risk in the exposure of the firm to the market portfolio’s discount rate
news; our results confirm this hypothesis. This is also consistent with the effect of R&D
intensity on the equity duration, a relation that has already been identified in Cornell
(1999) but not taken further. We acknowledge that, when we use the ICAPM along with
several benchmark asset pricing models (the CAPM, the two-news factor model and the
three factor Fama and French 1993 model) to test the positive R&D-return relation, we
receive mixed results. Nevertheless, a hedging strategy that goes long on portfolios of
R&D intensive firms and short on portfolios on firms with no exposure to R&D yields
statistical insignificant abnormal returns, based on the ICAPM model.
We conclude that the conservative accounting treatment of R&D conveys information
about equity duration by means of the deferral of earnings to the long-run when revenues
arising from the R&D project are earned and realized, or cost-savings become effective.
The influence of equity duration becomes obvious in terms of the exposure of the firm to the
market portfolio’s discount rate news. Given our hedging strategy results, we recommend
a risk rather than a mispricing explanation for the positive R&D-returns relation.
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The thesis also responds to the on-going debate on the value relevance of the financial
reporting information on R&D. In contrast to prior research, we investigate the value
relevance of the financial reporting on R&D by employing a return variance decomposition
model. From this perspective, value relevance is assessed by the extent to which revisions
of expectations about future earnings (cash flow news) and/or revisions of expectations
about future discount rates (discount rate news) affect the revisions of expectations about
future returns or, return news (Callen et al. 2006). This alternative perspective on value
relevance is motivated by the feature which prescribes the omission of the R&D asset
from the balance sheet, i.e., uncertainty in future benefits. It also provides a theoretical
framework to Kothari et al. (2002)’s argument that stock return variability reflects the
market’s assessment of a firm’s cash flow uncertainty. Our findings reveal that, R&D
intensity has a significant influence on cash flow and discount rate news variance, thereby
driving unexpected returns news variance.
Extending this analysis, we show that the association between R&D intensity and cash
flow news variance is driven by risk. In the spirit of Beaver et al. (1970)’s “accounting
betas”, we assess the sensitivity of cash flow news to the aggregate market news using the
Campbell et al. (2010) methodology. The findings reveal significant associations between
R&D intensity and the sensitivity of cash flow news to the market’s cash flow and discount
rate news. On the other hand, we do not observe a similar relation with respect to
discount rate news which, according to Campbell et al. (2010), is an indication of the
effect of sentiment in market participants’ assessments. We conclude that the conservative
treatment of R&D is value relevant, since it is useful for assessing the effect of R&D activity
on the properties of expected benefits and, more particular, their risk. This conclusion
is also consistent with the standard setters’ intention, stated in SFAS No.2 (1974), with
regard to the purpose of the conservative treatment of R&D to convey information about
future benefits’ uncertainty and risk.
Finally, we extent the value relevance investigation of the financial reporting informa-
tion on R&D to the common and idiosyncratic components of earnings. Using again a
return variance decomposition framework, we seek to identify how R&D intensity affects
the relative importance of idiosyncratic over common cash flow news to (unexpected) re-
turn variance. The motivation for this exercise arises from concepts mainly discussed in
the economics literature with respect to the effects of R&D activity on the firm’s prof-
itability. On one hand, the “resource-based” view postulates that the R&D activity allows
the company to differentiate itself from its rivals (Hall 1993b; Villalonga 2004; Brown and
Kimbrough 2011). On the other hand, it is claimed that R&D-related innovation becomes
a “public good”, as it spillovers to competitors (Arrow 1962; Mansfield 1985; Jaffe 1986;
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Mansfield 1986; Cohen and Levinthal 1989). We find that both influences co-exist in
market participant’s assessments; both idiosyncratic and common cash flow news variance
(representing correspondingly the “resource-based” and the “public good” view of R&D
activity) increase as a function of R&D intensity. However, we find that R&D intensity ac-
celerates the rate at which idiosyncratic cash flow news variance prevails over the common
cash flow news variance.
We further demonstrate that information on the underlying industry economics, in
terms of R&D investment concentration, affects the market’s assessment of the relation
between R&D intensity and the relative importance of idiosyncratic cash flow news. We
conclude that financial reporting information on R&D allows not only an assessment of the
source of uncertainty in future benefits (relating to common and idiosyncratic earnings),
but it also allows those assessments to be informed by the economics of the industry where
the firm operates.
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Appendices
Appendix A: “Off-balance Sheet” R&D Capital (R&DC i,t)
The estimation of the “off-balance sheet” R&D asset R&DCi,t follows the procedure
outlined in Lev and Sougiannis (1996). We measure R&DCi,t for firm i at time t, as the
proportion of current and past R&D expenditure (COMPUSTAT mnemonic RDX), that
is still productive in June of a given calendar year t. Prior research lacks a consensus
over the useful life and the amortization rates of R&D assets. Lev et al. (2005), argue
that an industry-specific schedule is more reliable than a uniform amortization schedule.
Therefore, we adopt the amortization rates and useful life that correspond to the 2-digit
SIC industry classification of firm i as estimated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996).
Table A1 reports the industry amortization rates, taken from Table 3 in Lev and
Sougiannis (1996, pg. 121).
[Insert Table A1 here.]
We compute R&DCi,t as follows:
R&DCi,t =
N−1∑
k=0
R&Di,t−k(1−
k∑
j=0
δj) (A.1)
where k takes the value of a given year of the industry-specific useful life of the R&D
expenditures and δj corresponds to the amortization rates in Table A1.
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Appendix B: Book Value of Equity
The book value of equity is estimated following Daniel and Titman (2006). The starting
block is the shareholder’s equity (COMPUSTAT mnemonic SEQ). If missing, we substitute
its value with the sum of total common equity (COMPUSTAT mnemonic CEQ) and
preferred stockholder’s equity, at par value (COMPUSTAT mnemonic PSTK). When the
last two variables are missing, we use total assets (COMPUSTAT mnemonic AT) minus
total liabilities (COMPUSTAT mnemonic LT). Without the last two variables we define
shareholder’s equity as missing for this year.
To estimate book value of equity, we subtract from the shareholder’s equity the value
of the preferred stock. The latter is estimated with the redemption value (COMPUSTAT
mnemonic PSTKRV), liquidating value (COMPUSTAT mnemonic PSTKL) or carrying
value (COMPUSTAT mnemonic PSTK), in that order, as available. If all three variables
are missing and do not have a valid value for the preferred stock we treat book value of
equity as missing for that year.
Finally, if book value of equity is not missing we add balance sheet deferred taxes
(COMPUSTAT mnemonic TXDITC) and subtract the post retirement benefit asset (COM-
PUSTAT mnemonic PRBA).
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Appendix C: Estimation of NCF, NDR and VAR(1)
Here, we set out the procedure of estimating the market level VAR(1) that corresponds
to the equation (2.4) in order to extract the market cash flow and discount rate news.
Recall:
zt+1 = c+ Γzt + ut+1
where zt is the (k × 1) vector of the k state variables at time t (k = 1 for reM,t, 2 for PEt
3 for TYt, 4 for V St and 5 for DEFt). The estimated NCF and NDR are then obtained
from equations (2.6) and (2.5), respectively.
[Insert Table C1 here.]
The entries in Table C1 report results from the monthly frequency state variables’
VAR(1) of equation (2.4), used in Chapter 2. Table C1 shows the estimated coefficients,
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, adjusted R2 and F -statistics. We can see that the
PE is a significant predictor; increases in PE forecast a lower excess market return. TY is
positive and significant return predictor. On the other hand, V S (negative coefficient) and
DEF (negative coefficient) are not significant. We acknowledge the possibility that those
findings might be affected by the multicollinearity among the persistent state variables
(e.g., correlation between V S and the DEF is 0.621 and 0.649 with monthly and annually
data frequency, respectively). Nevertheless, in the return-prediction regression all five
state variables are jointly significant, which suffices for the estimation of the NCF and
the NDR (Campbell et al. 2010, 2013).
[Insert Table C2 here.]
The entries in Table C2 report results from the annually frequency state variables’
VAR(1) of equation (3.11), used in Chapter 3. As above, the table shows the estimated
coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, adjusted R2 and F -statistics. The
result are qualitatively similar with those obtained with monthly state variables.
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Appendix D: The Bootstrap Simulation
The CF and the DR betas are not time-series regression coefficients. To obtain stan-
dard errors, also accounting for the errors-in-variables of NCF and NDR, we use a boot-
strap simulation.58 We employ Runkle (1987)’s approach as follows.
1. Estimate the VAR(1) of equation (2.4) and save the coefficient matrix, Γ, and the
residuals matrix, υt+1; where t takes values from 1 to 1020.
2. Draw with replacement a sample, υt+1
?, from the estimated residuals in step 1.
The new and the original samples have the same size. We partition υt+1
? with the
test portfolios returns in two groups; January 1929 to June 1976; and July 1976
to December 2013. This ensures that the simulated data are observable during our
sample period (see Campbell and Vuolteenaho 2004a).
3. Recursively estimate the new state variables series, zt+1
?, by adding the product
zt
?×Γ with υt+1? from step 2. To initialise the process we use the December 1928
values.
4. Steps 1 to 3 are repeated 2, 500 times.
We use the 2, 500 samples in obtaining new NCF and NDR as described in Appendix
C. Then we compute 2, 500 CF and DR betas for the ICAPM along with the V − G
and H − N differences. The standard deviation of the aforementioned betas and beta-
differences series are the standard errors to compute the t-statistics in Table 2.3. Finally,
we estimate the pricing models (see Subsection 2.4.3) and in turn the corresponding CPE
metrics [see equation (2.17)].59 As in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a), for each model
in consideration, the 5th percentile value of the 2, 500 CPE realizations is the critical value
to reject the zero pricing errors hypothesis. The 5% critical values are reported in Panels
B of Table 2.4 and Table 2.6.
58The only assumption/caveat is that the VAR is not misspecified (see Berkowitz and Kilian 2000).
59For the FF model we partition its risk factors with υt+1
?.
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Appendix E: The Jackknife Methodology
Since our dataset contains several cross-sections, we need to account for the cross-
sectional correlation in the VAR(1) residuals. This is an important point since an as-
sumption of independent error terms across time and firms may bias the standard errors
downwards. Shao and Rao (1993) develop a jackknife method for estimating asymptoti-
cally correct standard errors in linear regression models under a general group structure
(i.e., the delete-group jackknife methodology). Specifically, they prove that their delete-
group jackknife methodology is asymptotically robust in the presence of within-groups
error correlation, as opposed to the delete-one jackknife and the delta method. Below, we
summarise the implementation of the Shao-Rhao (1993) delete-group jackknife methodol-
ogy.
This study’s dataset includes 35 and 36 cross-sections in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4,
respectively. The delete-group jackknife is implemented by taking out in turn one cross-
section at a time and re-weighting the remaining cross-sections. This procedure yields in
total T (35 or 36) jackknife replicates of size T − 1 (34 or 35). θˆ denotes the coefficient
estimator from the original regression. Let θˆt denote the fitted value of θ obtained from
the tth replication. Then the jackknife variance estimator of θˆ is estimated as follows.
Vˆ (θˆ) =
T∑
t=1
αt(θˆt − θˆ)(θˆt − θˆ)′ (E.1)
Where αt = (T − 1)/T are the replication weights. For details and proofs, see Shao and
Rao (1993).
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Table A1: R&D amortization rates
Industry
Chemicals
&
Pharma-
ceutics
Machinery
& Com-
puter
Hardware
Electrical
& Elec-
tronics
Transporta-
tion
Equip-
ment &
Vehicles
Scientific
Instru-
ments
All other
R&D
industries
SIC (28) (35) (36) (37) (38)
Annual amortization rates
k (years) δ28 δ35 δ36 δ37 δ38 δall
0 0.082 0.106 0.114 0.072 0.135 0.110
1 0.133 0.168 0.176 0.123 0.207 0.176
2 0.158 0.192 0.196 0.155 0.240 0.205
3 0.161 0.186 0.183 0.170 0.244 0.205
4 0.147 0.157 0.146 0.171 0.174 0.177
5 0.121 0.115 0.095 0.162 0.127
6 0.086 0.076 0.050 0.147
7 0.060 0.040
8 0.052
Table A1 shows the estimated amortization rates as reported in table 3 in Lev and Sougiannis (1996, pg. 121). k represents
each year of useful life for the R&D investment. For each industry, denoted by the subscript, the variable δ is the amortization
rate that corresponds to each k.
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Table C1: State variables’ VAR(1) model using monthly data
ReM,t+1 PEt+1 TYt+1 V St+1 DEFt+1
c 0.056*** 0.015 -0.025 0.027 0.050
(3.07) (1.46) (-0.18) (0.72) (1.14)
ReM,t 0.104* 0.515*** -0.212 -0.019 -1.085***
(1.88) (13.50) (-0.77) (-0.46) (-4.92)
PEt -0.015*** 0.995*** 0.011 0.005 -0.022*
(-2.76) (323.98) (0.32) (0.440) (-1.66)
TYt 0.003* 0.001 0.937*** -0.001 0.000
(1.62) (1.04) (60.25) (-0.58) (-0.09)
V St -0.006 -0.004 0.016 0.968*** 0.045**
(-0.75) (-0.81) (0.48) (89.93) (2.05)
DEFt -0.003 0.002 0.059*** 0.013* 0.950***
(-0.31) (0.46) (2.50) (1.76) (39.42)
Adj.R2 1.90% 99.07% 90.70% 95.97% 96.03%
F 4.94** 21,813.80*** 1,988.64*** 4,850.77*** 4,934.70***
The entries report results from the state variables’ VAR(1) of equation (2.4). This is, zt+1 = c+ Γzt + υt+1 where zt is
the k × 1 vector of state variables at time t(k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), c is the k × 1 vector of constants, Γ is the k×k matrix of
slope coefficients and υt+1 is the k×1 vector of residuals. Estimated coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses,
adjusted R2 and F -statistic are reported. The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient and the F -statistic
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for any given equation within the VAR(1) are jointly equal to zero. [*], [**]
and [***] asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample spans the
period from January 1929 to December 2013 (1020 monthly observations).
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Table C2: State variables’ VAR(1) model using annually data
ReM,t+1 PEt+1 TYt+1 V St+1 DEFt+1
c 0.946*** 0.633** -0.898 0.140 -0.593
(2.95) (2.07) (-1.08) (0.86) (-0.81)
ReM,t -0.115 -0.053 -0.218 0.024 -0.248
(-1.29) (-0.62) (-0.67) (0.26) (-1.11)
PEt -0.244*** 0.827*** 0.205 0.038 0.124
(-2.57) (9.47) (0.87) (0.74) (0.72)
TYt 0.037** 0.024 0.397*** -0.020 -0.047
(2.05) (1.37) (6.09) (-1.31) (-1.06)
V St -0.103 -0.097 0.622** 0.808*** 0.450**
(-1.47) (-1.29) (2.00) (8.93) (2.16)
DEFt -0.056 -0.001 0.215 0.087** 0.606***
(-1.08) (-0.03) (1.28) (1.95) (4.86)
Adj.R2 11.05% 67.68% 30.24% 79.65% 50.64%
F 3.06** 37.76*** 8.02*** 65.99*** 18.03***
The entries report results from the annual frequency market-level state variables’ VAR(1) of equation (3.11). This
is, zt+1 = c+ Γzt + υt+1 where zt is the k× 1 vector of state variables at time t(k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), c is the k× 1 vec-
tor of constants, Γ is the k×k matrix of slope coefficients and υt+1 is the k × 1 vector of residuals. The estimated
coefficients, Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, adjusted R2 and F -statistic are reported. The t-statistic tests
the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient and the F -statistic tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for any
given equation within the VAR(1) are jointly equal to zero. [*], [**] and [***] indicate significance levels of 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively. The sample spans the period from June 1929 to June 2012 (84 annually observations).
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